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Abstract 
 
In my doctoral thesis I evaluate strategies designed to cope with the 
multicultural nature of four European nations: Great Britain, The 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. I also analyse and clarify the question of 
the place of religion in present-day Europe. The empirical material analysed 
in the study consists of politicians’ statements and policy documents dealing 
with immigration policy and religious and values education in the four 
countries. In addition, I analyse statements issued by the Council of Europe 
regarding religious education, along with all cases relevant to religious 
education brought before the United Nations Human Rights Committee or the 
European Court of Human Rights.  
The theoretical framework is formed by the scholarly debate – among 
philosophers, sociologists and scholars of religion in education – concerning 
the question of a just society. Special emphasis is given to philosophical 
theories that are in favour of granting special group rights to religious 
minorities in the name of equal treatment. With regard to the question of the 
appropriate place of religion, I apply Kim Knott’s methodological model for 
locating religion in secular contexts, and Émile Durkheim’s theory as to the 
significance of religion and collective sentiments in uniting adherents or 
members of a group into a single moral community.  
The study shows that even when the positive side of immigration, as a 
potential force for the enrichment of the public culture, is acknowledged, 
there is anxiety as to the successful integration of immigrants. The premises 
and goals of immigration policies have also been questioned. One central 
problem is the incommensurability between the values upheld by Western 
liberal democracies and certain religious traditions, above all those of Islam. 
Great Britain, The Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark have tightened control 
over their citizens’ ethical attitudes and want to regulate these as well. In 
coping with cultural diversity, the significance of education, especially 
religious education, plays a significant role; as future citizens, pupils are 
expected to internalise the society’s core values as well as gaining an 
understanding of different cultures and ways of life. It is also worth noting 
that both the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights 
have recently expressed the view that one important goal of religious 
education is to enable pupils to be critical and autonomous with regard to 
different religions and moral positions. 
The study shows that religion is not seen as purely a personal matter. 
Religion is closely linked to individual and national identity, and religious 
traditions thus have a place in the public domain. It should be noted, 
however, that a religious tradition – more precisely, an interpretation of 
religious tradition – qualifies as a legitimate partner in the democratic 
decision-making process only if it shares similar values with Western 
European nations. 
 
Key words: religion, multicultural society, cultural diversity, plurality, 
liberalism, core values, social cohesion, religious education, values 
education, liberalism, assimilation, sacred, Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
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Framing the research problems 
Since the 1960s, many European nation-states have experienced large-scale 
immigration (see e.g. Boswell 2005, 2).1 Immigration has made these 
societies more plural, in the sense that along with the majority culture they 
now include representatives of different religions and ethnic groups, whose 
presence is furthermore more visible than ever before.2 The flow of people of 
various origins has “changed cultural landscapes and turned ethnically more 
or less homogeneous nation-states, some more and some less, into 
multiethnic and multicultural societies” (Anttonen 2005, 95). In addition, 
almost all multicultural societies contain large diasporic communities “that 
are held together less by secular ties of citizenship than by a shared religious 
culture” (Turner 2011, viii). The diversity of comprehensive religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines is expected to be a permanent feature of 
Western nation-states (see e.g. Rawls 1993, xvi-xvii). 
With regard to their treatment of their citizens3, European democracies 
are committed to two basic liberal principles: respect for both the freedom 
and the equality of every individual. It is also the duty of the state to ensure 
                                                
1 All European states are net immigration countries. In countries such as France, 
Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and 
Denmark, this has been the case since at least the 1960s (Boswell 2005, 2). Statistics 
published by Eurostat (2010, 189) show that in 2008 the population of EU-27 countries 
grew by 2.1 million inhabitants, with the majority of this increase – more than seven out 
of ten persons (72 %) – composed of migrants. The most significant numbers of third-
country nationals residing in the EU are citizens of Turkey, Morocco, Albania and China 
(ibid, 192). 
2 I use the terms ’majority’ and ’minority’ as sociological terms, referring to the number 
of inhabitants within a particular nation-state. I use the terms ‘plurality’ and ‘diversity’ 
synonymously. For example Jackson (2007; 2004a) uses these terms in this manner. In 
the documents that I analyse, especially those from Great Britain, ‘diversity’ is used more 
often; that is why I chose to apply this term in the title of this thesis. The terms ‘cultural 
diversity’ and ‘cultural plurality’ refer to the fact that in multicultural societies different 
religions, customs and value systems are represented. 
3 In this thesis, the term ’citizen’ is used for the sake of simplicity to refer to all those 
persons permanently or quasi-permanently resident in a country, whether or not they are 




that free and equal citizens are able to govern cooperatively, while at the 
same time each individual can also promote those ends that he or she sees as 
valuable. However, harmony among citizens in culturally plural societies is 
put to the test because opinions as to what constitutes a good life, about right 
and wrong, vary greatly. There are tensions among the adherents of various 
faiths, ideologies, lifestyles and practices (see e.g. Thorseth 1999, 11).4 
The incommensurability of different modes of living has been an 
integral part of the debate over immigration and the success of various 
European governments’ immigration policies.5 An illuminating example of 
this is Paul Scheffer’s column ‘Multicultural drama’ (Het multiculturele 
drama) (2000) in the Netherlands’ leading newspaper NRC Handelsblad, in 
which he argued that the Dutch immigration policy has failed. According to 
Scheffer, the same kind of peaceful reconciliation between denominational 
groups that has taken place between Catholics and Protestants, even though 
these groups were once deeply divided, has not succeeded with certain 
immigrant groups. He argued that immigrants do not feel attached to Dutch 
culture and society, and are unwilling to integrate into the society and adopt 
its norms. (Enzinger 2006, 128.) Criticism questioning the success of a 
nation’s immigration policy can also be found in other European countries 
that have been open to large-scale immigration (Boswell 2005, 5).6 
Many of the tensions among citizens are related in particular to religion 
(Turner 2011; Casanova 2009). There are for example religious groups that 
want to live by ideals that according to them cannot be questioned; in other 
words, their ideals are treated as sacred, infallible, or beyond critical 
argument. It is obvious that members of these groups want to raise their 
children to respect their own practices and norms. (See e.g. Galston 1995; 
Halstead 1995; Tamir 1995.) On the other hand, the majority of citizens do 
not consider certain practices legitimate: for example placing autocratic 
constraints on individuals, maintaining gender inequality, or keeping children 
ignorant or giving them a distorted picture of other ways of life. And it is 
specifically Islamic beliefs and practices that have recently been singled out 
as incompatible with liberal democratic and human-rights standards in 
European countries. In particular right-wing populists have been openly 
critical or even hostile to Muslims in Europe. (Boswell 2005, 10.)  
Empirical research has confirmed that religion is widely seen as one 
important source of conflict among citizens. For example, in his article ‘The 
Religious Situation in Europe’, José Casanova (2009, 223-224) writes that 
“[t]he overwhelming majority, practically over two thirds of the population in 
                                                
4 It should be noted that difference as such is not a source of conflict (see e.g. Barry 2001, 
24). I return to tensions among citizens several times in this thesis. 
5 The term ‘immigration policy’ refers here to practical solutions for the incorporation of 
migrant populations into the society. In Chapters 2 and 3 I give a detailed picture of the 
ways in which immigration has proved problematic. 





every Western European country, agrees that religion is ‘intolerant’, and a 
majority in every Western European country, except Norway and Sweden, 
shares the view that ‘religion creates conflict’.”7  
The terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 marked a sea change in how 
the presence of religions is perceived by the public and the media. For 
example, according to Loraine Sheridan’s (2002) study in Britain after 9/11, 
Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus have reported increased experiences of implicit 
racism. The greatest increase was reported by Muslims. An interesting 
finding in the same study was that at the same time Christians and Jews 
reported a decline in experiences of implicit racism. Sheridan (2002) sums up 
her findings: 
 
Overall, results would suggest that significant world events do 
impact on racial and religious prejudice and on discriminatory 
actions, and that religion is more important than ethnicity in 
indicating which groups are most likely to experience racism and 
discrimination post-September 11th. ... Religion appeared to trigger 
both implicit racism and general discrimination to a greater extent 
than did race or ethnicity. 
 
Perhaps it is an exaggeration to speak of a ‘moral panic’8 that Europe is 
currently facing, but it does seem that tolerance, the foundational value of 
liberalism, “has declined significantly in many European countries” (Turner 
2011, 169). In his book Religion and Modern Society (2011), Bryan S. Turner 
writes that in a globalising context divisions between religions have increased 
rather than diminished, and that “there is a danger that multicultural societies 
will become enclave societies” (Turner 2011, 174). In this sense religious 
diversity is a serious political problem (Turner 2011, 175), and one which has 
been recognised by the governments of European countries and by regional 
actors such as the Council of Europe.9 Various programmes have been 
launched in order to make things better. It is this challenge that has served as 
motivation for the present study. What is needed to make things better? What 
                                                
7 However, as Barry (2001, 24) points out “there is nothing inherent in the phenomenon 
of religion as such that inevitably leads to conflict between adherents of different deities, 
cults or sects.” 
8 For example Ellie Vasta (2007, 713) argues that “[r]ecently in numerous European 
countries of immigration, there has been a widespread ‘moral panic’ about immigrants 
and ethnic diversity.” 
9 The Council is an inter-governmental organisation, founded in 1949. It currently 
comprises 47 member states; its aims include protecting human rights, pluralist 
democracy and the rule of law as well as seeking solutions to problems such as 
discrimination against minorities, xenophobia and intolerance. 
The Council of Europe’s most famous achievement is the European Convention on 
Human Rights, adopted in 1950 following a report by the Council of Europe's 
Parliamentary Assembly. The Convention created the European Court of Human Rights in 




is actually being done to make things better?  
With regard to these questions, there is an important dimension to be 
taken into account. In 2001 the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers10 
issued a recommendation to its (then) 43 member states: 
 
[w]here religious pluralism gives rise to religious divisions, with 
attendant tensions, the public authorities’ response should not be to 
eliminate religious pluralism, but to strive to ensure that the various 
groups respect each other. ... On this basis, the Committee concurs 
with the Assembly that member states have a responsibility to ensure 
conditions conducive to the preservation of harmonious relations 
between religions and between the latter and other sectors of civil 
society. They must also ensure, respecting the principle of equality 
before the law, that different religions can coexist and develop 
peacefully. (Council of Europe 2001.) 
 
The core of the above quotation is that, while there is a need to create 
conditions that enable the construction of harmonious relationships and 
mutual respect among citizens, this should be done in such a way that 
plurality is meaningfully maintained; or, to put it in other words, that no life 
choices are discriminated against. This gives rise to a further question: How 
do different nations currently promote peaceful co-existence in such a way 
that equality among citizens is (maximally) ensured?  
 
 
Main goals of the study  
For the purposes of my enquiry, I have selected four nations – Great Britain, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark – that have been open to large-scale 
immigration of people who differ – ethnically, culturally and very often 
religiously – from the majority of the society.11 In addition, I examine the 
Council of Europe, which as a regional actor aims at influencing its member 
nations.  
I have five general aims in this study: 
 
(i) to present and analyse the strategies these countries have used and 
are currently using in dealing with cultural and religious diversity;12 
                                                
10 The Committee of Ministers is the Council of Europe’s decision-making body. It 
consists of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of all the member states, or their permanent 
diplomatic representatives in Strasbourg. (Council of Europe 2011b.) 
11 I use this order systematically throughout this thesis. Later in this chapter I discuss why 
I have selected these particular countries and discuss their similarities and differences in 
the light of my interests in this thesis. 
12 Turner (2011, 175) writes that all multicultural societies are “by definition multi-faith 






(ii) more specifically, to see what kinds of changes have been suggested 
and/or made in these countries’ educational systems, in order to 
achieve a more tolerant and harmonious society;  
(iii) to explore the content and aims of ethical and values education; 
(iv) to compare different strategies adopted by these countries; 
(v) finally, with regard to the actions of the Council of Europe, I explore 
its perception of the role of education, in particular religious 
education, as a means of making Europe a more tolerant region. 
 
Since the starting premise in this study is that one source of conflict among 
citizens in a multicultural society is the presence of religions, I focus on the 
question of what is regarded as the ‘appropriate’ place of religion in 
contemporary Europe. With regard to this question, I explore the following 
issues: 
 
(vi) to what extent space is allotted for religion in the state and its public 
affairs (particularly in the field of education); 
(vii) what expectations and responsibilities are placed on citizens in 
general and religious citizens in particular;  
(viii) how the domain of the ‘secular’ is preserved from the impact of the 
domain of the ‘religious’. 
 
Below I explain my choices with regard to research questions, discuss 
the context of the research, and describe my detailed research strategy. 
 
 
Religion in education as a highly topical issue  
An analysis of educational arrangements that deal with the multi-religious 
nature of a society is of importance for (at least) three reasons. First of all, as 
Robert Jackson (2004a, 4) points out, political debates about religion in 
education reflect “wider controversies about national and transnational 
identity, ethnic identity, the perpetuation of culture and values”. Solutions 
and suggestions as to how to make education respond better to the challenge 
of cultural plurality are an important part of governments’ overall policy of 
dealing with difference. According to Jackson, such questions as ‘What 
should be the aims and methods of religious education?’ and ‘Ought children 
from different religious and non-religious backgrounds be taught together in 
the same schools, or should children from families with a particular religious 
background be taught in separate faith-based schools?’ are of importance to 
all Western democracies. It is important to note, as I show in this thesis, that 
there is a widespread controversy as to the right solutions to these questions.  
Secondly, issues relating to religion in education are topical because in 
recent years there has been increased international interest with regard to this 




factor in international relations and in the process of globalization”, its 
educational provision cannot be viewed in isolation, as solely a matter of a 
nation’s own choice.  
Thirdly, as it is the case that all nations have the implicit goal, at least to 
a certain degree, of overcoming diversity and standardising their citizens 
(Anttonen 1996, 69; Robertson 1990, 49), education is an important 
institution in producing ‘suitable’ and in some respects identical future 
citizens. Religious education plays an important role in this process, since it 
is often charged with the responsibility for transmitting the society’s core 
values. As Sakaranaho (2006, 315) writes, “[i]t is not an exaggeration to say 
that religious education, in particular, is one of the last bastions of national 
norms and values, which a society is adamant to transfer from one generation 
to other”. My interest in this matter derives from the fact that many 
immigrant parents  
 
experience a contradiction between the values and the world views of 
the school and home. The parents generally agree with the so-called 
instrumental culture of formal education, consisting of ‘skills, 
competences and social behaviours that are required to successfully 
make a living and contribute to society’ (Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-
Orozco 2001: 156). However, the problem lies in the expressive 
culture of schools, pertaining to ‘the realm of values, worldviews and 
patterning of interpersonal relations that give meaning and sustain 
the sense of self’ (Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-Orozco 2001: 156), 
which is seen to contradict the expressive culture at home. 
(Sakaranaho 2006, 316; italics in original.) 
 
It is Muslims in particular who are afraid of losing their children to the 
dominant culture, and who believe that the ‘neutral’ knowledge given 
children in schools is expected “to accomplish a kind of brain-washing 
intended to discredit Islam” (Maréchal 2003, 33). 
It is interesting to explore in what respects the needs of the parents are 
taken into account, and how nations’ own interests with regard to values and 
moral education are interpreted. Throughout history, parents have had almost 
unconditional authority over their under-age children with regard to moral 
education or passing on their own life values and beliefs. As Barry (2001, 
205) writes, “it is assumed without question that parents are at liberty to 
enroll their children in their own faith and subject them to its teachings”. At 
least three reasons for this can be given. First of all, in order to retain 
neutrality and respect parents’ freedom of conscience and association, the 
state must avoid taking sides in matters of religion. Children adopt a certain 
religious way of life by participating in their parents’ daily activities. In fact, 
it is inevitable that parental practices relating to religious faith will have an 





Secondly, it is in the children’s interest as well that their parents can 
initiate them into their way of life. Since children are dependent upon their 
parents, the latter are justified in giving their children a stable and coherent 
primary culture. The religious traditions to which parents are committed 
involve a range of social practices, attitudes, rituals etc. that children adopt 
and learn to see as legitimate.  
Thirdly, it is in children’s interest to have a coherent belief system as a 
starting point for their moral development. Richard Shweder (1991; cited in 
Feinberg 1995, 212), writes that “children’s emerging moral understandings 
are the product of continuous participation in social practices (the mundane 
rituals of everyday lives), and those socially produced and reproduced 
understandings are the grounding for later attempts reflexively or self-
consciously to reconstruct their own moral code.”  
Similarly, Gerald Dworkin (1988, 37) argues that 
 
[m]oral reform takes place against a background of accepted 
understandings about our moral relationships with one another. And 
these are not invented. Moral reforms (almost?) always take the form 
of attacking inconsistencies in the accepted moral framework, 
refusals to extend rights and privileges that are seen as legitimate 
already. 
 
Thus it could be argued that a parent also has the right for example to shield 
the child from a group of adults “ringing the door simultaneously, each 
demanding the right to provide different moral vocabularies and 
environments within which the child may understand his resistance to his 
primary culture” (Ackerman 1980, 150). 
The question of the rights of a parent in moral and values education in a 
culturally plural society has been widely discussed among scholars of 
political philosophy and religious education. In Chapters 4 and 5 I present the 
main arguments concerning this topic and explore how the matter is resolved 
in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. 
 
 
Selection of the countries for the analysis: Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark 
For my enquiry I have selected four European nations: Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. These four countries have been open to 
the large-scale immigration of people who differ ethnically, culturally, and 
religiously from the majority of the society.13 I ended up with these countries 
                                                
13 I give relevant information about the history of immigration in these four countries in 
Chapter 2. As background information, the following statistical information is relevant: in 
Great Britain in 2008 the non-white population (mixed, Asian, Chinese, Black, other) was 




for several reasons. First of all, I wanted to analyse and compare European 
nations that have experienced particularly high levels of immigration since 
the 1990s. In addition to these four nations, five others – Austria, France, 
Germany, Norway and Switzerland – have also received vast numbers of 
immigrants in the past two decades (see e.g. Boswell 2005, 2). Secondly, I 
wanted to include nations that have not only applied different strategies in 
dealing with cultural diversity and immigration over the past four decades, 
but also differ in the ways religious education is currently organised.14 
Thirdly, as a scholar from Finland, I wanted to place special emphasis 
on the Nordic countries. This is due in particular to the fact that (as yet at 
least) Finland has far fewer immigrants, especially from non-Western 
countries, than Sweden, Denmark or Norway (Sisäasiainministeriö 2011, 3);15 
religious education is likewise organised differently from these countries. 
The two issues are interconnected; if the number of immigrants should rise, 
as it is expected to, this would exert pressure to change the existing system of 
providing religious education (see Kallioniemi 2007). Although in Finland, 
as in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the state is responsible for the 
organisation of religious education and the subject is taught non-
confessionally, the main difference is that in Finland pupils attend different 
RE classes according to the family’s religious affiliation (Luodeslampi 
2007); in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, in contrast, all pupils attend the 
same RE classes (Larsson 2007; Monrad 2007; Leganger-Krogstad 2007). In 
other words, in Sweden, Denmark and Norway all pupils receive a similar RE 
content. If the number of adherents of different religions should rise in 
Finland, however, this would not only make the current system difficult to 
implement in practice but also would raise questions as to the aims and 
methods of religious education (Kallioniemi 2007, 110). It is worth noting 
that the question of how RE should be organised is the subject of constant 
debate in Finland, both among the general public and among scholars of 
religious studies (see e.g. Komulainen 2012; Kamppinen 2005). For future 
approaches to RE in Finland, it is thus important to evaluate different 
alternatives in a wider context. 
                                                
almost 72% were Christian while 2.7% were Muslims (Lankshear 2007, 217). In the 
Netherlands in 2008 the non-white population was around 13% (Migration Policy 
Institute 2011). Christians formed 27% and Muslims 6% of the total population (Kuyk 
2007, 135). In Sweden 80% of the population are Christians and 2% Muslims (Larsson 
2007, 193). In Denmark around 81% of all citizens are members of the Danish National 
Church [Lutheran] and 3% are Muslims (Monrad 2007, 49). 
14 See e.g. Janoski’s & Hicks’s (1994, 8-9) model of a comparative research project. The 
second phase of the research, the method of difference, “is the selection of countries that 
have similar features on some variables but are different on other critical variables” (ibid, 
15). 
15 In 2010 in Finland approximately 3% of all population were foreigners; 65% of these 





As noted above, apart from the Nordic countries, along with Great 
Britain and the Netherlands four other countries – Austria, France, Germany, 
and Switzerland – have also received significant number of immigrants over 
the past two decades. France was automatically deselected from this research 
because there is no place for religious education in state-maintained schools 
(Schreiner 2007a, 10). In considering which two of the remaining five 
countries to choose I found that both the Netherlands’ history of dealing with 
diversity in during the past century and its immigration policy over the past 
several decades differed fundamentally from those of the others. First of all, 
from the last quarter of the nineteenth century down to the late 1970s the 
Netherlands has had a unique institutional arrangement, known as 
‘pillarization’ (verzuiling), according to which the population was “divided 
into different social segments on the basis of their moral and/or religious 
views” (Spiecker and Steutel 2001, 294).16 Secondly, its official immigration 
policy in the 1980s was based on a strategy according to which immigrants 
were defined by their collective identities (see e.g. Soysal 1994, 46).  
Of the rest of the countries, I ended up with Great Britain because, in 
contrast to the Netherlands, its policy of dealing with immigration has been 
more individual-oriented and decentralised (Soysal 1994, 52). More 
importantly, Britain’s provision of RE is closer to realistic future scenarios 
for Finland than those of Austria, Germany or Switzerland. In Britain, within 
the state maintained system, the subject is centrally regulated, non-
confessional and uniform, in the sense that all students attend the same 
classes, while the system of providing RE and its content in the other three 
countries is not centrally regulated and contains both confessional and non-
confessional approaches (Kallioniemi 2007, 105-108; Kilchsperger 2007; 
Lankshear 2007; Pollitt 2007; Schreiner 2007b).17  
Of the Nordic countries, I ended up with Sweden and Denmark. Sweden 
was an obvious choice because its earliest official immigration policy was 
based on a strategy in which immigrants were defined by their collective 
identities. (See e.g. Soysal 1994, 46.) This took place a decade before the 
Netherlands. No other Nordic country has had a similar arrangement. I chose 
Denmark rather than Norway because Norwegian scholars have already 
provided analyses of Norway’s educational choices in response to concerns 
over disintegration. For example Geir Skeie (2006a, 22) argues that Norway 
                                                
16 It is worth noting that this arrangement accommodated mainly Protestants and 
Catholics. I return to this Dutch arrangement in Chapter 2. 
17 Germany is divided into sixteen states (Länder), without any standard model of 
educational provision that an individual state is required to follow (Schreiner 2007b, 82). 
In Austria RE is confessional subject in which “[t]he confession of the students, of the 
RE-teacher and of the type of RE has to correspond” (Pollit 2007, 18-19). In Switzerland 
RE is taught in many different ways, under many different names and with different 
providers. A given system may include both confessional and non-confessional 




has emphasised “a ‘cultural’ and ecumenical version of Christianity, used as 
a kind of ‘civil religion’”, while Bjørg Gundem and Berit Karseth (1998, 10) 
write that Norway is relying “on a monocultural identity of a society”.  
To sum up the historical differences among these four nations, before 
outlining their differences with respect to religious education: First, we can 
note that as old colonial powers Great Britain and the Netherlands have long 
been in contact with different customs and religions (see e.g. Davie 2006, 31; 
Spiecker and Steutel 2001, 294). Sweden and Denmark, in contrast, have 
been distinctively homogeneous nations, at least from the religious point of 
view; they have both had very powerful Evangelical-Lutheran traditions. 
Lutheranism became the official religion in the sixteenth century, and down 
to the late eighteenth century it was the only legal religion. After religious 
emancipation, Roman Catholicism, the Reformed Church, and Judaism were 
allowed to function in society. Until the recent immigration from non-
Western countries, these three denominations were practically the only non-
Lutheran religions practiced in Sweden and Denmark.  
More importantly, there are significant differences in the policies these 
nations have applied in dealing with cultural plurality and immigration over 
recent decades. As mentioned, in the 1970s in Sweden and the 1980s in the 
Netherlands the official immigration policy was based on a strategy whereby 
immigrants were defined by their collective identities. The policy discourses 
in both countries’ referred to ‘ethnic minorities’ (Soysal 1994, 46). Britain 
and Denmark, on the other hand, have had no such arrangement; in other 
words, immigrants have not been regarded in terms of their collective 
standing but as individuals (Soysal 1994, 52). With regard to these 
differences, my interest in comparing these countries departs from Yasemin 
N. Soysal’s idea, formulated in her book Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and 
Postnational Membership (1994), that the framework of national citizenship 
has been replaced with a more universal model, known as ‘postnational 
citizenship’. Soysal (1994, 3; 136-140) argues that the ‘narrative’ of 
nationhood has increasingly been replaced by a ‘narrative’ of human rights in 
political discourse on individual rights. The point is that rights are no longer 
linked to national or cultural identity but to humanity; in other words, to the 
fact that one is a human being. Thus we can ask whether the case is similar in 
policies dealing with cultural difference, and if so, what this means in 
practice.  
With regard to differences between Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Denmark in their past and present organisation of religious 
education, there are a few points to be taken into account.18 In England 
                                                
18 In Great Britain each individual ‘country’ or part, i.e. England, Wales and Scotland, has its 
own educational system under separate government. In this thesis I focus on the educational 







religious education has been a compulsory subject within the state-
maintained system since 1944. In 1943 the Board of Education presented a 
White Paper entitled ‘Educational Reconstruction’, suggesting that religious 
education should be given a greater place in schools as a means of reviving 
the spiritual and personal values of society.19 While the subject was 
compulsory, a ‘conscience clause’ in the legislation gave parents the option 
to withdraw their children from religious worship or education. (Louden 
2004, 276.) 
For the first few decades after 1944 Christianity held a privileged 
position in the syllabus (Kay 2000, 12-14), but from the 1970s onward other 
religions began to establish a stable place in the National Curriculum for 
state-funded schools. Their representatives also have had the possibility of 
participating in Agreed Syllabus Conferences. (Miedena 2007, 275.)  
In 1988 the new Education Act further strengthened the place of religion 
in schools. The name of the subject was changed from ‘Religious Instruction’ 
to ‘Religious Education’. (Lankshear 2007, 218-220.) In an article entitled 
‘Religious Education in England and Wales’, David W. Lankshear (2007, 
220) writes that “students experiencing the programme will be enabled to 
become well informed members of multi-faith and multi-cultural society who 
are able to respect the views, practices and beliefs of others.” This quotation 
quite clearly reflects the idea that RE has an important function in a culturally 
plural society. It is worth mentioning that parents have the right to opt their 
children out of the subject without giving any reason for their choice 
(Lankshear 2007, 219). 
The organisation of RE of the Netherlands differs significantly from 
Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark in two ways. First of all, until 1985 the 
state did not have any responsibility for the organisation of religious 
education. Schools had, and still have, the possibility of asking churches or 
other religious groups to provide RE on a voluntary basis, for those children 
who want to attend these lessons. In many schools religious education has 
had a confessional character, but more recently the approach has shifted 
towards a more multicultural and inter-religious approach. (Kuyk 2007, 136-
137.) 
In 1985 the government decided that a new and obligatory subject, under 
the name of ’Religious and Ideological Movements’, should be introduced in 
the curriculum of all primary schools, whether state or private. The 
government wanted pupils to gain some knowledge of the main belief 
systems of the world religions: their beliefs, practices, norms and values. This 
was seen as a precondition for adequate participation as citizens in a 
pluralistic Dutch society. (Kuyk 2007, 136; Miedena 2007, 272-276.) The 
                                                
19 Such a proposal serves as a prime example of the kind of religious education that tries 




new subject, however, did not need the formal status of an independent 
subject, and was often integrated into other subjects. 
A second difference is that prior to 2003 the Dutch Educational 
Inspectorate did not spell out any guidelines as to how to teach religion, and 
the schools have had great freedom in deciding the actual content and 
approach. Since 2003, the content and implementation of RE have been 
under stricter control by the authorities, but there are still no centrally 
dictated curricula or syllabi for the subject. (Miedena 2007, 276.) The subject 
is not compulsory; rather, pupils are guaranteed the possibility of attending 
RE classes if they so wish. (Kuyk 2007, 137.)  
Of the four countries, the Swedish system is most centrally regulated 
and has the longest tradition – dating from the late 1960s – of providing a 
separate, non-confessional subject. The subject, Knowledge of Religion 
(Religionskunskap) is taught in all primary and secondary schools, with 
syllabi provided by the Swedish National Agency for Education. The subject 
is obligatory for all pupils.20 Furthermore, private schools also are subject to 
the same legal requirements regarding RE curricula and syllabi. In faith-
based private schools this special religious character has to be expressed in 
other areas of school life.  
In terms of content, the focus of RE in Sweden is on questions 
concerning the life (life questions), ethics, beliefs and tradition. The content 
clearly reflects the goals and interests of society, along with the personal 
development of the individual student. According to Rune Larsson (2007, 
196), ”RE is seen as a resource for the children to broaden and deepen their 
experience and thinking, to train their ability for critical reflection on 
existential, religious, and ethical questions and develop their competence as 
reasonable citizens.” Thus, similarly to England, religious education is 
considered to play an important role in creating future citizens.  
In Denmark the public schools (Folkeskole)21 have shared responsibility 
for ‘Christian nurture’ with the Church of Denmark. Since 1975 the school 
system has had the responsibility for passing on knowledge and enabling 
cultural individualisation. The subject, under the name of Knowledge about 
Christianity (Kristendomskundskab), is non-confessional, with an academic 
approach aimed at passing on information about Christianity as well as other 
religions. (Monrad 2007, 49-51.) The Danish Ministry of Education provides 
guidelines as to the purpose of different subjects and sets short- and long-
term goals. The difference compared to Sweden is that the curriculum is 
established by individual schools and has to be accepted by the municipal 
council. The content consists of four ‘central areas and skills’. These include 
                                                
20 Until 1997 the Education Act gave the pupils or the parents a limited right to opt out of 
RE. In 1997 this right was withdrawn. (Larsson 2007, 194.) 
21 ‘Public school’ in the American sense, not the British one. The literal meaning is 





non-Christian religions and other life philosophies/ethics. However, 
especially in the case of younger pupils the main emphasis is on Christianity. 
Similarly to England, and unlike Sweden, the subject has an exemption 
clause: by the parental request a pupil can be exempted from attending the 
subject. (Monrad 2007, 51-52.) 
To sum up: in relation to the research questions of this thesis, the 
similarities and differences described above provide an interesting starting 
point for the exploration and comparison of these four countries. Since the 
motivational background of the study is derived from the evident difficulty of 
peaceful co-existence among citizens in culturally plural societies, my main 
focus will be on general solutions and patterns designed to promote unity 
among members of a given society.  
 
 
The context of the study 
The Council of Europe and the European Union aiming for stronger 
uniformity 
With regard to the regional context of the research, two points need to be 
made. The first is the explicit aim of achieving a certain uniformity within 
plurality in Europe. The second concerns the definition of European identity 
and its relation to the recognition of ‘others’, i.e. of those who have come to 
live in Europe from non-Western countries. The two points are closely 
connected. 
All Western European countries are members of the Council of Europe, 
which is committed to protecting the principles of human rights, pluralist 
democracy, and the rule of law. In the Council these “fundamental values” 
are regarded as “the foundations of a tolerant and civilized society and 
indispensable for European stability, economic growth and social cohesion.” 
(Council of Europe 2011a.) 
The aim of uniformity is also characteristic of the European Union, 
whose member states have taken steps towards integration at the political, 
economic and cultural level (Anttonen 2005, 96). It is worth noting that for a 
long time the real goals of European integration were not actively discussed, 
since the process was mainly seen as a functional development (Mikkeli 
1998). Commonly agreed values have nevertheless been seen as essential 
building blocks in the process of building a ‘new Europe’ (Laffan 1996, 83). 
In the past two decades, there has also been interest within the European 
Union in bringing about greater uniformity among the member states in terms 
of immigrant integration. According to Maria Teresa Bia (2004, 6), the 
European Union did not originally have any rule aimed at promoting 
supranational authority in matters of immigration and asylum policy. It was 
the achievement of the free movement of persons within the European Single 




for a common EU policy to complement national policies, which were 
proving inadequate to deal efficiently with immigration in an area without 
borders.” In 1999 the member states agreed, in the Tampere European 
Council Conclusions, on the need for more vigorous integration policies that 
would ensure the fair treatment of immigrants from outside the EU who were 
legally living in an EU country (Niessen & Huddleston 2009, 15).  
It was not until 2004 that the European Council produced a document, 
entitled ‘Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the 
European Union’. This document states that immigrant integration is “a 
dynamic, long-term, and continuous two-way process of mutual 
accommodation, not a static outcome” (Council of European Union 2004, par 
1). It is also seen as necessary that local residents should be in frequent and 
meaningful interaction (Council of European Union 2004, par 7). An 
important target of the policy is to prevent the isolation of immigrant groups 
(Council of European Union 2004, par 2).  
In 2007 the EU’s vision for future immigration policy was presented 
within the Commission communication ‘Towards a Common Immigration 
Policy’. The document states that “[a] successful immigration policy requires 
a committed and consistent policy at both national and EU levels” (European 
Union 2007). In 2008 the European Union produced a communication 
entitled ‘A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Action and 
Tools’, stating that immigration may have positive potential but that this will 
be realised only on condition that integration into the host society is 
successful. What is required is “an approach which does not only look at the 
benefit for the host society but takes also account of the interests of the 
immigrants.” (European Union 2008, 3.) 
With regard to European identity, it should be noted that there is 
constant and ongoing debate over the question what Europe actually is. As 
Pertti Anttonen (2005, 99) writes, Europe has become “a popular frame of 
reference, making the idea and concept of Europe a topic of constant 
discussion and definition.” The question has been raised, however, as to how 
in a situation of increased cultural plurality the ‘others’, i.e. newcomers, 
members of ethnic and religious minorities, should be taken into account. 
Amin Ash (2004), for example, distinguishes between the old idea of Europe 
and that of a new, multi-ethnic Europe. When describing the old idea of 
Europe Ash writes that  
 
[t]he prevailing idea of Europe is based on four myths of origin: first, 
the supremacy of a legal system based on Roman law; second, an 
ethos of social solidarity and common understanding based on 
Christian piety and humanism; third, a democratic order rooted in 
recognition of the rights and freedoms of the individual; and fourth, a 
universalism based on Reason and other Enlightenment principles of 






Ash (2004, 6-8) argues for a new ‘common ideal’, “a new imaginary of 
European belonging”, in which Europe is recognised as a region of “multiple 
and mobile identities ... moving towards cosmopolitan attachments.” I return 
to the question of ‘ideas’ of Europe in the next chapter. 
 
 
Religious landscape of Western Europe 
The religious field of Europe has become fragmented, and is continuously 
becoming more so (Sakaranaho 2006, 19). There are two parallel processes 
taking place: secularisation and pluralisation (Sakaranaho 2006, 19; Draulans 
& Halman 2003, 371-372). The secularisation thesis, in its simplest form, 
says that there has been a decline in the influence of organised religion 
(Bruce 1996), and/or in religious belief and practice (see Turner 2011, 106). 
According to Turner (2011, 9-10), in the 1960s the secularisation paradigm 
became popular among academic sociologists; in the 1970s and 80s the 
importance of religion as a central topic in sociology came under question, 
since in keeping with modernisation theory it was assumed that religion no 
longer played a significant role in social organisation. Today, however, it is 
widely held among scholars of the sociology of religion that the 
secularisation thesis as such was originally too narrow, focusing too much on 
the United States and Great Britain (Turner 2011, 148; Casanova 1994). In 
fact, Europe has faced an “eruption of the religious in the public sphere”. 
This has even led some scholars to challenge the view that modern societies 
are secular. (Turner 2011, x.) Because of the difficulties involved in the 
concept of ‘secularisation’, various alternatives have been proposed. For 
example Grace Davie (2006) considers that it is more accurate to speak of the 
‘de-Christianisation’ of Europe than of its secularisation.   
Despite the difficulties relating to the scholarly use of the term, it is 
commonly agreed that the roots of secularisation can be traced to the rise of 
individualism and rationality after the Reformation (Bruce 1996). Since then, 
the nature of religion and its place in the modern world have fundamentally 
changed. In the words of Steve Bruce (1996, 230), “individualism threatened 
the communal basis of religious belief and behaviour, while rationality 
removed many of the purposes of religion and rendered many of its beliefs 
implausible.” Individualisation made people freer and gave them greater 
autonomy to decide for themselves. Simultaneously, religious beliefs became 
increasingly dependent upon personal desires, ideas and preferences (Turner 
2011, 10; Draulans & Halman 2003, 372.)  
For the purposes of this study, I want to point out five important 
consequences of the process of secularisation. First of all, secularisation has 
involved the differentiation of society into various separate societal spheres; 
in the process, religion has become just one subsystem alongside others 




Secondly, religion has had to adjust to new ‘living conditions’. It has 
been forced to enter the secular sphere which has meant that religion “has 
become a set of institutions that function to support the secular world rather 
than a set of institutions that shapes and directs the world.” The states have 
domesticated religion by making it part of a system that provides welfare 
contributions in society. (Turner 2011, 31.) Furthermore, as Turner (2011, 
277) writes, religions have been drawn into “the global circuits of capital 
insofar as they are themselves converted into lifestyles and into agencies 
offering commodities and services that cater the needs of their clients.”22  
Third, as Davie writes in her book Religion in Europe: A Memory 
Mutates (Davie 2000, 30), modern European societies in particular can no 
longer maintain their religious memory. She refers to the theory proposed by 
Danièle Hervieu-Léger, according to which religion is a specific mode of 
believing. Through believing, the individual believer not only becomes part 
of a chain that brings together past, present and future members, but also 
becomes a member of the tradition that upholds a society’s collective 
memory. It is this collective memory that serves as the basis of that 
community’s existence. Losing this tradition makes societies ‘amnesic’. This 
‘chain of memory’ has been broken in the course of a long period of 
possessive individualism, along with a more recent period of neo-liberal 
economic policies. 
The fourth important consequence of secularisation is that the ties that 
bind people into communities have grown thinner and weaker (Turner 2011, 
31). This in turn has had led to a loss of social consensus and solidarity 
among citizens. Following Talcott Parsons’ interpretation of Émile 
Durkheim’s sociology of religion, Turner (2011, 296) argues that “the 
ultimate roots of community are sacred and thus that which binds people 
together into powerful, typically emotional groups, are religious forces.”23 
However, with secularisation “[t]he sacred roots of collective culture are 
being eroded by globalisation in the shape of commercialisation and 
commodification” (Turner 2011, 296-297). In sum, modern religion, 
characterised by subjective and emotional individualism, has caused a loss of 
solidarity among citizens (Turner 2011, 275).  
Fifth, it should also be borne in mind that despite secularisation, 
religions still have an impact on citizens and on society; to put it another 
way, “social life can never be an entirely secular arrangement” (Turner 2011, 
xxvii). Durkheim argues that fundamentally “religion is something eminently 
social” (Durkheim 2001, 11) and many sociologists of religion consider that 
“what counts as ‘religion’ does not decline; it just keeps transforming” 
                                                
22 In contrast to this trend there are also forces opposed to capitalism or consumerism and 
championing more traditional forms of religion. Political Islam is one example of this 
type of movement. (Turner 2011, 277.) 





(Turner 2011, 11). Because of the integrative function that religion performs 
in the lives of individuals, as Thomas Luckmann (1966) and Edward I. Bailey 
(1997) argue, it persists in less visible and less explicit ways. Davie (2006, 
24) writes about ‘vicarious religion’, meaning that acts relating to religion are 
“performed by an active minority but on behalf of a much larger number, 
who (implicitly at least) not only understand, but, quite clearly, approve of 
what the minority is doing.” One implication is that church leaders “embody 
moral codes on behalf of others” (Davie 2006, 25). Similarly Craig Martin 
(2009, 150) writes that while religious institutions have the right to socialise 
citizens, for example through education, churches, families etc., it should be 
noted that this right has “an incredible ‘public’ significance”.  
 
 
The place of religion in Europe? 
Above I wrote about the social dimension of secularisation. It is also 
necessary to discuss about normative dimension of the phenomenon in 
Europe and how it has been challenged. As David Lehmann (2006, 281) puts 
it:  
 
If we compare Europe to the US, it is noticeable that although 
religious attitudes clearly are playing a prominent part in US politics 
at present, fuelling sometimes almost violent rhetoric, there are, 
however, no serious running disputes about the place of religion such 
as we have in Europe. (Italics in original.)  
 
In secular European states religion is not only considered to be a non-political 
matter but also a matter of private and personal belief (Turner 2011, 169).24 
According to Casanova (2009, 233), it is a “[w]idely shared assumption that 
it is best to banish religion from the public sphere in order to tame the 
passionate conflicts and irrational attitudes which religion is assumed to bring 
into politics.” The historical roots of this kind of arrangement can be traced to 
the seventeenth century. According to Timothy Fitzgerald (2007a, 154), at 
that time “the identification of ‘religion’ with ‘church’, and of ‘politics’ with 
‘state’, was first rhetorically appropriated”. Fitzgerald writes:  
 
The conceptualisation of “religion” and “religions” in the modern 
sense of private faith, or the related sense of personal adherence to a 
soteriological doctrine of God, was needed for the representation of 
the world as secular, neutral, factual, comprehensively quantifiable 
                                                
24 It is useful to distinguish between the concept of the ‘secular state’ and the notion that a 
state is secular. France is a secular state while Britain is not, due to its close relation to 
the Church of England. On the other hand, all European nations are secular in the sense 
that religion is a matter of “private choice not to be dictated by the state, and ... the state, 
while ensuring religious freedom, does not enforce a particular set of religious practices 




realm whose natural laws can be discovered by scientific rationality, 
and whose central human activity is a distinct “non-religious” sphere 
or domain called “politics” or “political economy”. ... The crucial 
logic is separation into two essentially different domains.25 
(Fitzgerald 2007b, 6; italics added.) 
 
However, there are several ways in which the distinction between the public 
and private spheres can be, and actually is, criticised and/or challenged. For 
example Jürgen Habermas has recently raised questions concerning the place 
of religion in apparently secular societies. His criticism of the idea that 
religion should be banished from the public sphere can explicated by 
applying John Rawls’s (1993, 60-62) idea according to which citizens can 
hold certain values privately – for example values that are completely or 
partly derived from religious affiliation or secular humanistic values (private 
sphere) – and can simultaneously share those values and principles that apply 
only in the field of politics and are seen as a precondition for a just and 
functioning society (public sphere). Furthermore, political actions or 
decisions cannot be legitimated by principles or views derived from a 
particular religion. Decisions are required to be grounded in principles that all 
are expected to accept. This idea is known as the ‘condition of publicity’. 
(See Habermas 2006, 4-5; Räikkä 1998, 101-111.26)  
Contrary to this view, Habermas argues in his article ‘Religion in the 
Public Sphere’ (2006) that a dialogue between religious and secular outlooks, 
using both secular and religious language, is fully appropriate at the level of 
public debate (see also Taylor 2007; 2002, Habermas 2002). It can also be 
questioned whether citizens actually are able to respect the ‘condition of 
publicity’.  
More importantly, with mass immigration religion has become an 
important public issue. Diasporic communities, especially Muslim ones, have 
not only changed the religious landscape of Europe but have also forced 
European societies to re-evaluate the influence of religion on society and to 
re-open the debate over the place of religion in both public and private life 
(Davie 2006, 32). The point is that the culture that immigrant Muslims have 
inherited does not recognise the notion of private religion (Lehmann 2006, 
284).27 As Sakaranaho (2006, 19) writes, “Muslims seek to establish 
                                                
25 According to Fitzgerald (2007a, 154), the meaning of the concept ‘secular’ came to 
acquire the nuance of ‘non-religious’ in the late eighteenth century. The understanding of 
the meaning of the concept, however, has changed in the course of history. This has led 
scholars to argue that the concepts ‘religion’ and ‘secular’ are actually co-produced: “The 
‘invention’ of one leads to the co-invention of the other” (Knott 2010, 120). As Fitzgerald 
(2007a, 159) writes: “I would ... argue that the secular standpoint, understood as non-
religious in the sense either of neutrality or of reductive hostility towards ‘religion’, is 
actually made imaginable by the claimed existence of religions themselves.” 
26 Both authors refer to Rawls’s Political Liberalism (1993). 





European Islam and thereby strengthen the role of religion in this continent.”  
Third, as Turner (2011, 103) points out, in the West the states have 
become involved in the management of religions, with the result of an 
inevitable departure from the traditional separation of state and religion. 
According to Turner, “[p]aradoxically, by intervening to regulate the religion 
in the public domain, the state automatically makes religion more important 
and prominent.” Turner (2011, 105; referring to Spinner-Halevy 2005), 
writes that “[t]he privatisation of religion – the cornerstone of the liberal view 
of tolerance in the legacy of John Locke – is thought by many observers to be 
no longer a viable political strategy in the separation of state and religion.”  
It is also worth noting that sheltering the public from religious influence 
has also been challenged in practice within modern Western democracies: 
According to Habermas (2006, 1), during the presidency of George W. Bush, 
the United States faced a “political revitalization of religion”. This was 
because Bush had “a coalition of primarily religiously motivated voters to 
thank for his victory” (Habermas 2006, 3).28  
In addition to these points made above, it should be borne in mind that it 
is not at all clear that religion currently is, or can be, kept apart from the 
public sphere since European countries have a long history of one religious 
institution being dominant (Lehmann 2006, 291). Because of this, the 
religion to which the majority of citizens belong to is constantly present in 
the public culture, but largely in an invisible manner. This is so because this 
particular religion has had a close connection to the society for a long period 
of time. As Sakaranaho (2006, 68) points out, “in the liberal democracies of 
Western Europe, the public domain is not so free of religion as it is at times 
portrayed to be”:  
 
it is much easier to be ‘religion-blind’ with those representing the 
religion which is the most prevalent in society. In such situations, the 
threshold between private and public becomes practically invisible 
because time and the physical environment are fashioned both in 
public and private life according to the same religious tradition. 
(Sakaranaho 2006, 69.)  
 
The European calendar, for instance, is structured in terms of the Christian 
faith and citizens live in a “symbolic environment which is marked by 
Christianity”. It is a fact that “celebrating Christmas and resting on Sundays 
are important markers in European social life, even if in practice they no 
longer hold distinctive religious value.” (Sakaranaho 2006, 69.) Furthermore, 
                                                
one. For example in some Muslim countries, and in Israel as well, religious (family) law 
is either an alternative or a substitute for secular civil law. 
28 Habermas provides statistics on voters’ religious affiliation; he refers to the article 
’President Bush Benefits from Efforts to Build a Coalition of Religious Voters’ in the 




Sakaranaho (2006, 351) notes, in some European countries, such as Great 
Britain, Germany, Norway, and Sweden, the Christian cultural heritage is 
regarded as part of the national culture, which is “yet another example of the 
way religion in recent decades has found its way to the public of the society”. 
This has led some scholars to use a sceptical expression, “the liberal myth of 




As I noted above, all European nations exhibit some degree of plurality in the 
spheres of culture, values and religion.29 The Norwegian scholar Geir Skeie 
(2006b) refers to this sociological fact as ‘traditional plurality’. With regard 
to religion, ‘traditional plurality’ refers to “the existence of a variety of 
different religious groups and/or religious views in a specific context like 
contemporary Western society” (Skeie 2006b, 312). However, in order to 
better describe and comprehend the religious landscape in Europe, Skeie also 
suggests the term ‘modern plurality’. This refers to the social context within 
which religious plurality is situated, and reflects the fact that in contemporary 
Western societies citizens are exposed to a more or less constant flow of 
ideas, values, ideals, models and alternative choices of action (Skeie 2006b, 
314).  
One interesting feature of ‘modern plurality’ is that it does not involve 
merely increased diversity within religions, but that in particular diasporic 
religions are facing ‘border problems’ (Turner 2011, 167).30 In the context of 
‘modern plurality’ we see internal or ‘indigenous’ debates within religious 
traditions because citizens are exposed to different values, ideals and modes 
of living. Turner, for example, writes of changes taking place within Muslim 
communities, arising from the fact that it is not clear to all members what 
norms a good Muslim should adhere to in a secular society (Turner 2011, 
174). The question has become difficult to answer, since new situations and 
new sources of authority have emerged to challenge the traditional 
framework of the social consensus. As a consequence, a new type of Muslim 
                                                
29 It is worth noting that the concept of ’culture’ (already) implies a plural, in the sense 
that we become aware of our own culture or cultural traits when we encounter another 
culture. The us-them distinction is an implicit assumption when we use the concept. (See 
e.g. Angus 2002, 74.) In this sense, the concept of ‘cultural plurality’ is tautological. 
However, since I want to emphasise the point that societies contain many competing 
cultures, the term ‘cultural plurality’ is more informative. 
30 Turner (2011, 167), following Fredrik Barth (1998), writes that in order to exist it is 
necessary for religious groups to retain boundaries. The maintenance of a boundary is 
fundamentally a matter of the existence of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Members of a certain 
group may have dissimilar values and practices, as long as there is something that marks 
the outside and inside, in other words that defines the boundary of the group against other 





consensus is currently developing, for example via on-going Internet debates 
through blogs, Facebook, Twitter etc. (Turner 2011, 154-155.) 
This is an interesting development. In this thesis I explore the ways in 
which pupils are encouraged by the schools to use skills of critical enquiry, 
allowing them to scrutinise and reflect upon the beliefs and values they 
encounter. As noted, some religious parents, Muslim parents in particular, are 
afraid of losing their children to the dominant culture and want to shelter 
them from alien influences. We can ask: in which areas are cultural values 
and practices left to the families? In which ones does the state take 
responsibility, ensuring that children are presented in the schools with 
different ideas, values, ideals and alternative choices of action, and are 
enabled to evaluate different moral positions? Furthermore, do the states 
make strategic choices, and if so of what kind, to foster the internal 
development of religious traditions toward greater appropriateness for a 
secular society? 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to distinguish three different levels 
or modes of cultural plurality. First, it is obvious that within modern societies 
there are differing – and certainly conflicting – views as to the nature of 
reality. By this I mean that individuals have different opinions about what 
constructs the reality we are living in. For example, some of us are 
materialists,31 while others believe in the existence of non-physical entities 
such as God and other members of the category of supernatural agents. In 
short, different individuals give different answers to ontological questions. In 
this sense, we can speak of an ‘ontological’ level of cultural plurality.  
Cultural plurality is also manifested at the level of values or beliefs that 
individuals consider important or worthwhile. We can call this the 
‘normative’ level of cultural plurality. Needless to say, convictions at this 
level often have a connection to commitments at the ontological level. In 
particular many religions involve the perception that a superior and non-
empirical force has handed down ethical principles for adherents to follow. 32 
Thirdly, there are differences among citizens at the level of practices. It 
is clear that practices may be closely connected to individuals’ ontological 
and normative commitments. This can be called the ‘practical’ level of 
cultural plurality. 
The liberal principle tells us that every individual has the right to choose 
the kind of life he or she wants to lead, as long as they do not hurt other 
people’s equal rights.33 As I shall show in this thesis, however, the states 
                                                
31 By materialism I mean a conviction according to which there exist only material 
entities; or at least that all mental phenomena have a material basis.  
32 Logically it is implausible to derive values from simple facts about the nature of reality. 
33 This is called ‘negative freedom’, since it guarantees a person freedom not to be 
subjected to an action of abuse or coercion (see e.g. The Cambridge Dictionary of 




seem to have increased their control at all three levels of plurality with regard 
to some of the beliefs entailed by religions. In the case of ontological 
questions, the states normally give citizens broad freedom to hold whatever 
opinions they like as to the nature of the world. However, there is evidence 
that in the field of education some European states, as well as the Council of 
Europe, have tightened control over the kinds of ontological presuppositions 
provided to pupils.34 If we move towards other levels of cultural plurality, i.e. 
the normative and practical levels, in recent years some European countries 
have shown increased interest in monitoring certain religious practices, such 
as the wearing of religious symbols in public (see e.g. Davie 2006). In 
addition, as I argue in this thesis, the states have also become increasingly 
interested in citizens’ ethical attitudes and want to regulate these as well.  
 
Modern pluralities are also linked to debates over moral values, in the sense 
that it “is often assumed that the great diversity in contemporary, 
individualized society generates conflicts instead of a consensus of values, 
moral behaviours and convictions” (Draulans & Halman 2003, 398). In their 
article ‘Religious and Moral Pluralism in Contemporary Europe’ (2003), 
Veerle Draulans & Loek Halman present their findings regarding the effects 
of secularisation, individualisation, rationalisation and increased religious 
pluralism in Europe. Their conclusions are based on an analysis of data from 
the European Values Study from 1981 and 1990. I want to mention two 
findings in particular. First, Draulans & Halman conclude “that there is not 
one single, dominant pattern to explain the influence of religion (or 
secularisation) on moral opinions” (Draulans & Halman 2003, 397). 
Furthermore,  
 
the simple presupposition that the younger generations will be more 
heterogeneous as far as their religious and moral opinions are 
concerned compared with the older generations is not supported, nor 
do changes over time provide much evidence that support the idea of 
increasing levels of pluralism (Draulans & Halman 2003, 397). 
 
For instance, in Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland pre-war generations appear to 
be more pluralistic, and the “youngest generation less!” (Draulans & Halman 
2003, 392). In their conclusion regarding changes in individual morality due 
to a changing religious landscape, the authors write that “[t]he results of our 
analysis do not provide strong arguments in favour of such ideas about moral 
decline and the necessity to invest more energy in communities built upon a 
strong ‘we’-feeling as a dam against (perceived hyper-) individualisation” 
(Draulans & Halman 2003, 398). This last point refers to communitarian 
claims that in order to create a firm moral order in society there is a need to 
create a stronger ‘we’ feeling. Their conclusion is interesting, and offers an 
                                                





useful perspective for my analysis in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, where I describe 
measures taken by Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark to 




In my research questions I focus on several topics, each with its own specific 
questions. My main method is argument analysis, which I complement with 
thematic analysis and discourse analysis.35 I begin by exploring how nations 
and regional actors, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union, 
perceive and articulate themselves as institutions. I find this topic important 
because the process of self-identification is indeed one manifestation of what 
might be called an overall policy for the treatment of cultural diversity. I 
chart the argumentative process of constructing a national identity by 
exploring the use of the first person plural pronoun, ‘we’.  
An important point to be taken into account with regard to national or 
European self-understanding is that a descriptive conception about who ‘we’ 
are also has a normative side: prescribing what is required of citizens for 
them to be recognised as ‘respected’ members of that society (see e.g. Parekh 
2000, 202-203).  
The next step in my approach is to move towards the question of how 
differences in citizens’ various cultural backgrounds have been and currently 
are perceived. The focus is on the treatment of religious minorities. The 
philosophical background to this question is derived from the suggestion that 
culture-dependent identity needs to be recognised or even protected. The 
point is that as well as being citizens, i.e. members of a political community, 
we are also – indeed often primarily – members of a particular cultural 
community, and it is precisely this membership that has a great impact on 
who we are (see Kymlicka 1989a36). As communitarians argue, our sense of 
identity is inseparable from our awareness of ourselves as members of a 
particular family, class or community that holds certain values (see Sandel 
                                                
35 The findings of argument analysis serve as a starting point for further thematic analysis 
and discourse analysis. I apply thematic analysis as a method for identifying, analysing, 
and reporting themes within the empirical material. (See e.g. Boyazis 1998.) I use 
discourse analysis to clarify how groups and categories are articulated and defined and to 
consider what practical outcomes articulations and definitions may have. My point of 
departure is Foucault’s notion that discourse is related to power. In his genealogical 
studies Foucault showed how statements and ‘sets of statements’ act as rules and acquire 
authority eventually coming to manifest themselves as institutions. In the context of 
mental illnesses, for example, medical records of the insane are not only neutral 
statements but powerful tools that define what is madness and what or who represents 
sanity. (Arribas-Ayllon & Alkerdine 2008). The Foucauldian discourse analysis 
highlights the productive side of language in that it establishes groups, categories and 
subjects (Arribas-Ayllon & Alkerdine 2008; Wooffit 2005, 146-147).  




1982, 67). From this point of view, it has been argued that members of 
cultural minorities cannot adequately protect their cultural interests and are 
forced to assimilate into the majority (see Young 1990; Kymlicka 1995; 
Parekh 2000).  
For each of the four nations I look at changes in policies regarding the 
treatment of minorities, from the earliest days of the current wave of 
immigration to the present. Have there for example been any changes in how 
members of minority groups are recognised as bearers of distinct cultural 
identity? What kind of models for dealing with cultural plurality can be 
distinguished? What responsibilities do nations currently place on their 
citizens? 
To answer questions concerning identity and the treatment of diversity, I 
examine three kinds of sources: (i) official political documents, (ii) 
statements by politicians, and (iii) recommendations by advisory groups 
dealing with the management of cultural diversity and/or immigration.37  
                                                
37 The material from Great Britain consists in two White Papers issued by British 
government: Secure Haven, Safe Borders: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain 
(2002) and Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society. The Government’s strategy to 
increase race equality and community cohesion (2005). In addition I analyse three 
independent reports from advisory groups, namely Education for citizenship and the 
teaching of democracy in schools (1998); The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000) and 
Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team Chaired by Ted Cantle 
(2001).  
In the case of the Netherlands the material consists of two government White Papers: 
Minderhedennota (A memorandum on minorities) (1983) and Contourennota 
integratiebeleid etnische minderheden (A report for integration policy for minorities) 
(1994). I also refer to two press releases concerning the actions of the Government of the 
Netherlands: ‘Shared values in spite of differences’ (2004) and ‘Majority of ethnic-
minority women disadvantaged’ (2004). In addition, I discuss a report by the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy, WWR, Identificatie met Nederland (Identification with 
the Netherlands) (2007).  
The material for Sweden consists of four White Papers issued by the Swedish 
parliament: Regeringens proposition om riktlinjerför invandrar- och minoritetspolitiken 
(The government bill on guidelines for immigrant and minority policy) (1975); 
Regeringens proposition om invandrarpolitiken (The government bill on immigration 
policy) (1986); Regeringens proposition om aktiv flyktining- och immigrationspolitik (The 
government bill on active refugee and immigration policy) (1991); and Sverige, framtiden 
och mångfalden – från invandrarpolitik till integrationspolitik (Sweden, the future and 
diversity: from immigration policy to integration policy) (1997). In addition I explore 
Swedish Government’s white paper Empowerment against exclusion – Governments 
strategy for integration (Egenmakt mot utanförskap – regeringens strategi för 
integration) (2008).  
In the case of Denmark I analyse two White Papers issued by the Danish government: 
Regeringens visioner og strategier for bedre integration (The government vision and 
strategies for improved integration) (2003) and Regeringens strategi mod ghettoisering 
(The government strategy against ghettoisation) (2004). In addition I refer to a scholarly 
publication concerning a White Paper issued by the Danish Ministry of Education, 





My interest in official documents and statements by politicians is due to 
the fact that politicians have a special power to “identify, to categorize, to 
state what is what and who is who”, since they can impose “the categories, 
classificatory schemes, and modes of social counting and accounting with 
which bureaucrats, judges, teachers, and doctors must work and to which 
non-state actors must refer” (Brubaker & Cooper 2000, 15-16). This means 
that in these documents and statements, through the use of language, reality is 
not only constructed but also regulated, in the sense that statements, 
recommendations and decisions are intended to be applied in practice. 
The documents are written so that their argumentative structure can be 
traced and presented. They can be treated as teleological explanations for 
actions, in which the basic idea is that someone sets out to do something 
because she/he wants to achieve a certain goal. Documents and statements 
consist of recommendations or even prescriptions for practical actions 
(conclusions) and groundings (premises) for these. They are provided 
because certain phenomena in the society are perceived as undesirable and 
needing to be corrected; minimally, it is thought that even if not that bad, 
things could be better.38 From this perspective, we are dealing with a mode of 
reasoning known as practical syllogism (or practical inference): in a certain 
situation s, at time t, an act a is regarded as necessary in order to achieve a 
desired outcome or goal p. The formal mode of the argument goes as 
follows:39  
 
A intends to bring about p. 
A considers that he cannot bring about p unless he does a. 
Therefore A sets out to do a. (von Wright 1971, 96.) 
 
Applying this kind of analytical tool as a basis of my enquiry, I seek to 
find answers to several questions. First, what exactly is seen as wrong in a 
society,40 and what kind of behaviour is considered undesirable? Secondly, 
                                                
by the Minister of Education Margareth Vestager and Ministry of Education: Værdier i 
virkeligheden (Values in Practice) (2000). 
I have put an end date of these documents to a year 2008. I am aware of the possibility 
that in cases where I lean on academic analysis, the ideas and attitudes of the scholars in 
question can ‘creep’ into my discussion. I try to avoid this unwanted effect by referring 
directly to the original source as much as possible. 
38 In an article ‘What is Political Discourse Analysis?’ (1997), Teun A. van Dijk puts this 
as follows: “[q]uite typical for much political discourse is the fact that references to the 
present tend to be negative, and those to the future positive: Indeed, their raison d’être is 
to design policies that make life better, or at least prevent (further) deterioration or 
catastrophe.” (van Dijk 1997, 27.) 
39 The practical syllogism was first presented by Aristotle in Ethica Nicomachea (Book 7, 
Chapter 3). Georg Henrik von Wright (1971) developed the idea of the practical 
syllogism as a model to explain the intentionality of human behaviour.  
40 According to van Dijk (1997, 27) “[f]ollowing the basic principles of many aspects of 




what reasons do politicians and members of advisory groups give for the 
current situation; in other words, what has been done, or left undone, to allow 
the current situation to become a reality? Third, what concrete actions – in a 
situation of plurality – do politicians, other decision-makers and members of 
advisory groups suggest be taken, and what are the goals that the actions 
suggested are intended to achieve? What kind of society is seen as desirable? 
More specifically, what are the values and virtues that citizens should 
possess, and what (other) responsibilities do they have towards the nation? 
The basic outline of the argument consists of four premises and a 
conclusion, and in the ideal situation all of these can be traced: 
 
Premise 1 contains one or more facts about the society (factual statement, 
based on empirical evidence). 
Premise 2 contains an attitude towards Premise 1: Premise 1 is perceived in a 
certain way, i.e. it is seen as undesirable (normative statement).  
Premise 3 contains an expression referring to what is actually wrong 
(expressed as factual statement). 
Premise 4 expresses the view that the current situation is the outcome of 
certain previous actions: something has either been done or has failed to be 
done (expressed as factual statement).  
Premise 5 contains an expression about the goal (normative statement). 
The Conclusion expresses the view that taken together, some or all of the 
premises give reason for certain action(s) to be taken in order to correct the 
situation in the society (to achieve the goal).41 
In focusing the analysis on the educational system of these four 
countries, I ask what actions politicians and advisory groups have suggested 
and/or governments have taken in order to make education respond better to 
the challenge of cultural plurality. I am also interested in the kinds of changes 
(if any) that have been made in the curriculum in this respect. In addition, I 
look at how faith schools42 are currently perceived by politicians. The 
material consists of two kinds of texts: articles from leading newspapers, and 
official documents dealing with the organisation and content of education.  
With regard to the content of moral and ethical education, my interest is 
in the values that pupils are expected to internalise and in the ethical attitudes 
cultivated in pupils. I examine the normative framework designed to guide 
school arrangements and the content of values and moral education. These 
                                                
now the case and what should be done about it.” 
41 A sound or valid normative argument needs to include one or more value statement in 
its premises. In this way the is-ought problem can be avoided. 





documents include legislative education acts, curricula, syllabi for religious 
education, and recommendations issued by authorities in educational matters.  
After exploring governmental strategies I focus on the question of the 
legitimacy of the content of religious education. My aim is to determine what 
kind of content is in accordance with the human rights perspective provided 
by the United Nations and the Council of Europe.43 I also analyse statements 
issued by the Council of Europe on the issue, along with all relevant cases 
brought before the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the 
European Court of Human Rights. In this analysis I do not refer to national 
cases. This is because these international and regional perspectives are 
intended as obligatory and binding. I am especially interested in what kind of 
RE content is regarded not only as appropriate but also as necessary in 
present-day Europe. Here I refer to Jackson’s (2004a, 159) notion that the 
educational provision of RE cannot be viewed in isolation, as solely a matter 
of a nation’s own choice. 
Questions as to the ‘appropriate’ place of religion are dealt with in this 
thesis as a persistent and recurring theme,44 to be returned to in each chapter. 
I apply two theoretical resources from religious studies: Kim Knott’s 
methodological model for locating religion in secular contexts, and Émile 
Durkheim’s theory of religion, as presented in his book The Elementary 
Forms of Religion. I find both approaches useful for my purposes, in the 
ways they model and explain the functioning of the social world.  
Knott’s model is presented and discussed in her book The Location of 
Religion: A spatial analysis (2005), and in an article entitled ‘Theoretical and 
Methodological Resources for Breaking open the Secular and Exploring the 
Boundary Between Religion and non-Religion’ (2010). In this model, the 
terms ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ are seen as “discursively constructed, 
negotiated and policed” ‘forces’ that create power fields or ‘camps’ (see 
Figure 1).45  
 
                                                
43 The relevant legislative framework consists of the following Conventions: (i) the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); (ii) the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) by UN; and (iii) the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), issued by the European Court of Human 
Rights.  
44 The questions were: to what extent space is allocated for religion in the state and its 
public affairs (especially in the field of education); what expectations and responsibilities 
are placed on citizens in general and religious citizens in particular; and how the domain 
of the ‘secular’ is preserved from the impact of the domain of the ‘religious’. 
45 It should be noted that the distinction can ultimately be reduced to the ways in which 
the concepts ‘religion’ and ‘secular’ are understood and deployed. The meaning of these 
concepts has changed over the course of history, and the process is certainly still going 
on. In this sense, the distinction is thus necessarily vague and unstable (see Knott 2010, 









Figure 1. The religious / secular field and its force relationships (Knott 2005, 
125). 
 
Knott writes of “struggle and warfare” not only between power fields 
but also within them. Referring to Foucault, the relationship between ‘camps’ 
can be viewed as a ‘strategy of struggle’ in which oppositional forces “are 
not superimposed” and do not “become confused” but maintain their specific 
nature (Knott 2010, 122). The presence of the post-secular is explained as 
follows: 
 
As the relationship between ’religious’ and the ’secular’ is dialectical 
and not merely oppositional, the field is shown to include a third 
camp, the ’post-secular’ (Knott 2005, 125) which often makes use of 
the notion of ‘spirituality’ rather than ‘religion’ or ‘religiosity’ (Knott 
& Franks 2007, 2). 
 
Knott’s model gives insight into the various variables that affect the position 
of religion in Europe. Above, I have written that European societies have 
been forced to re-evaluate the influence of religion on society and to re-open 
the debate over the place of religion in both public and private life (Davie 
2006, 32). I focus, first of all, on the ‘struggle between camps’: is the public 
sphere, representing the secular (more precisely the non-religious) protected 
from the impact of the religious by politicians, secular officials, members of 
 
undecided, agnostic, 





Struggles between camps 





advisory groups, and courts of law? If so, what form does this protection 
take?  
Secondly, I am interested in what central ideas are regarded as important 
or even necessary ingredients of the secular. Knott writes that controversies 
among different ‘camps’ “reveal some of the deeply held views and values 
which constitute the field and mark out the territorial areas and lines of 
engagement within it” (Knott 2005, 125; italics added). Opening up this issue 
gives insight into why certain practical choices are suggested with regard to 
accommodating religious diversity, both in general and in the field of 
religious education in particular. As Sakaranaho (2006, 315) writes, “[o]f all 
fields of society, education is the one ‘straddling’ between the private and 
public realms.”  
In addition, I investigate the process of maintaining and rewriting the 
borders of the public and the private domain. I take into account all 
statements that deal with religion as well as interpretations as to what ideas 
are regarded as belonging to the secular public sphere. With regard to the 
concept of ‘religion’, my starting hypothesis is that in the documents and 
statements it is understood in a rather simple manner. I refer here to Knott’s 
(2005, 59) use of the term ‘conventional religion’, referring to “religious 
institutions, their traditions, beliefs, and practices, and those who to a greater 
or lesser degree adhere to them.”46 Knott argues that “[t]his is what most 
people in the West generally mean by ‘religion’”. However, it should 
simultaneously be noted that ‘religions’ are dynamic constructions that are in 
constant interaction with social institutions and individuals, and thus have an 
impact, active or passive, on these and vice versa.47  
I apply Durkheim’s theory of religion with regard to the research 
question ‘what responsibilities is put on citizens’. Durkheim defines religion 
as a social system of beliefs and practices, which need not involve a belief in 
a supernatural agent, for example a High God or gods. It is precisely their 
practices and beliefs that unite adherents or members of a group into a single 
                                                
46 This is the emic usage of the term ‘religion’ in this thesis. 
47 This is the etic usage of the term ‘religion’ in this thesis. I am not claiming that religion 
as such exists. Religion is an intellectual abstraction; it cannot be studied directly, since it 
appears only in individual minds, feelings and behaviour. However, we can call thoughts, 
feelings and behaviour of individuals as ‘religious’ only when we have explicitly defined 
the term ‘religion’. There is, however, no consensus among scholars as to what such a 
definition might be. Rather, rigid definitions are not regarded as an appropriate starting 
point in the study of ‘religion’. (Saler 2000, 212-225.) For example Benson Saler (2000, 
226) writes that “there are no clear boundaries drawn about religion. Rather, elements that 
we may apperceive as ‘religious’ are found in phenomena that numbers of us, for a 
variety of reasons, may not be prepared to dub religions.” It should also be borne in mind 
that any definition of religion is always excluding; Jonathan Z. Smith (2004, 39) argues 
that any given content prevents the creation of something new, and may easily lead to 
false conclusions. Thus religion is currently studied mainly on the basis of open-ended 




moral community. In this sense religion is a ‘power’ or ‘force’ that does the 
job of keeping the members of a certain social group together. (Durkheim 
2001, 46.) Religion survives, in Durkheim’s view, because it satisfies an 
important social function. However, this can also be seen other way around: 
religion is an essential component in the actual construction of the social 
world.  
The essential point in Durkheim’s theory of religion is the division of 
the universe into two mutually exclusive parts, the sacred and the profane. In 
this distinction, the dichotomy between the individual and the collective 
plays a crucial role. As Jonathan Z. Smith (2004, 386) writes: 
 
[f]or Durkheim, alternation between ... two types of time, one 
individual another collective, is in fact the social origin of the 
distinction between the profane and the sacred. It is this temporal 
opposition that marks the two qualities.  
 
My interest in Durkheim’s theory is connected with his idea that in order to 
exist a society needs “at regular intervals sustain and reaffirm the collective 
feelings and ideas that constitute its unity and its personality” (Durkheim 
2001, 322). But what form does this take in present-day Europe? Can the 
dichotomy between the sacred and profane survive in a highly individualistic 
culture, in a context of globalisation, commercialisation and 
commodification? Referring for example to Hervieu-Léger’s theory of the 
loss of collective memory, or Turner’s (2011, 296-297) argument that with 
secularisation “the sacred roots of collective culture are being eroded”, we 
can be at least sceptical as to the possibility of a positive answer. 
Furthermore, it seems that collective symbols, as a part of the sacred history 
of a particular nation, cannot do the job of uniting citizens, since due to mass 
immigration many minorities fall outside this nation’s sacred narrative 
(Turner 2011, 144). 
Despite these sceptical views, however, efforts to achieve unity naturally 
occur. The documents analysed in Chapters 2 and 3 are concrete examples of 
such efforts. In these documents, I explore what is regarded as the ‘sacred’ 
foundation of a nation; in other words, what forms the basis of the collective, 
regardless of individual variation in matters of belief, practices and modes of 
living. With regard to the concept of the ‘sacred’, I apply a definition 
proposed by Veikko Anttonen (2000, 281): 
 
[t]he sacred is a special quality in individual and collective systems 
of meaning. In religious thinking it has been used as an attribute of 
situations and circumstances which have some reference to the 
culture-specific conception of the category of God, or, in non-
theological contexts, to some supreme principle of life such as love, 





boundary to set things with non-negotiable value apart from things 
whose value is based on continuous transactions.  
 
In other words, ‘sacred’ equals something that is perceived as non-
negotiable; something is perceived as so valuable that it is beyond the 
possibility of being susceptible or subject to change, revision or compromise. 
In scholarly use, this idea has recently been applied in wider perspectives and 
used in secular matters as well, and has thus been freed “from its theological 
shackles”, to use Knott’s (2010, 133) expression. As Knott (2010, 126) 
writes: 
 
we have coined the term ‘secular sacred’ to refer to non-negotiable 
matters of belief and values that do not derive from formally 
religious sources but that occur within the domain of ‘non-religion’. 
 
Before concluding, it should be noted that I apply Durkheim’s theory of 
religion as a methodological tool, as a starting point for my analysis, and as a 
way to grasp the reality. As noted above, his theory is a functional 





Since in my material equality among citizens is an inherent assumption or 
goal, I find it useful to frame the analysis in terms of the scholarly debate – 
among philosophers, sociologists and scholars of religion in education – 
concerning the question of a just society. The debate also provides an 
appropriate context and analytical tools: theories, concepts, groundings and 
conclusions for the evaluation of the empirical material in which government 
strategies are embodied. I focus on two themes prominent in the debate: (i) 
how can harmonious co-existence among citizens be ensured, and (ii) how 
can equality be achieved in a plural society. The past two decades have been 
very lively time for the debate on these topics.  
With regard to the issue of ensuring peaceful co-existence in a fair way 
among citizens who hold differing or even conflicting views, I find John 
Rawls’s theory of a just society an appropriate point of reference; not only 
because nations seem currently to be committed, at least at the level of 
rhetoric, to ideas similar to those he proposes, but also because his theories 
have been widely criticised. This criticism has come from two directions: 
some writers argue that an understanding of equality as treating all citizens in 
the same manner is problematic (e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1992; Young 
1990), while others consider Rawls’s liberal ideals to be corrosive to certain, 
mostly religious, ways of life (Strike 1998; Galston 1995; Tamir 1995; 




prominent role throughout this thesis, it may be useful at this point to sum up 
the main lines of his theory. 
In his influential book Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls takes off from 
the belief that in modern Western democracies a diversity of comprehensive 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines is a permanent feature of public 
culture. According to Rawls, this diversity is the result of what he calls ‘the 
burdens of judgment’: different views are not necessarily a consequence of 
irrationality or ignorance. Instead, the complexity and contradictions of the 
relevant evidence, the vagueness of our concepts (moral and political ones in 
particular), and the imponderable but decisive influence of an individual’s 
moral experience upon his or her judgment result in disagreements among 
people. In short, the factors mentioned here create the possibility that people, 
even in similar situations, will arrive at interpretations and conclusions that 
are reasonable but nevertheless mutually incompatible. (Rawls 1993, 54-66.) 
Rawls (1993, xviii) asks: “[h]ow is it possible that deeply opposed 
though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm 
the political conception of a constitutional regime?” His answer consists of 
four essential features. First, Rawls points out that despite their deep 
disagreements citizens can share certain values and ideas, which he calls 
principles of justice. These are justified by appealing to the procedure and 
structural aspects of an original position, where free and equal parties are 
placed behind a veil of ignorance; this prevents them from knowing what 
their position in a society will be.48 (Rawls 1993, 22-28.) 
The second feature of political liberalism is that in public life shared 
political values always trump comprehensive values, because there is 
agreement upon them but not on the values that people hold in private. 
(Rawls 1993, 60-62.) 
This brings us to the third feature of Rawls’ theory: the demand for 
neutrality or antiperfectionism of a state. Because of the burdens of 
judgment, a government cannot tie itself to any one comprehensive doctrine. 
The state cannot justify its actions by referring to some public ranking of the 
intrinsic value of different ways of life, simply because there is no public 
ranking to refer to. Stephen Mulhall (1998, 163) sums this up as follows: 
 
Since the freedom and equality of all citizens can be respected only if 
the state’s coercive powers are deployed in ways that those subject to 
                                                
48 According to Rawls (1993, 5-6; 22-28), people behind the veil of ignorance would 
agree on two principles of justice:  
a) “Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and 
liberties.” 
b) “Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be 
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 





this coercion can reasonably be expected to endorse, the fact of 
reasonable pluralism entails that any use of state power that is 
justified by appeal to elements of one particular comprehensive 
doctrine is illegitimate. Instead, appeal must be made only to public 
reasons – or values and ideas all share or can share. 
 
The fourth essential feature of political liberalism is tolerance. The basic idea 
is that people can hold whatever beliefs they wish in private as long as they 
are willing to affirm the supreme political authority of principles that can be 
justified from the point of view of all reasonable citizens. (Rawls 1993, 10-
11; 154.) Rawls believes that citizens who have the virtue of reasonableness 
will recognise the burdens of judgment, and will consequently endorse the 
view that different and even incompatible conceptions of the good life can be 
fully reasonable.  
To summarise the above: Rawls gives three independent arguments to 
explain why only a neutral state policy is acceptable: (i) the criteria for 
ranking and summing the values are imprecise, (ii) a non-neutral attitude 
would jeopardise the deliberation of the contractors in the original position, 
and (iii) perfectionism is liable to engender the suppression of liberty 
(Hittinger 1994, 595-596). 
With regard to the question of how equality among citizens can be 
understood in a plural society, I make use of two theories of group rights: 
those proposed by Will Kymlicka and by Charles Taylor. Both theories are in 
favour of granting special group rights to religious minorities in the name of 
equal treatment. I present and discuss these in Chapter 3.  
In framing my analysis of educational arrangements and the content of 
moral and values education, I make use of the scholarly debate over 
questions relevant to my research questions. These debates are presented in 





In an article entitled ‘Ontology of Culture and the Study of Human Behavior’ 
(2002), Ilkka Pyysiäinen (2002, 176) suggests that we should regard culture-
concepts not as abstract entities49 but as universals, as “abstractions created 
by the human mind”.50 He refers to the three-world model developed by Karl 
Popper (1972), in which world-1 is constituted by physical and biological 
entities and world-2 by the human mind (consciousness and cognitive 
                                                
49 Pyysiäinen (2002, 175) argues that ”[c]ultures do not exist as abstract entities; nor are 
they mere names.” 
50 “[C]ulture-concepts are based on the human mind’s ability to form abstractions and 
generalizations; they are created by the mind and they exist in the form of mental 




processes); world-3 is a product of human minds (e.g. concepts). ‘Culture’ 
belongs to world-3. It is the product of world-2, but cannot be reduced to it. 
(Pyysiäinen 2002, 170-174.) What we regard as a particular culture, for 
example Islam, is thus “a different kind of object than the cognitive process 
of someone thinking about” that culture (Pyysiäinen 2002, 175).  
Following this idea, I apply the concept of ‘culture’ as a socially 
constructed phenomenon, a specific level of organisation that cannot be 
reduced to the thoughts and actions of individuals (see e.g. Geertz 1973). 
However, as there has to be something that makes a culture, I turn to the idea 
proposed by Lincoln (2000). He defines the term ‘culture’ as referring to a 
group of people and to some factor X that defines this group, while this group 
also defines the X (in Pyysiäinen 2002, 169). It is in this sense that we can 
consider a certain culture as a whole, even though cultures are not unified in 
the sense that everyone defines X similarly. Thus it is possible to speak of 
religious cultures; Anthony D. Smith (1993, 6), for example, writes that 
religious identities tend to “join in a single community of the faithful all 
those who feel they share certain symbolic codes, value systems and 
traditions of belief and ritual”.51  
However, it should be noted that since ‘culture’ is a socially constructed 
phenomenon, its “boundaries are not fixed but flexible, blurred and hybrid” 
(Anttonen 2005, 102). As Pyysiäinen (2002, 175-176) writes, cultures are 
constantly changing. What happens in world-2 also has an effect on world-3. 
 
 
Religious groups as cultural communities 
A religious group can also be viewed as being a ‘cultural community’. 
According to Kymlicka (1989a, 135), people are members of two sorts of 
communities in modern nation-states, namely political communities and 
cultural communities. The political community is the grouping “within which 
individuals exercise the rights and responsibilities entailed by the framework 
of liberal justice.” The cultural community, in contrast, is the grouping 
“within which individuals form and revise their aims and ambitions.” Within 
the same cultural community people share a culture “which defines their 
cultural membership”.  
In this thesis I discuss arguments in favour of granting special rights to 
religious minorities. The point is that religious minorities are regarded as 
cultural communities that are in need of protection in order to maintain their 
existence. For example Mark Halstead (1995, 265) argues, referring to his 
studies on Muslims in Britain,52 that for many Muslims “their religion gives 
                                                
51 In Chapter 3 I give the example of a case in which two multi-faith coalitions demanded 
special group rights by arguing that religion is a form or expression of ‘culture’ analogous 
to ethnic and linguistic minorities (Davies 1999, 11-12). 





them their distinct identity, and it is their religion rather than other aspects of 
their cultural heritage which they are most anxious to preserve.” However, it 
should be kept in mind that religious commitment varies within a given 
religious community. There are for example Muslims who do not have a 
religious commitment, just as there are many Christians who do not believe 
in God. Thus, while the distinction between the two types of community 
helps to explain the nature or dynamic of a society, it is also dangerous if 





Following Hull (2001, 3-5), we can distinguish three different approaches to 
(or aspects of) religious education: ‘education into religion’, ‘education about 
religion’ and ‘education from religion’. ‘Education into religion’ introduces 
pupils to one particular faith tradition. This form of religious education is 
taking place in some of the central and eastern European countries, for 
example in Spain, Italy, Greece, Poland, Bulgaria, and Georgia (see Religious 
Education in Europe 2007) but also in many private schools around Europe.53 
This type of education may also have a confessional nature, aiming at 
instilling religious beliefs or upholding them in pupils. This is especially the 
case in some private faith schools.  
 ‘Education about religion’ is learning about the beliefs, values and 
practices of different religions. Pupils are taught to understand how religions 
influence the behaviour of individuals and help to shape communities. Thus 
for example holy scriptures, such as the Bible or the Qur’an, are not treated 
as sacred books but as literature, adopting a non-religious perspective. This 
kind of education is non-confessional, and the content often includes the 
basic facts about more than one religion. Different levels of cultural plurality 
are also present; the difference, compared to ‘education into religion’, is that 
the aim is merely to give pupils information and to increase their 
understanding of religion as a phenomenon in general and about different 
religions in particular. (Hull 2001.) 
‘Education from religion’ gives pupils tools to consider different 
answers to religious and moral issues, thus enabling them to develop their 
own way of thinking. The idea is that pupils are taught (i) to differentiate 
religious questions and answers from those of other kinds; (ii) to think for 
themselves in religious terms; and (iii) to place themselves in the way of the 
sort of experience, and the kind of value judgments, that such thinking can 
                                                
53 It is worth noting that in all these countries there are also other goals, at least at the 
level of the explicitly stated goals of religious education, such as enabling a pupil to live 
in a diverse world and encouraging personal development in ethical matters (Religious 




generate (Hudson 1988, 110).54 The depth of this approach depends on how 
the overall goal of religious education is defined: ’education into religion’ or 
‘education about religion’. Although it may seem that ‘education from 
religion’ is closer to the former, it need not be so. It is also possible to teach 
pupils to think for themselves in religious terms without the objective that 
they will continue to do so with any degree of conviction or commitment. 
Just as it is possible for an individual to have a scientific education without 
going on to find a scientific solution to every practical problem that arises in 
life, it is equally possible to have a religious education without going on to 
solve problems that arise in one’s life by applying religious answers.  
 
 
Previous research on the topic 
There has been increasing scholarly interest in the policies currently practiced 
by governments with regard to cultural diversity. This academic debate 
provides an appropriate foundation upon which to build my enquiry.55 The 
studies represented in the literature vary widely in both their aims and in the 
materials used. It can be observed, however, that scholars tend to conclude 
that the policy adopted by a given nation can be described as one of 
assimilation.56 By this they mean, roughly, that a government’s actions, 
directly or indirectly, force cultural minorities to adopt certain qualities 
already possessed by the majority. 
I think we should be cautious in drawing such conclusions. First of all, 
the concept of ‘assimilation’ is vague because its use is not solidly 
established among scholars, not to mention that it is highly value-laden – in 
multicultural discussions assimilation is mainly considered a negative thing. 
Secondly, as I discuss later in this thesis, assimilation should be treated as a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon (Brubaker 2001, 544). By this I mean that 
                                                
54 Hudson writes of ‘education in religion’ but he obviously means the same thing that 
scholars currently call ‘education from religion’. 
55 In discussing British policies I refer to the findings of Abbas (2005); Back et al. (2002); 
and Joppke (2004). These scholars have explored the New Labour policy of treating 
diversity and immigration after it took government responsibility in 1997. With regard to 
the Netherlands, Brug & Verkuyten (2007); Enzinger (2006; 2003); Karsten (2006); 
Spiecker & Steutel (2001); Vasta (2007); and Vermeulen & Penninx (2000) have been 
interested in how the Dutch government has treated its immigrants, mainly Muslims, 
during the first years of the new millennium. The education policy of the Netherlands is 
discussed by Driessen & Merry (2006); Karsten (2006); Leeman (2008); Leeman & Pels 
(2006); Leeman & Ledoux (2003); and Shahid & Koningsweld (2006). In the case of 
Sweden, I refer to the findings of Dahlström (2004); Graham (1999); and Soininen (1999) 
concerning changes in Swedish immigration policy. Haas (2008) has investigated Danish 
policy documents concerning education and immigration that relate to the concept of 
‘citizenship’. 






surveys designed to analyse the rhetoric used by governments, or on the other 
hand to illuminate the educational policy of a given country, are about one 
specific area of policy. This does not mean that these findings can be 
generalised. Even if assimilation happens in one particular domain, it does 
not necessarily occur in others. The third problem is that the question is often 
treated as a mono-dimensional, with assimilation at one end and active 
government efforts to cherish difference at the other (Brubaker 2001, 544). 
Yet another important point is that current policies should be compared with 
past ones, in order to see whether or not relevant changes have occurred, and 
if so in what respect. Finally, there is a need to distinguish between rhetoric 
and practical actions. A change in rhetoric does not necessarily mean that a 
government’s ‘requirements’ towards minorities have changed. 
My purpose in this thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis, one 
which takes these points into account. I compare different levels of 
government policy in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark 
by analysing and exploring suggestions for practical actions in general and 
educational arrangements in particular This will serve not only the purpose of 




Significance of the thesis 
This thesis is a contribution to the debate on cultural plurality and the place 
of religion within it. Its significance lies in four factors. First of all, it 
provides an analysis of government strategies at two levels, focusing on 
policies dealing with the management of cultural plurality in general and 
educational arrangement in particular; it thus contributes a perspective not yet 
provided in academic studies.  
Secondly, I provide a detailed analysis of the main lines of documents 
dealing with the pluralistic nature of society and/or immigration policy. This 
can serve as a solid basis for more profound ethnographic analysis, in the 
search for a more nuanced picture of cultural plurality management policies. 
In the thesis I raise several questions to which documents do not give direct 
answers, along with ideas that would be interesting to investigate in depth.  
Third, my conclusions concerning the empirical material provide useful 
data for further discussion as to the appropriate direction of multicultural 
policies and the (better) recognition of cultural diversity.  
Finally, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, in Finland, the organisation 
of religious education is under constant academic and public debate. This 
book provides not only important data about the current trends with regard to 
RE in other European countries but also presents and analyses the reasons 






Outline of the thesis 
In Chapter 2, ’Articulating national and regional identity’, I explore the 
perception and articulation of the national self in politicians’ statements and 
in policy documents dealing with the pluralistic nature of society and/or 
immigration policy in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, the 
Council of Europe and the European Union. With regard to the four 
individual countries, my purpose is not only to find out how identity is 
articulated by politicians or policy makers, but also to analyse what is 
required of citizens in order to become ‘respected’ members of a given 
society. In addition, I explore the relationship between the definition of 
identity and the need to create a more cohesive society.  
Chapter 3 is entitled ‘Dealing with cultural diversity’. Here I trace how 
diversity policies are perceived by citizens, especially religious citizens. I 
first introduce and discuss the philosophical debate over group rights. I then 
establish a theoretical framework for the analysis of empirical data. This 
framework consists of three models for the recognition of cultural difference. 
Based on these models, I introduce two sets of framing questions. The first 
set of questions deals with the kinds of expectations societies have towards 
their citizens. The second set focuses on how the needs of minority groups 
have been and are currently recognised by governments. The empirical 
analysis is described at the end of this chapter.  
Chapter 4, ‘Social cohesion and education’, discusses ways in which the 
goal of better cohesion is reflected in educational arrangements. I first 
describe how the subject ‘religious education’ is implemented in these four 
countries, after which I explore the recent criticism of faith schools. Finally, I 
describe the curricular changes made in order to achieve better cohesion. 
In Chapter 5, ‘Values education’, the values and morality education of 
these countries are evaluated. Here I focus on three perspectives: explicitly 
stated values, desirable ethical attitudes, and the means and content of ethical 
reflection. My purpose is to find out (i) what kind of ethical attitude is 
cultivated in pupils, and (ii) to what extent they are encouraged to be 
autonomous in moral matters. This gives us a picture of the extent to which 
the way of life of the parents or other legal guardians is respected; or, from 
another perspective, to what degree the distinction between private and 
public values is maintained in education. 
Chapter 6, ‘Religious education in a multicultural society’, focuses on 
the possibility and/or necessity of religious education in a multicultural 
society. I evaluate and discuss the international legislative framework in the 
light of relevant legal cases that set limits to religious education. In addition, 
I discuss the position of the Council of Europe and the United Nations 
concerning the appropriate content of religious education. These actors are 
free of a specific history of religious education, and thus in a sense represent 
a disinterested point of view in this matter, but at the same time are obligated 





Finally, in Chapter 7 I summarise and discuss my findings, and return to 









Articulating national and regional identity 
 
 
Framing the research problems 
In this chapter I focus on the process of (re)production of national and 
regional identity.1 My main emphasis is on the question of how the national 
self is imagined and articulated in politicians’ statements and in policy 
documents dealing with the pluralistic nature of society and/or immigration 
policy. Before introducing the specific research questions on which my 
enquiry is based, I need to explicate my theoretical position in approaching 
the rather complex concepts of ‘national identity’.2 First of all, I treat 
different articulations of the concept as cognitive constructions about reality. 
From a cognitive perspective, concepts such as ethnicity, race, nationhood 
and national identity are not regarded as “things in the world, but 
perspectives on the world – not ontological but epistemological realities” 
(Brubaker et al. 2004, 45; italics in original). In the case of this study, 
different perspectives on the world show us not only how politicians and 
members of advisory groups perceive or experience the reality, but also how 
they argue in favour of recognising and defining the nation and/or its identity 
in a certain way.  
Secondly, the process of identification does not take place in isolation. 
As Brubaker and Cooper (2000, 14) write, “[h]ow one identifies oneself – 
and how one is identified by others – may vary greatly from context to 
context; self- and other-identification are fundamentally situational and 
contextual.” In other words, identity is not something that ‘is’, but an matter 
                                                
1 I use parentheses with the prefix ‘re’ because in a multicultural nation there is on the 
one hand a need to create a new identity that will accommodate people with different 
ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds, on the other a need to maintain elements of the 
old identity. Thus the parentheses should be read as referring to both meanings: 
redefinition and definition. 
2 See e.g. Brubaker and Cooper (2000). The authors discuss at some length the different 
meanings of ‘identity’ as well as how the understanding of the concept has changed from 
the days when it was first introduced in the social sciences. The confusion around the 
concept has led Brubaker & Cooper (2000, 2-4) to speak of an ‘identity crisis’ in the 
social sciences. The use of the term in the social sciences also depends for instance on a 
particular scholar’s commitment to a certain theoretical tradition (Brubaker & Cooper 
2000, 6-8). 
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of when, where, how (Anttonen 2005, 1033). It is also an issue of why: in 
order to exist, cultural identity “requires a motivation, a purpose, and an 
argumentative goal” (Anttonen 2005, 103). In sum, we need to take into 
account the context in which the articulation takes place. As noted in the 
previous chapter, political documents can be read as answers or solutions to 
the problems that cultural diversity is believed to have caused. In this sense, 
the context is from the very beginning fundamentally different from texts that 
deal with other phenomena in a society – even though, on the surface, similar 
issues might seem to be at stake.  
Acknowledging the political nature of the material, I take it as a 
hypothesis that constructions of identity are ideologically laden, in the sense 
that there is an implicit goal of overcoming diversity and standardising 
citizens (Anttonen 1996, 694), at least to a certain degree. Documents can be 
treated as if they were part of the building process of a nation, in which the 
goal is to create unity among the manifold local and regional cultures within 
the borders of the state (Anttonen 1996, 695). Articulations in the first person 
plural, ‘we’, refer to “a fundamental and consequential sameness among 
members of a group or category” (Brubaker & Cooper 2000, 7; italics in 
original) that is already believed to exist within the majority. This sameness 
can be understood objectively, as a sameness “in itself”, or subjectively, as an 
experienced, felt, or perceived sameness (Brubaker & Cooper 2000, 7). In 
this sense, sameness can also be viewed as providing a norm that dictates in 
what respect all citizens are expected to become similar. 
There is one more important point to take into account with regard to the 
context in which the articulation of identity takes place. We can speak of two 
types of identification: self-identification and external identification – the 
latter referring to the identification and categorisation of oneself by others. 
Normally, identification is a two-way process: while people identify and 
categorise themselves, they also become identified by others. However, here 
the role of the state is unique, in that it has no equal counterpart in this 
process. As representatives of the citizens, politicians can use their power to 
explicate the nature of the state, in this case its identity. Brubaker & Cooper 
(2000, 15) argue that  
 
the state monopolizes, or seeks to monopolize, not only legitimate 
physical force but also legitimate symbolic force, as Bourdieu puts it. 
This includes the power to name, to identify, to categorize, to state 
what is what and who is who. 
 
                                                
3 Anttonen refers to Fryckman (1995, 6). 
4 Anttonen refers to Robertson (1990, 49). 




To return to the main problems of this thesis, it can be argued that the process 
of identity formation or (re)articulation at this level is of particular 
importance because the state not only has the power to name and to state who 
is who (Brubaker & Cooper 2000, 15), but also has “the material and 
symbolic resources to impose the categories, classificatory schemes, and 
modes of social counting and accounting with which bureaucrats, judges, 
teachers, and doctors must work and to which non-state actors must refer” 
(Brubaker & Cooper 2000, 16). It is impossible to talk about a nation’s own 
self-understanding without considering its practical consequences, for 
example for educational policies.  
It is also important to note that the articulation of national identity not 
only provides the means to know ‘who we are’ in the contemporary world 
(see Smith 1993, 17), but is fundamentally a statement as to who belongs to 
the community and is therefore entitled to make claims on it. Broadly 
speaking, we can say that communities identify themselves through their 
common features. As Benedict Anderson (1991) suggests, we can think of 
nations as ‘imagined communities’; although the members can never know 
all the other members, they share an identity based on a common factor, such 
as history, cultural practices, language, religion etc. In the case of 
multicultural nations, however, it has been argued that immigrants, even 
though they have equal legal status with the natives, do not fit this classical 
description of national identity. Normative stances have therefore been 
adopted in order to strip the national identity of its ethnic essence. According 
to this line of thought, the definition of identity should be replaced with a 
more accommodating notion (Williams 2003; Parekh 2000). For example 
Bhikhu Parekh (2000, 232) argues that “the national identity of a community 
should be so defined that it includes all its citizens and makes it possible for 
them to identify with it”; the definition should encompass all citizens as 
“equally valued and legitimate members of the community” (Parekh 2000, 
233). One suggested solution is that a political community should be defined 
only by reference to a shared commitment to the core principles of a 
democratic society. This could be called ‘civic nationalism’ or ‘civic 
community’ (see Williams 2003, 210-211). 
Another way to see the issue is to apply Smith’s (1993, 83) distinction 
between ‘ethnic-genealogical’ and ‘civic-territorial’ conceptions of 
nationalism. The former is about championing a shared ethnicity and a 
common genealogy (shared language, religion, history, customs, race) as 
prerequisites for membership in a national community, while the latter is 
about seeking to bring citizens together and integrate them into a new 
political community. 
 
I examine policy documents and political statements in the light of three 
questions: (i) what kind of national identity is articulated; (ii) what are the 
factors that demarcate who does or does not fit this definition; and (iii) how is 
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a given construction of national identity used with the aim of increasing 
security and solidarity, or inversely, how in the name of security and 
solidarity are different elements of identity legitimated and others de-
legitimated? With regard to the first question my particular focus is on how 
sameness and difference are constructed, and on how differences between 
cultural groups are diminished or exaggerated. As Anttonen (2005, 103) 
writes, “the making of distinctions is argumentative by nature, as we have 
reasons for why difference makes a difference when it makes a difference”. 
Above I formulated the hypothesis that the context of the material implies an 
inherent goal of overcoming diversity and standardising citizens. I am 
interested, assuming that this is true, in the ways in which this takes place.  
With regard to the second question, I map what is required of citizens in 
order for them to qualify as legitimate members of a society. I also look at 
how rigid or flexible these boundaries actually are. In particular, I identify the 
necessary characteristics expected of the individual citizen. As Parekh (2000, 
231) writes,  
 
[e]very long-established political community includes several 
different strands of thought and visions of the good life. Since every 
definition of national identity is necessarily selective and must be 
relatively simple to achieve its intended purposes, it stresses one of 
these strands and visions and delegitimizes or marginalizes other.  
 
This quotation from Parekh is important because the boundaries of inclusion 
or exclusion are not always ones that can be objectively evaluated, such as 
language or culture. Rather, the relevant markers seem to involve the 
attitudes or beliefs that a person holds. My particular interest is in exploring 
the status and role of religious beliefs in the documents and statements 
examined.  
The third question emerges from the notion that any discussion of 
national identity involves an important psychological dimension that needs to 
be taken into account. Some kind of bond is needed to bring co-nationals 
together. As Smith (1991, 11) argues, “nations must have a measure of 
common culture and a civic ideology, a set of common understandings and 
aspirations, sentiments and ideas, that bind the population together in their 
homeland”. Thus the elements that are articulated in documents should 
signify bonds of solidarity among members of communities (Smith 1991, 
15). Walker Connor (1993, 376-377) stresses the importance of the 
psychological nature of that bond (in Triandafyllidou 1998, 597.)  
In the following, I present and discuss policy documents and political 
statements from Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. I then 







Great Britain and the (re)production of national identity between 
1997 and 20076 
In 1997 the Labour Party, the so-called New Labour, won the general 
elections. In its first years of power the Labour government showed an 
interest in embracing ethnic diversity and valuing a cultural mix (see e.g. 
Abbas 2005; Back & al. 2002, 446). One example of this was the granting of 
public funding to two Muslim schools that had previously been denied the 
grant (see e.g. Walford 2003, 282-283).  
Under Labour governance the question of national identity was 
incorporated in the political agenda several times; it has been a central 
element in discussions of citizenship and of how to deal with cultural 
diversity and ethnic relations. The importance of a coherent view of national 
identity was stressed in the report Education for citizenship and the teaching 
of democracy in schools (1998) (better known as the Crick Report). The 
report was the outcome of the Advisory Group on Citizenship, established by 
the Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett. The report refers to “the 
increasingly complex nature of our society, the greater cultural diversity and 
the apparent loss of a value consensus” (QCA 1998, 17 par 3.13; italics 
added). Furthermore, it is stated that “‘cultural diversity’ raises the issue of 
national identity” (QCA 1998, 17 par 3.13). As a solution, the report suggests 
that a sense of common citizenship should be cultivated in citizens: 
 
[r]esponding to the worries, a main aim for the whole community 
should be to find or restore a sense of common citizenship, including 
a national identity that is secure enough to find a place in the 
plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long 
found in the United Kingdom (QCA 1998, 17 par 3.14).7 
 
There are two interesting points about this extract. First, there is no clear 
                                                
6 In the previous chapter, I pointed out that due to Britain’s colonial history it has been 
acquainted with diversity for centuries. However, although Britain has also received 
immigrants for centuries, the country has traditionally been a net population exporter. It 
was only in the mid-1980s that the United Kingdom become a country of immigration. 
Today, around 9 % of the population is non-white. (Somerville et al. 2009.) 
7 To formalise central ideas of the document in the form of argument presented in the 
previous chapter, the argument looks like as follows: P1: There is increased complexity in 
the society due to cultural diversity (QCA 1998, 17 par 3.13). P2: The situation is 
perceived with anxiety: “Responding to the worries, a main aim for the whole community 
should be to find or restore a sense of common citizenship” (ibid, 17 par 3.14). P3: One 
problem within the British society is a loss a value consensus. There are also “worrying 
levels of apathy, ignorance and cynicism about public life” (ibid, 8 par 1.5). P4: One 
reason for this is inadequate educational arrangements (ibid, 7 par 1.1). P5: A goal is to 
foster a common sense of citizenship and create “a national identity that is secure to find 
a place in the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in 
the United Kingdom” (ibid, 17 par 3.14). Conclusion: There ought to be uniform and 
“systematic approach to citizenship education” (ibid, 7 par 1.4). 
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vision as to what the current national identity actually is. Indeed, identity is 
presented as something that is still evolving. Secondly, a connection is seen 
between the current situation and a lack of a sense of cohesion among 
citizens. It is also interesting that while the report stresses that citizens have 
certain responsibilities, it simultaneously makes a distinction between ‘us’ 
and ‘others’:  
 
Majorities must respect, understand and tolerate minorities and 
minorities must learn and respect the laws, codes and conventions as 
much as the majority – not merely because it is useful to do so, but 
because this process helps foster common citizenship (QCA 1998, 
17-18 par 3.16). 
 
It is quite clearly stated that it is minorities (‘the others’) that have problems 
with respecting the basic principles of British society. The document, 
however, does not say which particular minorities are involved and in what 
respect these problems have arisen. 
The extract highlights the importance of society’s norms, including 
laws, codes and conventions, as essential ingredients of common citizenship. 
Here we find a similarity to Rawls’ idea of the reasonable citizen: “[t]he 
reasonable is an element of the idea of society as a system of fair co-
operation. ... Reasonable persons ... desire for its own sake a social world in 
which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can 
accept.” (Rawls 1993, 49-50.) 
It was via the Runnymede Trust Commission’s report, The Future of 
Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000), that the issue of national identity became a 
matter of public dispute. In the chapter ‘Rethinking the National Story’, the 
writers ask: “[w]hat is Britain’s understanding of itself?”, and whether 
‘Britishness’, as previously understood, has a future. They also argue that the 
concept of identity is controversial – “Britain seems incapable of shaking off 
its imperialist identity” – and adopt a normative stance in favour of a more 
accommodating vision: “Genuinely multicultural Britain urgently needs to re-
imagine itself” (Runnymede Trust 2000, 38). The sentence most widely 
quoted and discussed in the media was “Britishness, as much as Englishness, 
has systematic, largely unspoken, racial connotations” (Abbas 2005, 158-
159; Back et al. 2002, 447). 
The time when the report was published is now seen as the heyday of 
British multicultural policy in its celebration of diversity, but this era only 
lasted a short time. The change began with the civil unrest of the summer of 
2001 in the northern cities of Britain, and the attacks of September 11. These 
incidents foregrounded the idea of strengthening community cohesion. (See 
e.g. Abbas 2005 159; Back et al. 2002, 446; Joppke 2004, 249-250.)  
The phrase ‘community cohesion’ appears in the Cantle report, 
Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team chaired by 




investigation of the riots. The review team consisted of a group of politicians, 
social workers and local government experts with strong ‘minority’ 
credentials. The report argues that there is a need for a greater sense of 
citizenship (Home Office 2001, 10 par 2.13) and that common elements of 
‘nationhood’ need to be clarified and agreed upon (Home Office 2001, 19 par 
5.1.7). The suggested key issues around which identity can be built were 
language and law.  
The report also argues that there is no going back to a “monoculturalist 
view of nationality” (Home Office 2001, 18 par 5.1.4). The writers thus 
recognise the existence of a perception of identity, which has now proved to 
be problematic. Similarly to the view in Crick report, the new identity is 
considered to be still evolving.  
The main point of the report lies in the emphasis placed on the 
importance of sharing common principles:  
 
[M]any of the present problems seem to owe a great deal to the 
failure to communicate and agree a set of clear values that can 
govern behaviour. This failure is evident at both the national and 
local levels, and it has led to community breakdown in some parts of 
the country, due to particular circumstances or triggers. (Home 
Office 2001, 18 par 5.1.1.) 
 
According to the report, it is the increased cultural plurality due to mass 
immigration that has created problems in the area of common norms and 
values. When the report was published, Home Secretary David Blunkett 
(cited in Joppke 2004, 251) stated: “We have norms of acceptability and 
those who come into our home – for that is what it is – should accept these 
norms.” Interestingly, in this document too a distinction is made between ‘us’ 
and ‘others’, in this case between ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ communities. It is 
made clear that both ‘communities’ need to revise their attitudes and change 
their behaviour. (Home Office 2001, 19 par 5.1.9.) 8 
                                                
8 To formalise the document in the mode of argument set down in the previous chapter, 
the argument looks as follows: P1: There is polarisation in towns and cities. “[M]any 
communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives.” One example of this is 
education arrangements. (Home Office 2001, 9 par 2.1.) P2: The Community Cohesion 
Review Team ”was struck by the depth of polarisation” (ibid, 9 par 2.1). P3: Along with 
segregation, the problem is that ”ignorance about each others’ communities can easily 
grow into fear; especially where this is exploited by extremist groups determined to 
undermine community harmony and foster divisions” (ibid, 9 par 2.3). P4: “[T]here has 
been little attempt to develop clear values which focus on what it means to be a citizen of 
a modern multi-racial Britain and many still look backwards to some supposedly halcyon 
days of a mono-cultural society, or alternatively look to their country of origin for some 
form of identity” (ibid, 9 par 2.6). Many of the problems owe to a great deal to the failure 
to communicate and agree a set of clear values that can govern citizens’ behaviour (ibid, 
18 par 5.1.1). P5: The goal is to promote community cohesion, “based upon a greater 
knowledge of, contact between, and respect for, the various cultures that now make Great 
Britain such a rich and diverse nation” (ibid, 10 par 2.12) and create understanding that 
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The idea of core values as at the heart of national identity, and of the 
non-ethnic essence of identity, is even more explicit in the government’s 
White Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in 
Modern Britain (2002). The document claims that Britain has been a multi-
ethnic nation for centuries and that “society is based on cultural difference, 
rather than assimilation to a prevailing monoculture” (Home Office 2002, 10 
par 5). It also maintains that “British nationality has never been associated 
with membership of a particular ethnic group”. The current situation, 
however, gives rise to anxiety; the Government recognises that migration 
poses a challenge “to our concepts of national identity and citizenship” 
(Home Office 2002, 9 par 4). In addition, it is acknowledged that the 
integration of immigrants has failed and that the society has become 
subdivided into various groups. Thus there is an urgent need for actions that 
will bind citizens together:  
 
The reports into last summer’s disturbances in Bradford, Oldham and 
Burnley painted a vivid picture of fractured and divided 
communities, lacking a sense of common values or shared civic 
identity to unite around (Home Office 2002, 10 par 6). 
 
The remedy, as in the Crick Report and the Cantle Report, is seen as a 
commitment to common values. Simultaneously, a plea is made for a 
stronger notion of citizenship: 
 
To ensure social integration and cohesion in the UK, we need to 
develop a stronger understanding of what citizenship really means. 
Historically, the UK has had a relatively weak sense of what active 
citizenship should entail. Our values of individual freedom, the 
protection of liberty and respect for difference, have not been 
accompanied by a strong, shared understanding of the civic realm. 
(Home Office 2002, 10-11 par 8; italics added.) 
 
In the chapter entitled ‘Citizenship and nationality’ the ideas of commonly 
shared values and citizenship are treated with more detail. It is written that 
“[w]e need to develop a sense of civic identity and shared values” (Home 
Office 2002, 32 par 2.11; italics added). These shared values can be derived 
from the Human Rights Act (Home Office 2002, 30 par 2.3). However, other 
values as well as virtues are also mentioned as a basis of British citizenship, 
namely democratic values, faithful observance of laws and fulfilling duties 
and obligations (Home Office 2002, 34 par 2.21). 
As far as citizenship is concerned, the government wants it to be as 
inclusive as possible: 
                                                
both white and non-white communities will need to change both attitudes and behaviour 




Common citizenship is not about cultural uniformity, nor is it born 
out of some narrow and out-dated view of what it means to be 
‘British’. The Government welcomes the richness of the cultural 
diversity which immigrants have brought to the UK – our society is 
multi-cultural, and is shaped by its diverse peoples. We want British 
citizenship positively to embrace the diversity of background, culture 
and faiths that is one of the hallmarks of Britain in the 21st Century. 
(Home Office 2002, 29 par 2.2.) 
 
One important point to note is that although the White Paper speaks of values 
that should apply in the public sphere (civic realm, civic identity), it is 
suggested that they should apply in the private sphere as well: “[i]t will 
sometimes be necessary to confront some cultural practices which conflict 
with these basic values – such as those which deny women the right to 
participate as equal citizens” (Home Office 2002, 30 par 2.3).9 
Before summarising my main findings about these documents, I 
examine the views on national identity of two politicians, David Blunkett and 
Gordon Brown. In a speech entitled ‘A New England: An English Identity 
within Britain’, delivered at the Institute for Public Policy Research (14 
March 2005), Blunkett asks where, in a situation of diversity, a shared sense 
of identity can be found. His answer is fairly well in line with what we have 
already seen: 
 
Britishness is defined not on ethnic and exclusive grounds – but 
through our shared values, our history of tolerance, of openness and 
internationalism, our commitment to democracy and liberty, to civic 
duty and the public space (Blunkett 2005, 4). 
 
In one of his speeches, Gordon Brown is more precise. He speaks of British 
                                                
9 The argumentative structure of the White Paper goes as follows: P1: In recent years, the 
changes associated with globalisation have led to greater complexity in the society (Home 
Office 2002, 9 par 2). P2: Migration brings huge benefits, but can also raise tensions 
unless properly understood and well managed (ibid, 9 par 3). P3: ”[W]e have failed. The 
reports into last summer’s disturbances in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley painted a vivid 
picture of fractured and divided communities, lacking a sense of common values or 
shared civic identity to unite around” (ibid, 10 par 6; see also 22 par 1.7). P4: One reason 
for the failure is that “[h]istorically, the UK has had a relatively weak sense of what 
active citizenship should entail” (Home Office 2002, 10 par 8). P5: In order to correct the 
situation “the social fabric of our communities” should be fostered and renewed as well as 
“a sense of common citizenship, which embraces the different and diverse experiences of 
today’s Britain” should be rebuilt (ibid, 10 par 6). Conclusion: The Government shall take 
initiatives to organise “an open and constructive debate about citizenship, civic identity 
and shared values.” This is viewed as the basis for “bringing together people of different 
races, cultures and religions in a cohesive society.” (Ibid, 10 par 7.) As concrete actions, 
new citizens are offered language teaching and education for citizenship. Among others 
effects, this will strengthen the bonds of mutual understanding between people of diverse 
cultural backgrounds. (Ibid, 11 par 9.) 





I think the days of Britain having to apologise for our history are 
over. I think we should move forward. I think we should celebrate 
much of our past rather than apologise for it and we should talk, 
rightly so, about British values. 
We can find common qualities and common values that have made 
Britain the country it is. (BBC 2005.) 
 
Both politicians find a certain consistency among the majority; in other 
words, the majority share the core values of the society. According to them, it 
is this consistency around which the British identity is and should be 
constructed. 
 
To sum up the material presented above: while it is clear that a definition of 
national identity cannot be based on ethnic construction, it is unclear how 
explicitly national identity should be understood (first question). However, 
what seems to be a common denominator is that citizens should agree on 
certain values. These values are derived from legal and/or human rights 
standards.  
With regard to those who do not fit the definition (second question), it is 
apparently the attitudes and values of citizens that serve as a designator. No 
one is excluded because of race or ethnic origin, but rather because he or she 
does not respect those values. Thus belonging or not belonging to a 
community is not necessarily a permanent state. One’s origins cannot be 
changed, but it is believed that one’s ways of thinking can. 
What, then, can be said as to national identity in relation to the need to 
increase security and solidarity (third question)? In the documents discussed 
here, plurality is welcomed but is simultaneously seen as a source of anxiety. 
The importance of an internalisation of core values is also evident in the 
process of increasing security and creating community cohesion. Insecurity, 
on the other hand, is regarded as the result of a lack of commonly shared 
values. It is illuminating to compare this attitude to the Labour government’s 
definition of society’s values in 1998, before the riots in northern England 
and the rise of political Islam. As already noted, the end of the twentieth 
century is regarded as a time of embracing ethnic diversity and valuing a 
cultural mix. In The Government’s Annual Report 97/98, important values 
referred to were “decency, social justice, reward for hard work, the 
importance of strong communities and families, and rights being matched 
with responsibilities” (Her Majesty’s Government 1998, 9; cited in Starkey 
2000, 51; italics added). After the riots and September 11, the idea of 
commitment to strong sub-communities has been replaced with the idea of a 




Since the role of common values is seen as so vital, it is somewhat odd 
that no mention is made of exactly which values are in conflict with these; 
not to mention whose values or which group’s. Conflicts among citizens in 
the sphere of values are referred to with an example only two times. The 
Crick Report states that “minorities must learn and respect the laws, codes 
and conventions as much as the majority” (QCA 1998, 17-18 par 3.16; italics 
added). In Secure Borders, Safe Haven it says that “[i]t will sometimes be 
necessary to confront some cultural practices which conflict with these basic 
values – such as those which deny women the right to participate as equal 
citizens” (Home Office 2002, 30 par 2.3). What is interesting is that the latter 
quotation refers to cultural practices that cause conflicts. It is worth asking: 
what is the status of society’s values? One possible interpretation – this is a 
hypothesis – is that society’s values are regarded as being neutral and secular; 
in other words, they are not cultural in the same sense as the values of various 
sub-groups. Referring explicitly to neutrality would undoubtedly be a better 
way (philosophically) to persuade those who do not currently respect these 
values to adopt them than admitting that these too are culturally driven.  
It is also worth asking whether it is enough for society’s basic values to 
be accepted merely for political purposes, as for instance Rawls’ theory 
suggests. I return to this topic in connection with the identity articulation of 
the Netherlands, and again in the Discussion section of this chapter. 
 
 
The Netherlands  
The Netherlands, like Britain, is a multicultural nation, with a history, since 
the beginning of the 1960s, of accommodating great numbers of immigrants. 
According to an estimate by the Netherlands Central Bureau for Statistics 
(Central Bureau voor de Statistiek), in 2010 some 20% of the population had 
a foreign background (Statline 2010). Approximately 5% came from other 
EU countries (Migration Policy Institute 2011). The main immigrant groups 
are Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans (Migration Policy Institute 
2011). 
Before the 1990s, the official Dutch policy with regard to cultural 
diversity was a kind of communitarian pluralism, the official slogan being 
“integration while preserving one’s own [i.e. the immigrants’] identity” 
(Karsten 2006, 27-28; see also Vasta 2007, 716-717; Joppke 2004, 247-248). 
The Dutch history of embracing diversity goes back as far as the beginning of 
the twentieth century. The Dutch system, known as ‘pillarization’, has been a 
unique arrangement in the European context: different societal sub-groups 
each had their own state-sponsored and semi-autonomous institutions for 
health care, social welfare, education etc. Thus it is fair to say that the 
Netherlands has had a multicultural identity long before the start of the most 
recent wave of immigration. There is a strong legal foundation for the 
arrangement, since it is laid down in the Constitution.  
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While the system of pillarization gradually ended during the second half 
of the twentieth century, its most distinctive feature, that of establishing a 
‘community of communities’, can still be seen for example in the educational 
system, where the private sector, including schools with a religious profile, is 
large and completely funded by the state.  
 
 
Rearticulating identity by polarising Dutch and Islamic values  
Due to mass immigration, this system of multiple ‘sub-societies’ within a 
larger encompassing society has proved to be problematic. It is the 
incommensurability of Western values with certain religious beliefs and 
practices that has been one of the main triggers of the debate over the 
significance of immigration. Han Enzinger (2006, 132) notes that many 
public and parliamentary debates focus specifically on religion. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the main source of the problem has been the 
presence of Islam. Ellie Vasta (2007, 714) calls this “a schism between 
immigrant Muslims and the native ‘Dutch’ over basic democratic values such 
as freedom of speech and the position of women in Muslim communities”.  
In the political sphere the criticism of Islamic values first emerged in 
1991, when the parliamentary Liberal Party started questioning the success of 
the multicultural policy; the party asserted that the Netherlands should not 
accommodate certain practices carried out in the name of religion. While 
tolerance is one of the major values in the Dutch society, it should not be 
extended to intolerance. Since 2001 such criticism has increased. (Karsten 
2006, 28.) 
What, then, are the issues that have caused criticism? According to 
Enzinger (2006, 132), the parliamentary debate has focused on genital 
mutilation, honour killings, incitement to jihad and terrorism. He reminds us 
that these practices are not really widespread among Muslims in the 
Netherlands. Another topic that has given rise to criticism in public is gender 
inequality, which according to Anna Korteweg (2006) is the frame within 
which differences in ethnicity, civic values and religion have mostly been 
discussed.  
As far as gender equality is concerned, there is at least one government 
document dealing with the disadvantaged position of Muslim women. The 
survey by the Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) was published in 
2003. It stated that more than half (53 %) of ethnic-minority women face 
disadvantages. The women in question were predominantly Muslim (Turkish 
or Moroccan), but a relatively large number of single mothers of Surinamese 
and Antillean descent also fell into this category. Most of them were 
unemployed, poorly educated and economically dependent. According to 
Aart Jan de Geus, the Minister for Social Affairs and Employment, these 
findings confirm the view that emancipation and integration should be high 





In 2004 the Dutch government argued that since the Netherlands is home 
to citizens with different value systems, a few basic values needed to be 
shared by all. The basic values mentioned were derived from the Constitution 
and from international Conventions; they included equality of treatment, 
freedom of religion, freedom of speech and association, respect for privacy, 
and the right to inviolability of one’s person. (Government of the Netherlands 
2004b.) 
In 2009 the government declared that those aspects of Islamic law 
(Sharia) which involve compulsion, pressure and abuse of power are 
inconsistent with Dutch law. In particular those aspects that deal with 
differences between men and women, along with divorce laws, conflict with 
the key values of Dutch society. According to Justice Minister Ernst Hirsch 
Ballin,  
 
[t]he cabinet’s job is to ensure that the Netherlands does not develop 
a parallel society in which people take the law into their own hands 
or maintain their own legal system which operates outside the 
framework of our own legal system. (Dutch News 2009.) 
 
This quotation suggests the existence of (at least) two possible scenarios for 
the future. The undesirable alternative is a society divided into sub-groups, 
each with its own values; the other, desirable one is a more cohesive society, 
where everyone follows certain basic rules and norms. It is important to note 
that the current situation is perceived as being located somewhere between 
these two alternatives. It can potentially lead to either outcome; thus it is all 
about what actions are taken in the near future. 
 
 
Some aspects of the polarisation between Dutch and Islamic values and 
practices 
In relation to the articulation of national identity in Britain, I noted above that 
the question remains open as to what or which groups’ values are in conflict 
with the core values of the society. In the British documents explored here, 
there is only one reference to “certain cultural practices” which deny “women 
the right to participate as equal citizens” (Home Office 2002, 30 par 2.3). As 
I have shown, in the case of the Netherlands the main conflict is between the 
democratic values of native Dutch people and certain values and practices 
characteristic of Islam.  
In an article entitled ‘Multiculturalism, pillarization and liberal civic 
education in the Netherlands’ (2001), Ben Spiecker and Jan Steutel have 
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analysed differences among the Dutch and Islamic cultures.10 They argue that 
although the system of pillarization was designed to cherish group cultures, 
members of all groups strongly identified with the Christian-Humanistic 
tradition, sharing the same historical narratives and collective experiences 
and using the same language (Spiecker & Steutel 2001, 296-297). The point 
is that there existed a sort of national culture, ‘a shared roof’, to use the 
expression of Spiecker and Steutel. With Muslim immigrants, however, the 
case is different, since they have brought with them Islamic conceptions of 
government, law, marriage, and family life. Therefore those who want to 
maintain these Islamic ideas “do not and cannot share the same roof” with the 
majority. According to Spiecker and Steutel (2001, 299) “the most intense 
cultural conflicts relate to inconsistencies between the rules and values of 
Islamic family life and the typical western laws of Dutch society.”  
It is worth considering this issue in the light of Rawls’ theory of the 
‘reasonable citizen’. According to Rawls, as already observed, citizens whom 
we can term ‘reasonable’ can hold whatever beliefs they wish in private, as 
long as they are willing to affirm the supreme political authority of liberal 
principles in public. Now, Spiecker and Steutel give an example of the 
inconsistency between the Western and Islamic ways of life by referring to 
the values and norms that Muslims hold in private. From the perspective of a 
Rawlsian just society, all Muslims should affirm the supreme authority of 
liberal principles. The question we need to ask is this: if, for the sake of 
argument, all Muslims accepted democratic Dutch values in the name of 
peaceful co-existence among citizens, for instance for prudential reasons,11 
but still held Islamic values in private, would this be satisfactory in the eyes 
of the politicians who represent the opinion of the majority? If the answer 
were in the negative, this would mean that the idealistic distinction between 
public and private is not that easy to apply in the eyes of the majority. I return 
to this issue later in this chapter. 
Getting back to differences between the Dutch and Islamic cultures, the 
two cultures also vary considerably with regard to the status of a member of a 
given cultural group. To clarify the point: we need to consider the differences 
between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. One shared characteristic 
of individualistic cultures is that “people’s social behaviour is largely 
                                                
10 With regard to Dutch culture, the writers speak of the “dominant ideology of a nation” 
and the “ideological cement of the nation” (Spiecker & Steutel 2001, 293). They also 
comment that in a nation-state, “its population, or at least the vast majority of its 
inhabitants, shares a common culture, which may be called a national culture” (ibid, 296). 
11 See Tamir’s (1995, 170) discussion of the conditions on which illiberal cultures would 
accept liberal ideals: “illiberal cultures do not have the theoretical foundations that would 
allow them to pay genuine respect to liberal ones”. They feel that “they have been forced 
to join a liberal game, which places liberal values” on them. However, they might accept 
a compromise, a second-best solution, if the only real alternative is worse. But, Tamir 
stresses, this would happen “merely out of necessity as their own principles do not leave 




determined by personal goals that often only slightly overlap with the goals 
of collectives, like the family, the work group, coreligionists, fellow 
countrymen and the state” (Spiecker and Steutel 2001, 297). In collectivistic 
cultures, in contrast, a social behaviour is “determined by goals shared with 
the collective” and “giving precedence to collective values over 
individualistic ones is considered highly desirable”. Defining which values 
are important for each type of culture, Spiecker and Steutel cite Harry C. 
Triandis (1990, 68):  
 
For collectivists, social order, self-discipline, social recognition, 
humility, honouring parents and elders, accepting my position in life, 
and preserving my public image. For individuals, equality, freedom, 
an exciting life, a varied life, and enjoyment. 
 
Maintaining a focus on these notions, Spiecker and Steutel (2001, 297-298) 
argue that in the heyday of pillarization Dutch culture was actually quite 
collectivistic, but that the ongoing individualisation of society has been one 
major reason for de-pillarization.  
 
 
Articulation of national identity in public debate and policy documents 
Thus far I have examined political discourse on the subject of immigration. 
The need for a comprehensive definition of national identity became a 
publicly disputed issue in the Netherlands in 2007, when the Argentine-born 
princess Máxima, wife of Crown Prince Willem Alexander, said at the 
publication of a report about identifying with the Netherlands that there is 
actually no such thing as a Dutch identity:  
 
My search for the Dutch identity began around seven years ago. I had 
the help of dozens of generous and wise experts. But a Dutch 
identity? No, I didn’t find one. The Netherlands is large windows 
without curtains so that everybody can look in but also the right to 
privacy and being cosy. ... The Netherlands is too complex to sum up 
in one cliché. (Crossroads 2007; Radio Netherlands 2007.) 
 
This statement aroused serious criticism from intellectuals, for example Paul 
Scheffer, as well as politicians, such as Geert Wilders, leader of the 
nationalist Party for Freedom, and Ruud Lubbers, former Dutch prime 
minister and ex-UN High Commissioner for Refugees. While Scheffer 
argued that the underlying assumption of a world citizen is unrealistic, 
Lubbers was of the opinion that there is a Dutch identity since “no one would 
fail to recognize a Dutch person when they meet one”. He admitted that 
Dutch identity is continually developing and being refined. (Crossroads 2007; 
Radio Netherlands 2007.) 
Eventually, the government had to comment on the Princess’s statement. 
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Integration Minister Ella Vogelaar, Justice Minister Ernst Hirsch Ballin and 
Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende had in fact approved the speech, and 
the cabinet took complete responsibility for the text. In the words of Minister 
Vogelaar: 
 
I understood the speech as saying that a single Dutch identity doesn’t 
exist but that doesn’t mean that we don’t have a number of 
characteristics in common. The Dutch identity isn’t static. We’re 
now in a phase of trying to find out exactly what Dutch identity is. 
(Crossroads 2007; Radio Netherlands 2007.) 
 
This episode relating to national identity took place in a totally different 
context from the debates described above. Although this discourse too is 
about who is a legitimate member of society, it is free of any pressure to 
provide concrete solutions; in other words to find a sameness that would 
easily divide citizens between ‘us’ and ‘them’, as in the case of statements 
dealing with the presence of Muslims in Dutch society. Thus it is no surprise 
that the ministers’ answer is as accommodating as possible. No borders are 
drawn as markers of either inclusion or exclusion. 
 
The issue of national identity was also treated explicitly in 2007 in the report 
Identification with the Netherlands (Identificatie met Nederland) (2007) by 
the Scientific Council for Government Policy, WWR (Wetenschppelijke 
Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid).12 According to the WWR report,13 the 
question of national identity is currently an important issue because of the 
multicultural nature of Dutch society. The underlying concern is that 
immigrants and their children, as well as some native Dutch, do not always 
feel at home in the Netherlands. (WWR 2007, 11.) There is also a fear that 
cultural diversity may weaken the sense of trust between groups, as well as in 
the society as a whole. According to the report, there are two main problems: 
Islamic fundamentalism, and the far right’s response to the presence of 
immigrants. (WWR 2007, 14.) 
The report stresses the urgent need for a strong, clearly articulated sense 
of national identity (WWR 2007, 11). In comparison to the statements by 
politicians, it is interesting to see that the report strongly questions the current 
trend of dividing citizens into two camps, with unrealistic expectations 
placed on one of them while the other can remain more or less as it is: 
                                                
12 The WWR is a strong voice in the Netherlands, and its work has influenced Dutch 
government policies over the last decades. In one of its previous reports, published in 
1979, the WWR for example categorised immigrants as a group of ethnic minorities. This 
laid the ground for the 1983 government policy on immigrants and ethnic minorities, 
calling for the protection of minority identities. The principle of preserving the native 
language of immigrants was also recommended by the WWR. (Entzinger 2003.)  





The story of ‘the’ unifying/unified Dutch national identity confirms 
and strengthens an undesirable and too simplistic distinction between 
established residents and newcomers, autochthones [native Dutch] 
and allochthones [immigrants]. Allochtones as a group are defined in 
terms of what they are not: not from here. At the same time, the 
demand is that they become completely Dutch. However, if we keep 
holding onto a historical description of being Dutch, they will never 
succeed in that. (WWR 2007, 17; italics in original.) 
 
The report suggests functional identification, in which the starting premise is 
that “people are no longer seen primarily as members of an ethnic group but 
as individuals with widely varying functional ties” (WWR 2007, 14). In the 
next chapter I present three theoretical models for the treatment of difference 
in a culturally plural society. The point of the WWR solution is that real 
opportunities should be created for expanding and revising the civil sphere 
through interaction among groups, and of course among individuals.  
With regard to the core values that provide a framework for civic co-
operation, the report stresses that all citizens should adopt these values 
unconditionally; at the same time, however, it maintains that the discursive 
universe within which the debate over values occurs should be widened:  
 
Not everybody has an equal say in this process [of modifying 
norms]. ... It is important that minority groups and individuals can 
promote norms, because the one-sided focus in policy and public 
debate on adjusting to [existing] norms can be counterproductive.14 
(WWR 2007, 15.) 
 
According to the report, the role of government policy is considered to be of 
special importance in this process; thus the Dutch government should ensure 
that the media as well as politicians themselves clearly represent a diversity 
of viewpoints (WWR 2007, 16).  
 
To return to the questions formulated in the introduction to this chapter: the 
first conclusion to be drawn is that in the Netherlands, as in Britain, the 
national identity articulated in policy documents and by politicians is not 
strongly based on ethnic construction.15 Rather than asserting what actually 
constitutes the Dutch national identity, it is easier to focus on what it is not. 
From the material analysed, we can conclude that, as in Britain, identity is 
not regarded as fixed. The political debate triggered by the presence of Islam, 
however, suggests that at the heart of national identity are values. Values are 
                                                
14 The report gives no concrete examples of what values are negotiable. 
15 Korteweg (2008, 10) and Entzinger (2006) disagree with this conclusion. According to 
them, being Dutch is starting to look more like an ethnic construct because of increasing 
assertions of a need for linguistic and cultural homogeneity both in the media and the 
government. 
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a necessary ingredient of national identity. In this sense, the question of who 
fits this definition is quite easy to answer. Immigrants are expected to adopt 
the core values of society, and to act and behave in their daily practices 
accordingly. The marker of demarcation is the attitude of a citizen. As 
Enzinger (2006, 132) argues:  
 
[m]ore than before, immigrant integration appears to be defined in 
terms of loyalty to and identification with “Dutch values and norms”, 
rather than in terms of their social and institutional participation.  
 
With regard to the third question, the psychological dimension of identity, 
citizens’ attitudes towards the society’s core values play an essential role. As 
in the case of Britain, values are believed to play an important role in creating 
cohesion among citizens. Furthermore, since the presence of certain Islamic 
values and practices is seen as a threat to social order and is believed to lead 
to segregation, it is plausible to infer that core values are expected to be 
adopted as personally binding, not only in public and for the sake of 




I have argued that in both Britain and the Netherlands the society’s core 
values play a central role in forming the non-negotiable core of the national 
identity. Values also form an essential element in attempts to promote social 
cohesion and create a sense of security among citizens. In this sense, the case 
of Sweden is similar. With regard to the process of defining national identity, 
on the other hand, Sweden differs in two ways from Britain and the 
Netherlands. First, the debate over values took place over a decade before 
them, and secondly, preserving national cultural heritage that also includes 
religion (Evangelic Lutheran), has had a salient role in Sweden’s immigration 
policy in the mid-1990s.  
Sweden, like Britain and the Netherlands, has been open to immigration 
for decades. From 1945 until the early 1970s most immigrants were labour 
immigrants from other Nordic countries and from southern Europe. After the 
early seventies labour immigration declined and refugee immigration began. 
(Graham 1999, 27.) Immigration reform took place in 1985, causing an 
increase in the number of refugees from five thousand refugees annually to 
fourteen thousand (Graham 1999, 35). Since then a growing number of 
Middle-Eastern refugees has arrived in Sweden from Eastern Turkey, 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. In the early 1990s there was also a large 
influx of refugees from the former Yugoslavia. (Graham 1999, 27.) 
In 1986 the Swedish Government produced a White Paper The 
government bill on immigration policy (Regeringens proposition om 




cultural ‘freedom of choice’, was problematic; it needed to be clarified and 
made more precise.16 According to the White Paper, it was unclear to some 
immigrants what laws and rules of conduct were valid in Sweden. In some 
cases, for example, ‘freedom of choice’ was interpreted as permitting forms 
of education for immigrant children that inculcated values deviating sharply 
from basic Swedish ways of thinking (grundsyn), as expressed in laws and 
political decisions (see Riksdagen 1986); it was also interpreted as conferring 
the right to practice female circumcision and child marriage (see Riksdagen 
1991a, 80).  
The Swedish Parliament made it clear that there were “basic values for 
which there is political unity” and that these formed the framework within 
which ‘cultural freedom of choice’ could be practiced. The possibility of 
endorsing customs, norms, values and practices “that conflict with Swedish 
law” was thus ruled out. The important values explicitly stated in the White 
Paper included democracy, gender equality and children’s rights. (Riksdagen 
1986, 20.) 
The White Paper also deals with the question of the multicultural 
identity of Sweden. It is written that according to the previous White Paper 
on immigration policy (adopted in 1975), “Sweden is on its way to becoming 
a multicultural society, and this is to be seen as a positive development”. 
However, it is acknowledged that during the last decade the society has 
become more ethnically diverse and new cultural patterns have been 
established. (Riksdagen 1986, 15.) The document also states that the 
development of Sweden in the direction of a multicultural society will 
inevitably involve difficulties and even the danger of conflict (Riksdagen 
1986, 17).17 In 1996, another government report, Sweden: Future and 
Diversity (Sverige: Framtiden och Mångfalden) (1996) recognises that 
Sweden is an “unavoidably multicultural society” (SOU 1996:55; in Soininen 
1999, 692). 
                                                
16 Freedom of choice was one of the three objects established as the bedrock of 
immigration policy in 1975. I return to this in Chapter 3. 
17 The argumentative structure of the White Paper goes as follows: P1: Swedish society 
has become more ethnically plural and new cultural patterns have been established 
(Riksdagen 1986, 15). P2: In a society where different groups live side by side ethnic 
conflicts are a latent danger (ibid, 21). One goal of the earlier immigration policy, namely 
‘freedom of choice’, is now seen as problematic, as it is unclear to some immigrants what 
laws and rules of conduct are valid in Sweden. P3 & P4: Freedom of choice has been 
misinterpreted, by some immigrants, as permitting practices that actually deviate strongly 
from the basic principles expressed in Swedish legislation and political decisions. On the 
other hand, minorities face discrimination and intolerance. (Ibid, 20.) P5: There is a need 
to create good ethnic relations and real opportunities to develop one’s own cultural 
heritage as well as to increase communication among people with different cultural 
backgrounds. This should take place within the framework of the basic principles of 
Swedish society. (Ibid, 18; 21.) 
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The next government report, issued in 1990 under the title Active 
refugee and immigration policy (Aktiv flykting och immigrationspolitik) 
declares that it is no longer easy to define what is specifically Swedish. 
Interestingly, the document recognises that a national identity includes a 
normative side, with possible negative effects on those who do not belong to 
the majority since it easily regulates right and wrong, sharpens 
contradictions, and introduces distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This in 
turn may lead to a situation in which ethnic communities start to protect 
themselves from majority pressure “by building cultural defences against the 
outside world.” Simultaneously the report points out that many Swedes 
would themselves feel uncomfortable if they were forced to adopt what can 
be called ‘normal Swedishness’. In this sense, it is seen as both difficult and 
inappropriate to enunciate any specific ‘non-negotiable’ Swedish values.18 
Interestingly, according to the document, the negotiation of ‘cultural values’ 
is welcomed “since these values are not once and for all”. (Riksdagen 1991a, 
83.) In this sense cultural values are regarded as contingent, and certainly as 
being changeable. 
In 1998, Swedish immigration policy was transformed into a policy of 
integration. According to the parliamentary White Paper, Sweden, the future 
and diversity: from immigration policy to integration policy (Sverige, 
framtiden och mångfalden – från invandrarpolitik till integrationspolitik) the 
former principle of immigration policy, freedom of choice, had been created 
in part as a specific policy for ethnic groups. However, this policy reinforced 
the division of the population into ‘us’ and ‘them’, thereby contributing to the 
sense of alienation that many immigrants and their children experience in 
Swedish society. Simultaneously, many citizens belonging to the majority 
saw this arrangement as a threat to the Swedish national character. 
(Riksdagen 1997, 18.) An important objective of the new integration policy 
was to safeguard basic democratic values and to promote equal rights and 
opportunities for women and men (Riksdagen 1997, 21).19 
One important point to note is that while cultural plurality is seen in the 
White Paper Sweden future and diversity (Sverige framtiden och mångfalden) 
(1996) as “a question for society, not an immigrant question” (SOU 1996:55, 
72; in Graham 1999, 119), a distinction is nevertheless made between the 
national culture and immigrant cultures. While it is recognised that in the 
course of history cultures cannot remain intact or unchanged (SOU 1996:55, 
354; in Graham, 120), it is argued that the state has a “historical 
responsibility to safeguard the Swedish cultural heritage” (SOU 1996:55, 
                                                
18 However, it is also stated that Swedish legislation places clear limits on human 
interaction (Riksdagen 1991a, 82). 
19 I present the argumentative structure of the White Paper in the next chapter when I 




353-354; in Graham 1999, 119) in which an essential ingredient is religion.20 
Furthermore, when it comes to other cultures and traditions, the interpretation 
is that the state is not to be held responsible for developing and passing them 
on to successive generations. Upholding certain cultural practices is left 
entirely to individuals. (SOU 1996:55, 353-354; in Graham 1999, 119.)  
The White Paper also recognises that since Sweden is “ethnically and 
linguistically mixed”, there is a need “to find the kit that can hold all the 
lifestyle and cultural traditions together.” However, in spite of the fact that 
the cultural rights of the dominant ethnic majority are supported by the state, 
it would be wrong to infer that national heritage is believed to constitute the 
core of national identity:  
 
Unifying Swedishness does not lie in a common historical origin but 
in the contemporary belonging to Sweden and its social order, basic 
values of democracy and the equal rights, and values of people. In 
Sweden, it is ultimately the constitution, the laws, and politics that 
provide the framework for life in society. (SOU 1996:55, 354; in 
Graham 1999, 120.) 
 
The quotation implies that, similarly to Britain and the Netherlands, “[i]t is 
institutional forces that do the job of holding society together” (Graham 
1999, 120; italics in original). The basis of these forces is formed by values 
of democracy, liberal principles and legal norms. 
 
To sum up the Swedish case: we can say that, as in Britain and the 
Netherlands, Sweden’s articulation of national identity can be regarded as 
inclusive of immigrants, in the sense that it is a matter of attitude towards 
society’s basic values that demarcates whether or not a person is regarded as 
a respected member of society. The emphasis placed on the role of national 
cultural heritage nevertheless indicates that Swedish society wants to 
preserve its distinctive character even though it recognises itself as a 
multicultural society. In this sense the proclaimed identity is also exclusive. 
In Chapter 5 I show that adopting or internalising the Swedish cultural 
heritage is seen as a necessary condition for an immigrant being able to 
function successfully in Swedish society.  
With regard to the question of how national identity is used in relation to 
increasing the sense of security and solidarity among citizens, we see that in 
Sweden too there is a fear of a society in which citizens do not act according 
to the same rules as the majority. The White Paper from 1990, Active refugee 
and immigration policy, indicates that the debate over immigration in the 
                                                
20 For example, the syllabus for religious education states that “Swedish society has been 
strongly influenced by the values and standards of Christianity” (Swedish National 
Agency for Education 2008, 73) and that “[t]he school in its teaching of Religion should 
aim to ensure that pupils…develop an understanding of how Christianity has influenced 
Swedish society” (ibid, 71-72). 
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mass media is more polarised than ever before, and that there is evidence of 
adverse changes in the attitudes of the majority society. It is the Muslim 
group, according to the White Paper, that is “often pointed out as the group 
that especially hates the ‘Swedish world’” (Riksdagen 1991a, 81). It is worth 
noting that this was a decade before the terrorist attacks of September 11. 
Finally, it can be argued that the debate over the role of values is an 
important element in the process of building a national identity, with the goal 




The main outline of the articulation of national identity in Denmark does not 
differ significantly from the three European countries discussed above. 
Comments and decisions by the Danish government concerning immigration 
and the multicultural nature of society display the exact same themes. In the 
following I present and discuss four governmental documents.  
In 1999 the Danish Ministry of Education published a report entitled 
Education and Community (Uddannelse og fælleskab). The report asserts that 
the Danish educational system is facing new challenges: not only is there a 
need to ensure that the pupils’ level of competence is among the best in the 
world, but the values that can strengthen the community should also be 
clarified. The following excerpt shows that it is the nation, as a unifying 
community, that plays a significant role in every citizen’s welfare: 
 
Educational system must strive to give new life to the concept of 
citizenship, in that we by the notion citizen mean the empowered 
person that feels obliged to engage in the life of fellow human beings 
and the community. It is within the community that we learn to 
handle the problems and crises that occur. Personal freedom is not 
meaningful until you are part of a community. (Danish Ministry of 
Education 1999, 2; cited in Haas 2008, 62.) 
 
How, then, can this community be identified? The document recognises that 
although there is a need for a single unifying community, with its own 
values, in a multicultural society a fixed definition of national identity is not 
possible: 
 
We are developing a multicultural identity in Denmark. That doesn’t 
mean that we lose a Danish identity, but the Danish identity develops 
and becomes something different than it was – as it has always done. 
(Danish Ministry of Education 1999, 4; cited in Haas 2008, 63.) 
 
It is worth noting that although a fixed definition is not possible, and national 
identity is seen as continuously evolving, the reference point is the traditional 




In 2000 the Minister of Education Margareth Vestager and the Ministry 
of Education published a document entitled Values in Practice (Værdier i 
virkeligheden). According to Haas (2008, 63), this document “offered some 
clarification regarding the vagueness and tensions between the national 
and/or multicultural identity”. In the document the Minister writes that 
plurality has a positive side; “Danish cultural concepts and value patterns had 
been positively challenged and enriched” (Danish Ministry of Education 
2000, 20; cited in Haas 2008, 63). However, the document also speaks of 
plurality with some anxiety; there is for example a fear of normative nihilism. 
Thus the Minister considered that the educational system should play a 
greater role as the upholder of the community’s basic values and norms. 
(Telhaug et al. 2004, 155-156.)  
Vestager makes it clear that it is not the case that “we in Denmark [have] 
tried to force a uniform Danish nationality on everybody”. Rather, “elements 
of the Danish identity” should be provided “which are essential for them 
[newcomers] to feel at home in Danish society without any difficulties”. This 
“should be done in full consideration of their own cultural values.” (Danish 
Ministry of Education 2000, 39; cited in Haas 63-64; italics added.) Here 
again we find a clear distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is the 
responsibility of newcomers to become like ‘us’, to internalise essential 
“elements of the Danish identity”. While the report mentions that other 
people’s cultural values should be respected, there is no reference to the idea 
of providing real opportunities for expanding and modifying the civil sphere. 
It is worth noting that when Vestager speaks of solidarity, her point of 
departure is “our human and Christian heritage” (Danish Ministry of 
Education 2000, 37; cited in Haas 2008, 64). Here we find a hint of the 
ethno-religious essence of national identity. I return to this topic in Chapter 4 
where I shall present the debate over an explanatory memorandum in the 
objects clause in Denmark’s Education Act (the Folkeskole Act) in which 
Christianity is mentioned as the only example of Danish culture. 
Along with values, language is seen as an essential element in the 
national identity: “[t]he language is itself a symbol of the community” 
(Danish Ministry of Education 2000, 18; cited in Haas 2008, 64). 
In 2003, the Danish government published a document entitled The 
government’s vision and strategies for improved integration (Regeringens 
visioner og strategier for bedre integration). The report was to show ‘a new 
course’ in Danish integration policies. The bedrock of this new course was a 
stress on the importance of society’s basic values (grundværdier): 
 
The basic values on which Danish society is based must be 
respected. The individual’s opportunities for self-expression cannot 
be at the expense of those values. Should those basic values 
nevertheless be violated, the society has to respond immediately and 
with impact. (Regeringen 2003, 6.) 
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The reason for emphasising these values is because “the Danish society has 
during a number of years been challenged by several changes – not least the 
fact that refugees and immigrants bring new norms and values from other 
countries and cultures”. It is also written that values are challenged by other 
parts of population. (Regeringen 2003, 8.) However, the examples of those 
values and practices that conflict with the foundation values of the society are 
mainly about foreigners. Furthermore, the only religion that is negatively 
referred to is Islam: 
 
This happens for instance in connection with the circumcision of 
girls, forced marriages, and when somebody is expelled from work 
because of their colour, their conviction or because a Muslim woman 
wants to wear a headscarf (Regeringen 2003, 8). 
 
In 2004 the Danish government provided a White Paper entitled The 
government’s strategy against ghettoisation (Regeringens strategi mod 
ghettoisering): as the title implies, it outlines measures to reduce 
ghettoisation and its harmful consequences. Referring to the report from 
2003, The government’s vision and strategies for improved integration, the 
White Paper describes the vision of the future as a society whose 
fundamental values are accepted by every citizen (Regeringen 2004, 11). 
Ghettoisation is one obstacle to achieving this goal, as some citizens are kept 
ignorant as to what is going on in the society. The report also refers explicitly 
to the lack of opportunities for some children to integrate into society. The 
problem is that they are not provided with information about society’s values: 
 
Ghettoisation, however, has the effect that not all citizens have, or 
are given, any genuinely equal possibility of participating in or 
contributing to the development of society. Children’s future 
possibilities of integration are significantly impaired. ... And no 
connection can be made to the fundamental values in society – 
simply because there is no knowledge of those values. (Regeringen 
2004, 11.) 
 
In sum, the Danish case shares the same features as those discussed above in 
connection with Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden. Immigration has 
made it necessary to stress the importance of the society’s values. In the view 
of Minister Vestager, these values are derived from history and tradition, and 
the national identity incorporates religious (Christian) elements as well. Thus, 
as in Sweden, certain representations of religion are elevated to serve the 
interests of the nation and its citizens. 
As with the other countries presented above, it is the attitude towards 
values that demarcates those who can be regarded as legitimate citizens. 
Newcomers have the responsibility to internalise the basic principles of 




With regard to the need to increase the sense of security and solidarity, a 
stress on the idea of the society as a unified whole is seen as important. It is 




I have applied the concept of ‘national identity’ as the arena within which the 
debate over common citizenship and its basic components has taken place. In 
particular, I have explored (i) what kind of identity is articulated, (ii) how 
inclusively identity is defined, and (iii) what role is played by identity in the 
effort to gain security or promote social cohesion. In the following I sum up 
my findings briefly and discuss them.  
The material used in the analysis shows no indication of a strong ethno-
cultural definition of nationhood in any of these nations. On the other hand, 
as shown by the case studies of Sweden and Denmark, national identity 
incorporates religious elements as well; in both countries the cultural 
heritage, in which Christianity has played a significant role, is mentioned.  
A central element of national identity in each of the four nations 
involves values. I have suggested that it is one’s attitude towards fundamental 
principles that serves to demarcate the boundary between those who are 
included and those who are not; who is regarded as a legitimate member of a 
society. As Christian Joppke (2004, 252) puts it “the liberal state is becoming 
more assertive about its liberal principles, and shows itself less willing to see 
them violated under the cloak of ‘multicultural’ toleration”. This seems to be 
precisely the case. In each country studied, all citizens are expected to share 
unconditionally in the society’s core values. It could be argued that the ethno-
cultural notion of nationhood, if one ever existed, has been replaced in 
political discourse with a ‘modern’, constitutional perspective.  
There is a further point to make. While each nation talks about ‘our’ 
values, what they are actually referring to are the principles of human rights 
and/or those fundamental values on which all Western secular democratic 
nation-states are based: democratic order, equality among citizens (including 
gender equality), individual freedoms and rights, and the rule of law.  
Another important finding is that the increased cultural plurality arising 
from immigration is regarded as a possible threat to social order. An 
unwelcome future scenario is that of a society divided into separate groups, 
each endorsing its own culturally derived values. More specifically, the 
unwelcome values are those religious values – mainly Islamic – that conflict 
with secular democratic values.  
It can thus be argued that the current process of identity formation is 
about reaffirming Western democratic ideals and simultaneously drawing 
clear limits as to what can be tolerated. This finding fits in neatly with those 
theories that emphasise the presence of the ‘other’ in national identity 
formation. In an article entitled ‘National identity and the ‘other’’ (1998), 
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Anna Triandafyllidou explains the process of national identity formation in 
terms of the sociological concept of the ‘significant other’. Significant others 
are those from whom the community tries to “liberate and/or differentiate 
itself” (Triandafyllidou 1998, 594). According to Triandafyllidou (1998, 
600), “[t]he history of each nation is marked by the presence of significant 
others that have influenced the development of its identity by means of their 
‘threatening’ presence.” I have argued that in the documents analysed here, 
politicians perceive cultural plurality with some concern. This is not merely 
due to the fact that plurality encompasses different values systems; the main 
problem arises from the presence, within a society, of ways and views of life 
that regard illiberal values and practices as valid. From this perspective it is 
plausible to conclude, as Evans (1996) does, that 
 
[n]ational identity is produced through the process of negation, the 
creation of a coherent sense of self through explicit rejections and 
denials. It is a dynamic relationship, defined through the exclusion of 
groups deemed not to belong. (Evans 1996, 33-34.)  
 
To get back to the empirical material used in this survey: it can be argued that 
it is the presence of Islam that has launched the process of reaffirmation of 
what are regarded as Western values. The point seems to be that Islam is 
perceived as threatening national identity from within (see Schlesinger 1994, 
323). In Chapter 1, I noted that one conclusion from the analysis of the 
European Values Study is that it is an exaggeration to speak of a moral 
decline in Europe, or to demand a stronger “‘we’-feeling as a dam against 
(perceived hyper-) individualization” (Draulans & Halman 2003, 398). I have 
argued that it is because of the challenge to unity of values by those coming 
from the outside that the need to emphasise the importance of ‘we’-feeling 
has become topical. 
Harald Bauder and Jan Semmelroggen have analysed German 
parliamentary debates over immigration between 2002 and 2006 (Bauder & 
Semmelroggen 2009). Their findings are strikingly similar to what I have 
proposed here. When the data for 403 text passages from parliamentary 
debates were assigned thematic codes, the finding was that the most frequent 
narrative had to do with Muslim immigrants. According to Bauder and 
Semmelroggen (2009, 7) this narrative “revolves largely around the 
perceived discrepancy between the values of Islam and the secular 
democratic state.” When the authors interviewed policymakers, they found 
that “the origin of this threat is believed to rest with religious values and 
norms that are irreconcilable with liberal democracy” (Bauder & 
Semmelroggen 2009, 13). Their conclusion is that in the debates Muslim 
immigration is a seen as a threat to the democratic order of the German state 
(Bauder & Semmelroggen 2009, 1). 
Bauder and Semmelroggen suggest that it is religion that serves as a 




The new perspective of German identity excludes immigrants based 
on their religion rather than their “ethnic” origin. While historically 
the German nation has distinguished itself from other Christian 
European nations, such as France, through ethno-cultural 
characteristics, today, in an era of European political integration and 
non-European immigrant population that is largely non-Christian, 
religion appears to be a more suitable marker of distinction. (Bauder 
& Semmelroggen 2009, 14.)  
 
This conclusion is interesting.21 My findings are similar, in the sense that the 
examples given of inconsistency between cultural values and the society’s 
core values are mainly about Islam. Considering that certain other religious 
groups, such as fundamentalist Christians, likewise do not regard all Western 
values as valid, it is worth asking why these are not mentioned at all. One 
possible answer is that value statements not only express what can be called 
an awareness of ‘my’/‘our’ belonging to Western cultural milieu, but also 
attempt to protect this.22 In this sense, and due to the long history of Christian 
impact in Europe, various representations of Christianity may be regarded as 
being closer to this cultural milieu than Islam, even if some interpretations of 
Islam are closer to democratic ideals than some representations of 
Christianity. As Pertti Anttonen (2005, 103) writes, “we have reasons why 
difference makes a difference when it makes a difference, and why similarity 
does not always carry enough symbolic meaning to unite or integrate those 
who are similar.” Christianity, as part of the European cultural milieu, may 
serve as a reason for making the difference, as Bauder and Semmelroggen 
suggest.23 
We can also look at this issue from the point of view of preserving the 
public sphere from the impact of the religious; to be more precise, from that 
of an unwanted religion. Referring to Knott’s theory, we can say, first of all, 
that the ‘strategy of struggle’, from the point of view of politicians and 
members of advisory groups, has been quite straightforward. In the material 
presented and discussed here the purity of society’s values is defended 
without concession; in other words, the debate over values has been 
remarkably one-sided. If there has ever been any uncertainty as to which 
cultural values or practices should be tolerated, it is made clear that any 
values that conflict with the basic values of the society are not acceptable. In 
this sense it is not an exaggeration to speak of a ‘sacred concern’ in this 
matter.  
                                                
21 One may recall the discussion in the previous chapter of Loraine Sheridan’s (2002) 
study in Great Britain, in which she concluded that religion seems to trigger both implicit 
racism and general discrimination to a greater extent than does race or ethnicity. 
22 By the Western cultural milieu, I here refer to things that are common to all countries in 
Western Europe, including respect for liberal and human rights principles and the demand 
of separating the (secular) public sphere from the private one. 
23 This naturally has nothing to do with rational thinking. 
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We can also ask whether one strategy in the ‘struggle’, conscious or 
unconscious, has been to contrast the values held by the majority with the 
cultural values of certain religious minorities; the former are seen as not only 
neutral but in some sense universal and eternal, while the latter, for example 
certain values and practices of Islam, are seen as something that citizens can 
eventually abandon. It would certainly be absurd to demand that all citizens 
should act according to certain values without believing that it is possible.  
I have also asked, referring to Rawls’ theory concerning the reasonable 
citizen, whether it is enough for democratic values to be accepted for political 
purposes alone; or is it perhaps the case that they should be internalised more 
deeply, as personally binding, so that they become the principles that guide a 
person’s daily actions. The question to ask is, why is it so important that 
every citizen accept society’s values? Under the label of ‘neutrality’, or in 
referring to functional democracy or international conventions, these values 
are philosophically defensible, since adherence to them secures a fair playing 
field for all citizens. This is how Rawls ultimately defends his theory. 
However, as I have argued, this way of thinking and legitimising democratic 
values usually means that although these values should be unconditionally 
respected in public, in private citizens can hold whatever values they wish, as 
long as they do not violate others’ right to hold their own values.24 But the 
distinction is not that easy to apply in practice. Deeply held religious beliefs 
are normally regarded as morally binding and non-changeable. It is possible, 
however, that for most people living in Europe the central principles of 
human rights – including civil and political rights, basic individual liberties, 
gender equality and individual freedom – are not just something that provides 
a framework for political purposes. Rather, they are considered morally 
binding and cannot be changed through negotiation. In this sense, the virtue 
of being reasonable is actually quite difficult. As Rawls (1993, 60) writes:  
 
the evident consequence of the burdens of judgment is that 
reasonable persons do not all affirm the same comprehensive 
doctrine. Moreover, they also recognize that all persons alike, 
including themselves, are subject to those burdens, and so many 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines are affirmed, not all of which 
can be true (indeed none of them may be true). The doctrine any 
reasonable person affirms is but one reasonable doctrine among 
others.  
 
In practice it is difficult to regard other value systems as equally reasonable 
as the one that a person believes to be true. As Eamonn Callan (1996, 12) 
puts it: 
                                                
24 In Chapter 6 I discuss parents’ rights to initiate their children into the form of life they 
endorse. The point is that liberal theory has traditionally been interpreted in a way that 




To retain a lively understanding of the burdens of judgment in 
political context while suppressing it everywhere else would require 
a feat of gross self-deception that cannot be squared with personal 
integrity.  
 
It should also be kept in mind that Europe has a long and undisturbed history 
of transmitting Western values. In an article entitled ‘Modernization, cultural 
change, and the persistence of traditional values’ (2000), Ronald Inglehart 
and Wayne E. Baker present their findings of changing cultural values in 
different societies due to economic development. These findings are based on 
data from the World Values Surveys, which include 65 societies and cover 75 
percent of the world’s population (average 1400 per country). While their 
survey confirms the modernisation thesis – economic development does in 
fact bring pervasive cultural changes – one interesting finding is that it is 
precisely “[r]eligious traditions [that] appear to have had an enduring impact 
on the contemporary value systems of 65 societies” (Inglehart & Baker 2000, 
31). Sociologists such as Weber and Huntington have presented similar 
arguments before. According to Inglehart and Baker, religious traditions have 
led to the creation of cultural zones, and it is possible to talk about a global 
cultural map (Inglehart & Baker 2000, 32-34). Inglehart and Baker speak of a 
“shared historical experience” created by religious institutions (Inglehart & 
Baker 2000, 35); they describe culture as ‘path-dependent’ (Inglehart & 
Baker 2000, 38).  
The practical outcome of all this is that even if it is maintained that 
society’s values should only apply to the public sphere, it is almost 
impossible to maintain the distinction between private and public. This is 
because the national culture is transmitted and disseminated in many ways, 
including through nationwide institutions such as laws and schools (Inglehart 
& Baker 2000, 36). Living in a multicultural society inevitably means a 
certain degree of automatic assimilation, acculturation and homogenisation 
with regard to values.  
 
 
Identity at the regional level: Articulation of European identity by the 
Council of Europe and the European Union  
As at the national level, it is obvious that communities operating at a regional 
level need some kind of identity to be agreed on, in order to guide their 
actions and ensure their coherence. The fundamental disagreements that arose 
in the process of creating the EU Constitutional Treaty show that, given the 
multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of the member states, it has become 
difficult or impossible to define a ‘European’ identity. Heated debates over 
references to ‘God’ and ‘Christianity’ in the preamble serve as illuminating 
examples of the need to recognise the ‘other’ or ‘others’. A compromise was 
finally reached by referring to the “cultural, religious and humanist 
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inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values ... of 
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.” (European Union 2004.)  
In the following I discuss aspects of the debate over identity within the 
Council of Europe and the European Union. I focus on the same questions 
applied in analysing the articulation of identity at the national level. 
 
 
The Council of Europe building the identity of Europe 
The Council of Europe has organised (at least) two colloquia around the 
question of European identity: (i) ‘The European Identity (now and in the 
future): Colloquium in three parts’ (2001-2002) and (ii) ‘European Culture: 
Identity and Diversity: Colloquy of the Council of Europe’ (2005).  
The first part of the 2001-02 colloquium was titled ‘The concept of 
European identity’. In his opening speech, Secretary-General Walter 
Schwimmer formulated the goal of finding a ‘profile’ for Europe 
(Schwimmer 2001a). At the end of two days of roundtable discussions, 
involving philosophers, historians, political scientists and theologians, the 
conclusion was somewhat abstract; the group arrived at a definition 
according to which Europe is a plurality of identities or “a constantly shifting 
kaleidoscope, mixing perceptions of the past with the search for a coherent 
future” (Council of Europe 2001a, conclusion summary). In the General 
Conclusions, the political scientist Dennis Driscoll (2001) argued that  
 
[t]he construction of identity uses building blocks from history, from 
myth or mythology, from religion, from language, from law ... and 
from psychology which gives us ... a profound sense of belonging.  
 
However, according to Driscoll, the quintessence of European identity is 
rights: “In Europe there is a promotion of rights which is not simply a matter 
of political rhetoric, but these rights are actually guaranteed, notably through 
the European Convention on Human Rights.” He further suggests that this 
idea is actually Western, not merely European (Driscoll 2001). In the 
Conclusion summary of the colloquium “a sense of belonging to a shared 
legal arena” was also raised as one of the primary elements of European 
identity (Council of Europe 2001a, conclusion summary). 
The title of the second part of the colloquium was ‘From cultural 
identities to a European political identity’ (Council of Europe 2001b). As the 
name implies, the task of defining European identity was here framed in 
terms of the political identity of Europe. The role of commonly shared values 
was stressed in this colloquy too. For example, in his opening speech 
Secretary-General Schwimmer (2001b) defined Europe “as a community of 
shared values in a given geographical area”. According to Schwimmer, one 
reason for the greatness of Europe is its fundamental unity of values. He also 




great impact of Christianity, Judaism and Islam, which serve as the origins of 
those values. Since the colloquium was held shortly after 11 September, 
Schwimmer recognised the rise of islamophobia and added a “spirit of 
tolerance and mutual respect” to the core of European identity. He also 
reminded the participants that the Declaration of Cultural Diversity (adopted 
in 2000) posits an inseparable link between European identity and cultural 
diversity.  
In the conclusions of this second part of the colloquium it is argued that 
plurality is one of the foundations of Europe (see Adler 2001). Above this 
diversity, there is nevertheless a certain ‘unity’, a shared roof. This unity is 
based on shared consensus as to certain values that can be regarded as 
‘European’ values.  
The third part of the colloquium was entitled ‘Europe tomorrow: shared 
fate or common political future?’. In its presentation paper the idea of a ‘fluid 
identity’ is introduced: 
 
The history of Europe reaches far into the past, but the history of 
European integration is much more recent – and so cannot be 
encapsulated in a monolithic identity, forged by centuries of unity 
(Council of Europe 2002). 
 
In his keynote speech, Schwimmer (2002) argued that the leading idea behind 
the goal of unity is to achieve a “stable peace order”. Since the Second World 
War the twin sources of the European idea have been the creation of 
“international structures for safeguarding peace” and the protection of human 
rights. Obviously, democracy is also something that needs to be protected: 
“Safeguarding the community of democracies is a legitimate concern of all 
member States, old and new.” Other themes introduced by Schwimmer were 
the importance of common legal standards and the need to defend and protect 
diversity — national, regional, cultural, religious — which is a precious 
common heritage. At the end of his speech he returned to the idea of values 
serving as a core of European identity:  
 
In the spirit of such unity, we are committed to the same fundamental 
values and principles. They are at the very heart of our European 
identity.  
 
In the other colloquium, the ‘Colloquy on European culture: Identity and 
diversity’ (2005), the participants represented different parts of Europe and 
diverse scientific and political backgrounds. The major themes discussed 
during the colloquium were intercultural and inter-religious dialogue and 
strengthening social cohesion while respecting diversity. This colloquium 
moved from abstract ideas to practical actions, such as creating programs in 
the areas of education, culture and heritage, youth and sport. Democratic 
values again played a significant role, but respect for other cultures, as an 
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important educational goal, was raised as well: 
 
Education in all its forms and institutional contexts was analysed as 
the key vehicle of social and cultural development, which is central 
to identity formation and civic participation, the sharing of 
democratic values, the respect of human rights and the building of 
confidence and mutual respect between cultures and communities 
(Council of Europe 2005a).  
 
Finally, the concrete ideas that emerged during the colloquy were combined 
in a message to be conveyed to the Conference of European Ministers of 
Culture at Faro. In this message, the first point was that “identity is a matter 
of individual choice, not official labelling.” The second idea was that cultures 
are not fixed, but are free to change through contact and intercultural 
dialogue. The importance of social cohesion was also stressed: “The state 
must manage the creation of a common sense of belonging, mutual trust and 
an attitude for living together – delicately balanced by cultural protection of 
diverse traditions and languages.” Finally, the role of education was 
emphasised: “The key to the successful development of a cohesive, diverse, 
democratic and free Europe is imaginative and enlightened education.” 
(Council of Europe 2005a.) 
Shortly afterwards, the gathering of European Ministers of Culture 
issued a statement, commonly known as the ‘Faro declaration’. Familiar 
themes are mentioned with regard to European identity: 
 
We undertake to pursue our efforts in favour of European identity 
and unity on the basis of shared fundamental values, respect for and 
valorisation of our common heritage and cultural diversity (Council 
of Europe 2005b, 3). 
  
It is worth noting that the Council of Europe’s actions on this issue are not 
limited to issuing statements. Especially in the field of education several 
programs have been launched in order to achieve a more stable and just 
society. I return to these in Chapters 4 and 6.  
 
With regard to the material summarised above, it can be said that the 
perspective on the world of these official pronouncements and ministerial 
statements is quite similar to that of the political documents discussed above. 
Precisely the same elements are foregrounded as essential ingredients of 
European identity as at the national level. It is values that form the core of 
European identity, values which should be held in common. It is worth noting 
that for example Schwimmer does not hesitate to state that these values are 
culturally driven. The protection of cultural diversity is also seen as 
important, but these shared values draw strict limits as to what kind of 




All this suggests that citizens’ attitude towards values are of importance. 
However, responsibilities that citizens have are not limited only to values; 
tolerance, open-mindedness towards other cultures, and the ability to engage 
in dialogue are virtues that all citizens are expected to share.  
 
 
The European Union 
Gabriel N. Toggenburg (2004) has analysed the discussion of values within 
European Union and the current usage of the concept of ‘European values’. 
He concludes that the issue has become “highly topical in the context of 
European integration”:  
 
[a]t least four factors can be cited for bringing discussion of values to 
a head: the drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, 
the so-called Austrian crisis in the same year, the general turmoil in 
international politics following September 11 and, finally, the 
European Convention’s drafting of the European Union’s new 
constitutional treaty (Toggenburg 2004, 5).  
 
Toggenburg reminds us that the Community was initially a community of 
economic interest, and that its development into ‘a community of values’ has 
been gradual (Toggenburg, 2004, 7). How, then, does the European 
Community define itself? The original Community Treaties did not contain 
provisions relating to human rights or other legal values. However, the 
jurisdiction of European Court of Justice stated – in the spirit of 
constitutional traditions common to member states – that “fundamental 
human rights [are] enshrined in the general principles of Community law” 
(The European Court of Justice 1969; cited in Toggenburg 2004, 10). 
According to Toggenburg, in the late 70s and 80s the idea of European values 
was increasingly invoked and mentioned in EU declarations. After the 
joining of the post-dictatorial democracies of Greece, Portugal and Spain, the 
Single European Act of 1986 stated that the Parties are  
 
determined to work together to promote democracy on the basis of 
fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the 
member states, in the convention of protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the European social charter, notably 
freedom, equality and social justice (European Union 1986, 2: 
Preamble of the Single European Act; cited in Toggenburg 2004: 
footnote 29).  
 
These principles are also proclaimed in the Maastricht Treaty (better known 
as the Treaty on European Union):  
  
The Union is founded on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the member states (European Union 
2002, Art 6 par 1).  
 
Since Maastricht these principles have been enshrined in other treaties, and 
are today referred to as the constitutional principles of the European Union. 
Thus, Toggenburg (2004, 10) argues that it is possible to speak of the 
‘constitutional values’ of the European Union. Or, as proclaimed in the 
European Constitution, in what constitutes, more or less, a declaration of 
central Western values:  
 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 





Every one of us is a bearer of a culture; more precisely, of cultures. Thus we 
are also bearers of the collective identity of that culture (or cultures) and 
share its (their) vision (or visions) of the good life.25 The members of a 
distinct group, for example a religious group, may share only one vision of 
the good life, while a nation contains many such visions. In this chapter I 
have shown that Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, as 
well as regional actors such as the Council of Europe and European Union, 
have their own ‘conviction’, a vision of the good. The next sentence could be 
applied to all of these: At the heart of our identity are such values as equality, 
tolerance, human rights, protection of diversity, individual freedom, and the 
rule of law.  
Another feature of collective identity is that it draws a dividing line 
between ‘us’ and ‘others’, since it defines both sufficient and necessary 
conditions as to what is required to qualify for membership in a group 
(Kaunismaa 1997, 226). In some cases only those who share for example a 
particular vision of the good life are regarded as members, while in other 
cases membership may be a matter of ethnicity. One of the main questions 
explored in this chapter was, “who fits the definition of national identity”. I 
have argued that the main marker is the individual’s attitude towards Western 
                                                
25 ‘Collective identity’ is a social construction that does not actually exist. I use the 
concept here in the sense it was applied in the Introduction chapter under the section 
’Culture’. The point is that there is some factor X, a symbolic code that defines a group, 




values. Citizens are not only expected to have a positive attitude towards 
these values; they are also expected to internalise these values as personally 
binding.  
The third feature of a collective identity is its social function. It gives 
people moral codes as to how to act in different situations. According to 
Gerald Dworkin (1988, 36-37), moral rules or codes provide  
 
solutions to a coordination problem – a situation in which what one 
agent chooses to do depends upon his expectations of what other 
agents do – agents whose choices are in turn dependent on what the 
first agent will do. ... They [also] provide common standards that are 
used as the basis of criticism and demands for obedience. 
 
I have suggested that society’s core values are important not only because 
they are philosophically justifiable but also because the majority of people 
believe in them. They provide a standard for the evaluation of what kind of 
action is acceptable.  
When it comes to the practical consequences of the articulations of 
identity by these four European nations, it is clear that it is in every nation’s 
interest, as well as in that of the Council of Europe and the EU, that this 
vision of ‘conviction’, the good, be reproduced. In the following chapters of 













The question of how a nation should treat its minorities – whether 
immigrants, national minorities, religious groups or any other – has produced 
an enormous number of contributions in the fields of sociology and political 
philosophy. Applying a very rough distinction, opinions can be divided into 
two normative lines of thought. Some, for example Barry (2001) and Rawls 
(1993), argue that the best way to manage diversity and keep society from 
disintegrating into separate groups is an approach based on egalitarian 
treatment with commonly agreed liberal principles. Others, for instance 
Young (1990), Taylor (1992), Kymlicka (1995) and Parekh (2000), campaign 
for government policies designed to advance the special treatment of 
minority groups. They believe that the idea of equal treatment supported by 
traditional liberalism is not sufficient to ensure equal status to minorities 
along with the majority. The point is that minorities cannot adequately 
protect their cultural interests, and the members of minority groups feel that 
they are forced to gradually assimilate into the majority. The emergence of 
this kind of thinking in the scholarly literature took place in the early 1990s. 
For example Tariq Modood (2003, 105) describes this as a significant shift 
“from an understanding of ‘equality’ in terms of individualism and cultural 
assimilation to a politics of recognition; to ‘equality’ as encompassing public 
ethnicity.”  
The debate over how minorities should be treated cannot be understood 
without taking into account the distinction between the public and private 
spheres. The conception of equality for those who are in favour of special 
recognition means that “‘difference’ (minority ethnicity, etc.) [ought to be] 
recognised and supported in both the public and private spheres” (Modood 
2003, 105). Defenders of a “politics of difference” thus argue that people are 
treated equally only if “public policy treats people differently in response to 
their different culturally derived beliefs and practices” (Barry 2001, 17). Iris 
Marion Young, for example, makes a plea for a politics where no group “is 
stereotyped, silenced, or marginalized” and where “melting pot ideals of 




The focus in this chapter is on the ways in which Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark have dealt with cultural plurality, in the 
past and today. I first clarify and discuss three concepts central to the debate 
over how minorities should be treated: ‘multiculturalism’, ‘assimilation’ and 
‘acculturation’. I then look more closely at the philosophical debate in favour 
of group rights.1 Most of this debate takes place at a rather abstract and 
general level; in other words, the justification of group rights is not tied to 
any particular topic, such as the preservation of religious identity. However, 
since the core chapters of this thesis deal with the organisation and content of 
religious and values education, I focus here on the question of how the basic 
rationale behind the justification of group rights is applied by those who 
argue in favour of granting special educational rights to religious groups.  
As the main focus in this chapter is on how cultural plurality has been – 
and currently is – dealt with at a general level, part of the theoretical 
framework within which I analyse the empirical material involves arguments 
favouring group rights. The concepts, foundations and conclusions of these 
arguments provide concrete tools for understanding how, and to what degree, 
different nations recognise the needs of their (religious) minorities.  
Following the consideration of group rights, I describe three models of 
how difference can be recognised in a plural society. These models form 
another part of the theoretical framework within which I draw conclusions as 
to these four nations’ former and current policies for treating diversity.  





The term ‘multiculturalism’ is approximately three decades old (see e.g. 
Abbas 2005, 155). There is no established single usage of the term; in fact, it 
is both understood and applied in many ways. According to Brian Barry 
(2001, 22), the term has been used to refer either to a ‘state of affairs’ or to a 
‘political programme’ – sometimes both, by the same writer and in the same 
piece of writing. In speaking of multiculturalism, in any case, we are dealing 
with the issue of cultural difference (see e.g. Alexander 2001, 237). Here I 
briefly present the two most common usages, along with their further 
implications when the term is applied to a political programme.  
First, some writers use the term ‘multiculturalism’ neutrally; they see it 
as “a response — or a set of responses — to diversity that seeks to articulate 
the social conditions under which difference can be incorporated and order 
achieved from diversity” (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 222; see also Alexander 
2001). In this sense the term has to do with different strategies adopted by 
                                                
1 My discussion of ‘group rights’ is based to a large extent on my Licentiate Thesis, 
Religious Groups’ Illegitimate Demands on Their Children’s Education (2001). 




social agents in a situation of diversity. Since, however, there is rarely only 
one way to deal with diversity, it would be better to speak of 
multiculturalisms, as suggested for instance by Haas (2008).  
Although the term is sometimes used as described above, there is no 
agreement as to what the overall goal of such a policy might be. This is 
where we come to the popular usage of the term. In its scholarly usage the 
term mostly refers to a movement or ideal, according to which in a 
multicultural society minority cultures should have recognition that goes 
beyond difference-blind or identical treatment. Tariq Modood (1998, 396-
397), for example, argues that  
 
[t]he goal of democratic multiculturalism cannot and should not be 
cultural neutrality but, rather, the inclusion of marginal and 
disadvantaged groups, including religious communities in public life. 
... [A] policy of public multiculturalism will require the recognition 
of religious minorities.  
 
Understood in this way, multiculturalism is a policy that “emphasizes group 
distinctions and tends to legitimize the cultural maintenance and identity 
affirmation of ethnic and racial groups” (Brug & Verkuyten 2007, 116) or 
“sees it as the active duty of the state to promote and protect minority 
cultures” (Koopmans 2006, 23).2 Two essential themes here are social 
equality and cultural rights. This often means that diversity is cultivated by 
giving minorities special rights. Thus those who favour giving special 
recognition to minorities can be called ‘multiculturalists’. It is also possible 
to evaluate the positions taken by scholars; for example Alexander (2001, 
238) writes that Young takes a “radical multiculturalist position”. 
Not everyone is satisfied with this kind of understanding of the overall 
objective of how minority cultures should be recognised. Some think that the 
goal is not improving the position of minorities but enhancing solidarity 
among citizens. Alexander (2001, 248) for instance claims that 
 
multiculturalism is often fundamentally misunderstood. Not only 
social conservatives but radical multicultural intellectuals describe it 
as a process that is organized around separation and difference rather 
than inclusion and solidarity.  
 
Hartmann and Gerteis (2005) agree with Alexander. According to them, the 
goal should be creating solidarity or bonds between citizens:  
 
                                                
2 Joppke & Morawska define multiculturalism as a policy “in which states have 
deliberately and explicitly recognized and protected immigrants as distinct ethnic groups” 




Multiculturalism is best understood as a critical-theoretical project, 
an exercise in cultivating new conceptions of solidarity in the 
concept of dealing with the realities of pervasive and increasing 
diversity in contemporary society (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 222). 
 
In this thesis, I use the term as it is understood in its most popular sense, 
namely, that special recognition should be granted to minorities, for example, 
by giving them special rights. If the writers I refer to or cite use it differently, 
I point that out explicitly.  
 
 
Assimilation and acculturation 
In the literature referred to in this thesis, the term ‘assimilation’ is used in a 
way that is closely related to ‘multiculturalism’: it refers to the process of 
increasing similarity (Brubaker 2001, 533) or “erasing cultural differences 
and promoting cultural homogeneity” (Bleich 1998, 82). Thus understood, it 
can be seen as the opposite of ‘multiculturalism’ in its most popular usage.3 
The term is also used as equivalent to the preservation of monoculturalism.4  
Understood in this way, the term is linked to the belief that the state’s 
actions can (or should) reduce cultural diversity. This could involve for 
example treating citizens in a neutral manner, putting pressure on immigrants 
to adopt something from the main culture, refusing to grant special rights, or 
embracing only one culture. Since ‘assimilation’ is used in various ways, it is 
necessary here to introduce a more precise term, ‘acculturation’, which refers 
to the “process of becoming more similar culturally” (Barry 2001, 72; italics 
added). Through acculturation, citizens begin “to acquire cultural practices 
belonging to the tradition of another group”; assimilation indicates one step 
further, meaning “a change of membership which makes an individual 
similar to a receiving community in the sense that the members recognize her 
as one of their kind” (Bauböck, 1998, 42). Even though ‘acculturation’ is not 
commonly used in the literature that I refer to, I use the term here in drawing 
conclusions as to different policies for dealing with cultural diversity. 
With regard to assimilation and acculturation, there are two points that 
need to be made. First, while nations may treat their citizens in a neutral 
manner, this is not equivalent to the assimilative treatment that nations have 
                                                
3 For example Ellie Vasta’s (2007) article is titled ‘From ethnic minorities to ethnic 
majority policy: Multiculturalism and the shift to assimilationism in the Netherlands’. 
The title of the article by Back et al. (2002) is ‘New Labour’s White Heart: Politics, 
Multiculturalism and the Return of Assimilation’. Tahir Abbas (2005, 153) speaks of 
British multiculturalism that returned to assimilation.  
4 For example Liz Fekete (2004, 18) argues that “[i]t is via the debate on national identity, 
taking place across Europe, that the state is seeking to steer ‘race relations’ policy away 
from multiculturalism towards monoculturalism and cultural homogenisation. ... Each 
nation moves towards the assimilationist model.” 




used in the prime years of immigration, when the idea was that immigrants 
would eventually either return or completely adopt the mainstream way of 
life. A nation can actively cherish diversity in some respects, even if it treats 
its citizens similarly. As Brubaker (2001, 533-534) writes, increasing 
similarity always happens “in certain respects, that obviously have to be 
specified” (italics in original). Assimilation and acculturation are always 
domain-specific. According to Brubaker, “the desirability of assimilation in 
[some] respects does not imply the desirability of complete acculturation, for 
example; or of full ‘identificational assimilation’” (Brubaker 2001, 541). 
Thus, when talking about assimilation or acculturation on macro level, the 
question is not mono-dimensional in the sense that we can define how much 
it happens, but rather multi-dimensional, and the relevant questions to ask 
are: in what respect, over what period of time, and to what reference 
population (Brubaker 2001, 544).  
Secondly, while total assimilation or acculturation is an unwanted 
outcome of government policies, some scholars see positive sides to it. 
According to Hartmann and Gerteis (2005, 236),  
 
there is some reason to believe that the assimilationist vision may 
provide a strong platform for addressing racial inequality, especially 
if it is genuinely open to all persons that adopt the dominant culture 
and language. This is precisely because its bonds of solidarity and 
feelings of commonality are the richest, deepest, and most widely 
shared. This is one reason why assimilation is being seriously 
reconsidered by many scholars (Huntington 2004; Brubaker 2001; 
Rumbaut n.d.; Barkan 1995; Morawska 1994; Glazer 1993). 
 
The writers’ logic is quite clear: commonly shared principles and customs 
give citizens a feeling of unity. This in turn is a precondition for ‘thick’ 
solidarity. When solidarity is achieved, possible inequalities will be 




Philosophical debate on group rights 
As already noted, one concrete way to evaluate a nation’s policy in treating 
diversity is to analyse it within the framework of the philosophical discussion 
of group rights. In the following I present two arguments in favour of group 
rights: one by Will Kymlicka, the other by Charles Taylor. My special 
interest here lies in the nature of rights claims. Both Kymlicka and Taylor 
suggest that in multicultural societies there sometimes exists a legitimate case 
for the protection of minority cultures. This is justified by appealing to the 
importance of culture-based identity. The two writers, however, disagree with 




(1995; 1989a) justification of the protection of minority cultures leads only to 
a liberal or liberalising qualification for cultural rights: 
 
I will argue that liberals can and should endorse certain external 
protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should 
reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to 
question and revise traditional authorities and practices (Kymlicka 
1995, 37). 
 
Charles Taylor, on the other hand, wants to defend the survival of cultures as 
such. He is talking not only about equality between the members of different 
groups but also about the equal value of every culture. His theory leads to a 
pluralistic policy that institutionalises cultural difference by segmenting 
society. 
I shall argue that the claims of religious groups concerning for example 
educational rights are more dependent on Taylor’s view; this is because they 
often aim at preserving a distinct collective identity, one which may include 
practices that are considered illiberal. Since some minorities also want to 
shelter themselves from external influences, Kymlicka’s idea of liberalisation 
threatens the preservation of cultural identity as such.  
Before I introduce and discuss these theories, there is a need for 
conceptual clarification. First, what exactly do we mean when we speak of 
‘group rights’? Koopmans et al. (2005, 147) suggest that all group demands 
have two characteristics in common:  
 
[F]irst, they are demands that go beyond the set of common civil and 
political rights of individual citizenship that are protected in all 
liberal democracies; and second, they are demands that, if realized, 
constitute the recognition and accommodation by the state of the 
distinctive identities and needs of migrant groups. 
 
A point I want to stress here is that it is not always the case that group rights 
are demanded in order to gain a form of special treatment that is completely 
new in a given society, i.e. one is not already granted to someone else. It is 
thus important to distinguish between ‘demands for exceptional rights’ and 
‘demands for parity’. The former means a demand for right(s) that are not 
already granted to any other group, while the latter means that what is 
requested involves “the same privileges and exemptions from duties that are 
already extended to other religious or minority groups” (Koopmans et al. 
2005, 159). An example of an ‘exceptional group demand’ is a case from 
Britain, in which Muslim parents wished to withdraw their children from 
Religious Education lessons because they considered that these had harmful 
effects on their children. This demand was supported by a statement by the 
Association of Muslim Schools, arguing that if children “get bombarded with 
different ideologies and different thinking, the Muslim child gets so clicked 




on to what the teacher is saying, that he or she thinks whatever the teacher is 
saying is truth.” (Koopmans et al. 2005, 165.) 
An illuminating example of a ‘demand for parity’ comes from Ontario, 
Canada, where in the 1990s two multi-faith religious coalitions tried to get 
public funding in order to establish their own religious schools.5 In the same 
province, religious Catholic schools were funded as part of the public schools 
system, free of cost to the parents. The coalitions’ case can be presented in 
the form of an argument as follows: 
 
1. The present educational arrangements in society produce some 
inequalities: members of some minority cultural groups are placed in a 
disadvantaged position compared to those of the majority culture and one 
religious group. Education wherein all students are taught a common 
worldview does not truly accommodate diversity. It actually produces 
uniformity in the name of diversity. There is also potential harm that occurs if 
individuals lack a distinctive ethnic identity. If people lose their distinctive 
particularities, they become nobody. Members of religious minorities would 
no longer know what it is to be a real Muslim, Hindu or Sikh. 
2. Publicly funded educational arrangements, whereby each group can foster 
its own particular view of the good life, would correct these actual or 
potential harms.  
3. Rights-claims are legitimate and in accordance with the spirit of liberalism 
or true multiculturalism.  
4. It is legitimate to equate religious minorities with cultural minorities. 
Religion is an expression of culture and religious groups have needs that are 
analogous to those of ethnic and linguistic minorities. Thus religious groups 
are in similar need of state protection.6 In a truly pluralist, multicultural and 
democratic society, religious minorities should be equal partners and thus 
have a right to cultural survival, preservation of cultural heritage and 
distinctive cultural identities. (See Davies 1999.) 
A search for empirical data on various group demands relating to 
education in the Netherlands, Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland 
between 1992-1998 shows that both types of demands occur; demands for 
parity, however, have been far more popular. These are mostly demands for 




                                                
5 One coalition, the ’Multifaith coalition for Equity in Education’, brought together Sikh, 
Hindu, Muslim, Mennonite, and Reform Protestant parents; the other consisted of the 
Ontario Alliance of Christian Schools and the Canadian Jewish Congress (Davies 1999, 
3).  
6 Note that majority is defined similarly; for example the majority religion is secular 




Kymlicka and cultural membership as a primary good 
Kymlicka’s point of departure in his theory favouring group rights is the 
existence in modern nation states of two sorts of communities: a political 
community and a cultural community. The existence of these two 
communities means that individuals also possess two main types of collective 
identity.7 Kymlicka argues that a citizen’s primary collective identity is 
derived from a cultural community, since patterns of activities within a 
culture  
 
become potential models, and define potential roles, that we can 
adopt as our own. From childhood on, we become aware both that 
we are already participants in certain forms of life (familial, 
religious, sexual, educational etc.), and that there are alternative ways 
of life, which offer alternative models and roles that we may, in time, 
come to endorse. We decide how to lead our lives by situating 
ourselves in these cultural narratives, by adopting roles that have 
struck us as worthwhile ones, as ones worth living (which may, of 
course, include roles we were brought up to occupy). (Kymlicka 
1989a, 165.) 
 
The point is that cultural membership “is a good in its capacity of providing 
meaningful options for us, and aiding our ability to judge for ourselves the 
value of life-plans” (Kymlicka 1989a, 166). According to Kymlicka (1995, 
89), cultural identity provides an anchor for self-identification and a sense of 
belonging. Kymlicka (1989a, 176) cites F. Svensson (1976, 436) to make a 
point about the importance of cultural identity:  
 
[H]uman beings very reluctantly give up their [cultural associations], 
even in the face of negative costs of membership (such as 
discrimination). This is because the group functions as a mechanism 
for mobilizing the individual to act in general social situations, helps 
to define needs and desires and the ways to achieve them, and forms 
the locus of strong affective attachments which figure prominently in 
self-identity. It also has much to do with the pride and self-respect of 
individual members. 
 
The essential point in Kymlicka’s theory is a possible incompatibility 
between the two types of communities: as he points out (Kymlicka 1989a, 
162), in many liberal states the two types of communities do not coincide, 
and in some cases the members of some cultural communities may be placed 
in a disadvantaged position compared to those of the majority culture. 
What should be done to give equal footing to these groups? According 
to Kymlicka, minorities should be granted special minority rights. The 
                                                
7 See Chapter 1, section on ‘Religious groups as cultural communities’. 




justification for this depends on the idea of acknowledging the equal worth of 
every citizen. We ought to acknowledge the essential role of cultural 
membership and the fact that identity is tied to a particular culture. 
(Kymlicka 1989a, 135.) In his view, cultural membership should be “one of 
the primary goods with which justice is concerned” (Kymlicka 1989a, 166). 
He criticises Rawls for ignoring this in his equalitarian theory. Kymlicka 
argues (1989a, 166) that this would actually be recognised by the parties in 
Rawls’s original position:  
 
The relationship between cultural membership and self-respect gives 
the parties to the original position a strong incentive to give cultural 
membership status as a primary good. As Rawls says, ‘the parties in 
the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the 
social conditions that undermine self-respect’ (Rawls 1971, 440); the 
loss of cultural membership is one such condition. 
 
 
Charles Taylor on recognition, equality and cultural survival 
In his essay ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (1992), Charles Taylor favours 
external protections for minority groups. He argues that we should 
“recognize the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them 
survive, but acknowledge their worth” (Taylor 1992, 64). Taylor’s point of 
departure is the assumption that there is an important link between identity 
and recognition. As he writes, 
 
[t]he thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its 
absence, often by misrecognition of others, and so a person or group 
can suffer real damage, real distortion, if people or society around 
them mirror back to them a conflicting or a demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves. (Taylor 1992, 25.) 
 
Taylor starts with a brief historical account of two changes that have made it 
possible for us to recognize an indisputable connection between identity and 
recognition. The first change was the collapse of social hierarchies, formerly 
the basis of honour. In ancient times, enjoying honour was the privilege of 
only few people. Not everyone could be worthy of it. Thus honour was 
intrinsically linked with inequality. With the collapse of the hierarchical 
system, honour was replaced with the notion of dignity; this in turn is 
nowadays applied in a universalist and egalitarian sense, based on the 
inherent dignity of human beings. It is assumed that everyone shares in it and 
that everyone’s dignity ought to be recognised. Equal dignity and equal 





The second change emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. The 
importance of recognition was modified and intensified by the new 
understanding of identity. “We might speak of an individualized identity, one 
that is particular to me, and that I discover in myself” (Taylor 1992, 28; 
italics in original). The crucial point is that each individual has their own 
particular way of being, their authentic self. It became important for a person 
to be recognised because they were different from everyone else. (Taylor 
1992, 28.)  
And how is every person’s original way of being generated? According 
to Taylor, the crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally dialogical 
character: 
 
We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in 
struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us. 
Even if we outgrow some of these others – our parents, for instance – 
and they disappear from our lives, the conversation with them 
continues within us as long as we live. (Taylor 1992, 32-33.) 
 
The point is that a persons’ discovery of their own authentic identity does not 
take place in isolation. There are always significant others: “[m]y own 
identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others”. From this 
it follows, according to Taylor, that recognition becomes increasingly 
important. (Taylor 1992, 34.) 
To understand what Taylor means, we need to take a look at the 
different levels of recognition, individual and social. In the intimate sphere 
the formation of identity and the self takes place in a continuing dialogue and 
struggle with others. At the public level, refusals of recognition can inflict 
damage on those who are denied it. (Taylor 1992, 36-37.) Here I consider 
only the public sphere; I introduce Taylor’s views as to what counts as 
misrecognition and what ought to be done in order to achieve appropriate 
recognition. 
According to Taylor, there is a need for a politics of difference: “what 
we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual or group, 
their distinctness from everyone else.” (Taylor 1992, 38.) Taylor argues that 
the politics of difference is based on the idea that all humans are worthy of 
respect. We have a basic intuition that we should respect our capacity to 
direct our lives through certain principles. This means that what is of worth 
here is a ‘universal human potential’, a capacity that all humans share. It 
could thus be argued that the demand for equal recognition ought to extend 
beyond a respect for the equal value of all people potentially, to include a 
respect for what we have made of this equal potential. Then the step needed 
to arrive at cultural equality is to give “equal respect to actually evolved 
cultures”. To respect the universal potential for forming and defining identity 
is thus to acknowledge the possibility that two different cultures – say the 
European and the Zulu – have the same potential for culture formation. It is a 




mistake at the outset to say that Zulus might produce a culture that is less 
valuable than others, since saying this would mean denial of this fundamental 
principle of human equality. Every culture contributes to worth in different 
ways, and thereby becomes equally worthy of recognition. (Taylor 1992, 41-
43, see also 64; 72.) As Taylor writes, 
 
[i]f all cultures have made a contribution to worth, it cannot be that 
these are identical, or even embody the same kind of worth. To 
expect this would be to vastly underestimate the differences. (Taylor 
1992, 71: footnote 41.) 
 
However, the premise that all cultures have equal worth is problematic, and 
Taylor thinks that it may not be valid to demand this as a right. One obvious 
problem is that it seems senseless to demand that we come up with a final 
concluding judgment saying that their value is great, or equal to others 
(Taylor 1992, 69). Another problem is the controversy over the objectivity of 
judgments. However, Taylor suggests that since judgments are ultimately a 
question of human will, the issue of justification falls away:  
 
One doesn’t, properly speaking, make judgments that can be right or 
wrong; one expresses liking or dislike, one endorses or rejects 
another culture. ... [T]he validity or invalidity of judgments here has 
nothing to do with it. (Taylor 1992, 69.) 
 
Judgments like “when a Zulu produces Tolstoy we will read him” show the 
depths of ethnocentricity. It seems that when we assume something to be 
excellent, it has to have a form that is familiar to us. The other error is that 
we assume that their contribution is yet to be made. (Taylor 1992, 71.) 
According to Taylor, the presumption of equal worth could be grounded at 
the human level:  
 
[I]t is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the 
horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse 
characters and temperaments, over a long period of time – that have, 
in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the 
admirable – are almost certain to have something that deserves our 
admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we 
have to abhor or reject. Perhaps one could put it another way: it 
would take a supreme arrogance to discount this possibility a priori. 
(Taylor 1992, 72-73.) 
 
Real judgments of worth assume a fused horizon of standards: through the 
study of the other we ourselves gradually change, until eventually we are no 
longer judging by our familiar standards. (Taylor 1992, 70.) According to 
Taylor, there are two possible – and mutually conflicting – interpretations of 




politics of difference”. The first means the same universally, an identical 
basket of rights and immunities, and is applied in contemporary political 
theories. The second interpretation emphasises the need to recognise the 
unique identity of an individual or a group: their distinctness from everyone 
else. (Taylor 1992, 43.) 
Taylor favours the second interpretation. He emphasises that the first 
one, the politics of equal respect, requires that we treat people in difference-
blind fashion. However, this is problematic since the supposedly neutral set 
of difference-blind principles is  
 
in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. As it turns out, then, 
only the minority or suppressed cultures are being forced to take an 
alien form. Consequently, the supposedly fair and difference-blind 
society is not only inhuman ... but also, in a subtle and unconscious 
way, itself highly discriminatory. (Taylor 1992, 43.)  
 
In other words, distinctness is assimilated to a majority identity, “[a]nd this 
assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity” (Taylor 1992, 
38).  
In contrast to a difference-blind treatment, the politics of difference 
claims that distinctions should be seen as the basis of differential treatment. 
The goal is cultural survival or the protection of collective identities.  
 
 
Difference between Kymlicka and Taylor 
In the discussion of collective identities in the section ‘Concluding remarks’ 
of the previous chapter, I mentioned that collective identities include 
normative and ideological power; in other words, they define what is seen as 
right or wrong and what is to be regarded as appropriate behaviour in certain 
situations. Here it is also worth noting (i) that collective identity is not 
voluntary in the sense of being a matter of individual choice, and (ii) that a 
group’s practices function in such a way that norms defined by a collective 
identity are usually regarded as legitimate by members of that group.  
Kymlicka and Taylor argue that a person’s initial culture is of particular 
importance to him or her, but they disagree as to what implications this 
should have. One essential difference can be formulated in the form of a 
question: to what degree should we protect the members of disadvantaged 
cultures? Should we protect cultures in order to give members equal standing 
by equalising life conditions with the majority, or should we also guarantee 
the survival of cultures forever? Kymlicka allows protection, arguing that 
“[i]t seems that some measures of cultural protection are justified ... Once we 
recognize cultural membership as an important primary good which underlies 
our choices, then special rights and status for minority cultures may be 
required” (Kymlicka 1989a, 199). He does not talk about protecting cultures 




as such: “Protecting people from changes in the character of the culture can’t 
be viewed as protecting their ability to choose. On the contrary, it would be a 
limitation on their ability to choose” (Kymlicka 1989a, 167). Kymlicka’s 
theory is not in favour of protecting for example a group of illiberal 
character.  
Taylor (1992, 40), on the other hand, argues that we should  
 
maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever. After all, 
if we are concerned with identity, then what is more legitimate than 
one’s aspiration that it never be lost.  
 
Thus Taylor is seeking an effective pluralist policy. 
What further implications do these theories have? One essential feature 
in Kymlicka’s theory is that the cultural community is being recognised as a 
context of choice. He writes that cultural membership is “a good in its 
capacity of providing meaningful options for us, and aiding our ability to 
judge for ourselves the value of our life-plans” (Kymlicka 1989a, 166). There 
are, I think, two points to make. First, Kymlicka is careful not to say that 
membership is valuable because we can only choose those life-plans that a 
certain community regards as valuable. Thus Kymlicka’s notion introduced 
above, “we decide how to lead our lives by situating ourselves in these 
cultural narratives, by adopting roles that have struck us as worthwhile ones, 
as ones worth living” is not descriptive, in the sense that cultural membership 
is seen as providing the limits within which a person can understand what is 
worthwhile. Rather, Kymlicka sees cultural membership as being a context of 
choice, in the sense that we can choose to do differently than currently 
prescribed as the culture’s norms. We can regard as valuable something that 
the community does not see as such. 
Secondly, Kymlicka(1989a, 167) argues that a community’s norms and 
practices may change through revision: “the cultural community continues to 
exist even when its members are free to modify the character of culture, 
should they find its traditional ways of life no longer worthwhile”.8 Thus he 
maintains that a collective identity that is not voluntarily chosen may change 
following reflection by the members of a community. 
This notion, cultural community as a context of choice, is thus 
fundamentally different from the idea of the character of a community. In the 
latter view, “changes in the norms, values, and their attendant institutions in 
one’s community (e.g., membership in churches, political parties, etc.) would 
amount to loss of one’s culture” (Kymlicka 1989a, 166). The former view, 
favoured by Kymlicka, emphasises the meaning of the structure of the culture 
rather than the character of a cultural community: “It is the existence of a 
                                                
8 For example the Council of Europe’s ‘Colloquy on European culture: Identity and 
diversity’ (2005) states that cultures are not fixed, but are free to change through contact 




cultural community viewed as a context of choice that is a primary good, and 
a legitimate concern for liberals” (Kymlicka 1989a, 169).  
 
 
The question about religions’ protected cultural survival 
Kymlicka’s theory has been criticised. According to Taylor, for instance,  
 
Kymlicka’s reasoning is valid (perhaps) for existing people ... But it 
doesn’t justify measures designed to ensure survival through 
indefinite future generations. For the populations concerned, 
however, that is what is at stake. (Taylor 1992, 40-41: footnote 16.)  
 
Taylor does not want to restrict the scope of protection in the way that 
Kymlicka does. The main reason for criticism of Kymlicka, however, arises 
from the fact that his theory endorses the value of personal autonomy. 
According to Parekh (2000, 110), this tendency “to absolutize liberalism” 
divides “all ways of life into liberal and non-liberal, equate the latter with 
illiberal, and talk of tolerating and rarely respecting or cherishing them.” 
Parekh writes that “[i]f liberals are to do justice to alternative ways of life and 
thought, they need to break away from this crude binary distinction.” 
Similarly, Modood (1998, 390) argues that rather than a theory that bases 
multicultural citizenship on a ‘context of choice’ argument, we should try to 
create a theory of multiculturalism “in which we respect and recognise 
people’s sense of belonging, regardless of whether that identity is a context 
of choice or not.”9  
It is important to review here at some length the critique of autonomy-
based liberalism; in the academic debate the justification of religious groups’ 
rights are often based on an idea according to which multicultural policies 
should not be founded on an autonomy-based liberalism, and accusations of 
promoting assimilation often lean on these arguments. More importantly, 
what is at stake is the question of how a nation should react to those 
religions’ values that are not in line with its ethos. As we have seen in 
Chapter 2, it is in the interest of every nation (as well as the Council of 
Europe and the EU) that every citizen have a positive attitude towards 
democratic values. I have argued that it is this attitude that has become the 
main marker of inclusion/exclusion when it comes to the question of who fits 
in with the definition of national identity. 
 
 
                                                
9 The idea that autonomy is a crucial value of a liberal theory has also been challenged, 
for example by Galston (1995), Habermann (1994), Halstead (1995), Rawls (1993), Strike 
(1998), Tamir (1995), and Tomasi (1995). These scholars see themselves as liberal but 
claim that autonomy is not a necessary ingredient of a liberal doctrine. 




Yael Tamir’s right-based liberalism and respect for decent (religious) 
cultures 
In her article ‘Two Concepts of Multiculturalism’ (1995), Tamir presents a 
theory that she calls ‘thick’ multiculturalism. Her starting point is that in a 
plural society too much is demanded of illiberal communities; in order to 
achieve a fair society, one where liberal and illiberal communities can live 
side by side, liberal communities should accept the fact that those citizens 
who hold illiberal views of life have an equal right to lead the life they wish. 
Rather than an autonomy-based liberalism, which merely tolerates and 
respects autonomy-supporting cultures as a starting point in multicultural 
politics, what is preferable, according to Tamir, is a rights-based liberalism 
which is sensitive to the rights of individuals “without conceiving of those 
rights as grounded in autonomy-entitlement and choice prerogatives”. In 
seeking genuine respect for others, liberals should tolerate “decent illiberal 
cultures which do not foster the ideal of personal autonomy”. (Tamir 1995, 
168.)  
What, then, is wrong with autonomy-based liberalism? Tamir argues 
that many liberals who believe personal autonomy to be paramount also 
consider that human dignity requires autonomy. Autonomy here means that a 
person has the ability to independently determine a view of the good life for 
themself. This concept of autonomy, according to Tamir (1995, 168), 
suggests that “[m]embership of cultural, religious or national groups is ... 
seen as valuable only to the extent that it provides a context for choice, an 
evaluative horizon”. This in turn means that espousing the ideal of an 
autonomous life entails the risk that illiberal cultures will be ranked as 
inferior to liberal ones, as they do not necessarily contribute to their 
members’ ability to develop the mental skills or independence required to 
lead an autonomous life.  
According to Tamir (1995, 168), a multicultural politics founded on an 
autonomy-based liberalism will lead unjustly to actions designed to 
assimilate illiberal cultures into liberal ones. If a multicultural politics is 
founded on a rights-based liberalism, assimilation is not a necessary 
conclusion; such a liberalism places “at its core a commitment to equal 
concern and respect for individuals, their preferences and interests, regardless 
of the way these were formed”. If reasonable illiberal communities are valued 
by their members, “even if they fail to provide (or even prevent) the chance 
to develop autonomous lives”, they have the right to exist. “Hence for rights-
based liberalism the question is not which cultures allow individuals to 
develop their autonomy in a better, more comprehensive way, but rather 








Kenneth Strike and context sensitive balance  
Similarly to Tamir, Kenneth Strike makes a plea for a more sensitive liberal 
theory. He argues that although liberals value autonomy, and indeed it may 
be that autonomy is one of the reasons why liberals value tolerance, it is not 
the only reason. There are other reasons, such as the avoidance of sectarian 
strife and of psychological violence against individuals. Strike writes: 
 
[r]eligious beliefs may be deeply held. And this fact about them is 
independent of whether they are autonomously held. Those who say 
to their governments, ‘I must obey God rather than man’, or ‘Here I 
stand, I can do no other’ are damaged when their convictions are 
subjected to coercion regardless of whether their beliefs are 
autonomously acquired. Liberals must not respect autonomy to 
excess. (Strike 1998, 358.)  
 
According to Strike, we should find a context-sensitive balance between 
different liberal values, such as autonomy and freedom of conscience: 
 
[t]he commitment to balancing requires that we accept outcomes that 
have real costs. Freedom of conscience may require that we accept 
groups and practices that may socialize children who will not support 
or fully support liberal values. It may require that we accept some 
forms of injustice in order to avoid others. (Strike 1998, 358-359.) 
 
Strike’s interpretation of liberalism, like Tamir’s, is based on the 
understanding that adults are not only free to live a life that does not regard 
autonomy as worth pursuing, but are also free to inhibit, to some degree, the 




Minority claims in numbers 
It is time to place the above discussion in the appropriate frame of reference. 
What is at stake in the claims of Tamir and Strike is of course the right to 
protect and produce a kind of religious identity that is not in line with the 
value of autonomy.  
Empirical evidence supports this conclusion. Koopmans et al. (2005) 
have collected empirical data on immigrant group claims in Britain, France 
and the Netherlands between 1992 and 1998. Looking at the type of 
collective identities expressed in immigrants’ group demands, we find two 
interesting points. First, a vast majority of immigrant group claims were 
made using religious forms of identification: in France more than half 
(53.1 %), in the Netherlands six out of ten (60.0 %), and in Britain two thirds 




(65.9 %). Secondly, “group demands are made principally through one 
religious self-identification, i.e., Muslims.” (Koopmans et al. 2005, 154.) 
It is reasonable to ask why other immigrant groups possessing a strong 
religious identity, for example Hindus, have not made such claims. 
According to Koopmans et al. (2005, 155), 
 
the relatively low level of Hindu group demands compared to 
Muslims is the result of the different infrastructures of the two 
religions in their societies of settlements. Islam is a more collective 
and public religion, centred on the mosque, whereas there are many 
different types of Hinduism ... As a non-proselytizing de-centralized 
religion that is practiced privately, Hinduism as a new minority 
religion has fitted more easily within the political space granted.  
 
Their conclusion is that “multicultural debates in Europe tend to be about the 
position of Islam”. However, it is worth noting that while Muslims have 
made most of the demands, the phenomenon is still relatively marginal. Most 
Muslims seem to adhere to a secular or modern understanding of Islamic 
practice. (Koopmans et al. 2005, 156.)  
Now let us get back to the counter-arguments to Kymlicka’s justification 
of group rights. It is argued that Kymlicka’s idea that the character of the 
community ought not to be protected, and his claims that liberals should seek 
to liberalise illiberal groups (see Kymlicka 1989a, 170; 1995, 94), in many 
cases “amount to a forced shift of basic group identity” (Galston 1995, 523). 
This turns out, according to the critique presented, to be the “cultural 
equivalent of the Vietnam-era principle of ‘destroying the village in order to 
save it’” (Galston 1995, 523). In other words, Kymlicka’s view does not 
accommodate diversity in the way that for example some religious minorities 
would want it to. Actually, it seems to leave many religious communities 
unprotected just as they are at present. According to Mark Halstead (1995, 
266-267), when Kymlicka distinguishes between the protection of the 
community as such and the protection of a particular preferred vision of what 
sort of character the community should have, “this rules out the right of 
religious minorities ... to preserve their distinct cultural identity, since it is 
only the groups’ possession of a ‘preferred vision’ which makes them a 
distinct community at all”. This is so because “their shared identity depends 
not on a shared cultural heritage ... but on a shared framework of fundamental 
beliefs”.10 
It is useful here to take into account the differences between religious 
groups and other minority groups, whether autochthonous (native citizens) or 
allochthonous (immigrants). Halstead (1995, 264) argues that religious 
groups differ fundamentally from autochthonous ones in two ways: (1) their 
                                                
10 The reader may recall that in Chapter 1 I wrote that especially diasporic religions are 




culture is (in most cases) not associated with a particular territory within a 
state, and (2) “preservation of their distinctive culture does not involve 
significant restrictions being placed on the rights of the majority”. In the case 
of allochthonous groups, on the other hand, religious minorities differ in 
three ways: (1) religious groups want to bring up their own children “in line 
with their own religious commitments”, (2) the groups’ religious 
commitment determines the primary identity of these religious minorities, 
and (3) “the cultural identity of such groups is not of a form which can be 
tacked on as an extra component to their citizenship. ... On the contrary, their 
religious identity is something which they believe should permeate the whole 
life.”  
Halstead refers to his own empirical research with Muslim 
communities.11 According to this study, one of Muslim parents’ main 
educational goals is the “preservation, maintenance and transmission of their 
distinctive beliefs and values, both through direct teaching and through a 
school ethos informed by these values” (Halstead 1995, 265). Halstead 
argues that if religious groups “cannot use education to maintain this shared 
framework of fundamental beliefs, then their culture is vulnerable either to 
gradual corrosion as a result of sustained exposure to liberal values or to a 
more direct assault by liberal social policy” (Halstead 1995, 267). 
The reason why minorities want separate schools is to provide children 
with an education where the beliefs and values of the school are broadly in 
line with those of the home. Kymlicka’s demand for the liberalising of 
cultural communities, however, seems to be incompatible with the claims of 
minorities. According to Halstead (1995, 264), religious minorities find it 
difficult to accept an education in which for 95% of the time their children 
are subjected to a ‘neutral’ or secular curriculum, while 5% is devoted to 
their own cultural or religious beliefs and practices. The 95% would be 
perceived as potentially undermining their faith. Here, faith is specifically 
something that pupils’ independent thought might undermine. 
Halstead (1995, 270) argues that “each cultural group must be free to 
pursue its own conception of the good within a framework of justice and 
equal respect. The freedom guaranteed to citizens by political liberalism 
includes the freedom to pursue non-liberal cultural goals.”  
 
 
Problematic group rights 
If Kymlicka’s justification of group rights is not particularly useful in cases 
where certain religious groups want to protect their children from alien 
influences, another possibility is to refer for example to Taylor. However, 
quoting Taylor in order to justify educational rights for religious minorities 
seems problematic. First of all, the presumption of the equal value of every 
                                                
11 See Halstead (1986). 




culture has been questioned. It is one thing to say that a particular culture has 
something that deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied 
by much that we have to abhor or reject; it is quite another to claim that every 
culture has equal value. In his critique of Taylor, Habermas (1994, 129-130) 
writes: “[t]he right to equal respect, which everyone can demand in the life 
contexts in which their identity is formed as well as elsewhere, has nothing to 
do with the presumed excellence of their culture of origin.”  
Secondly, the conclusion that Taylor sees as a proper way to protect 
minorities is seen from a liberal point of view as questionable. This is so 
because his idea of protecting diversity “calls into question the individualistic 
core of the modern conception of freedom” (Habermas 1994, 109). Taylor’s 
demand for respect does not seem to be aimed at equalising the living 
conditions of individuals, but rather at protecting the integrity of traditions 
and forms of life. According to Habermas (1994, 109-110), since equal rights 
of co-existence are individual rights of free association and non-
discrimination, they should not guarantee survival for any culture. The 
political project of preserving cultures as if they were endangered species 
deprives cultures of their vitality and individuals of their freedom to revise 
and even to reject their inherited cultural identities. As Habermas (1994, 130-
131) argues: 
 
cultural heritages and the forms of life articulated in them normally 
reproduce themselves by convincing those whose personality 
structures they shape, that is, by motivating them to appropriate 
productively and continue the traditions. The constitutional state can 
make this hermeneutic achievement of the cultural reproduction of 
lifeworlds possible, but it cannot guarantee it. When a culture has 
become reflective, the only traditions and forms of life that can 
sustain themselves are those that bind their members while at the 
same time subjecting themselves to critical examination and leaving 
later generations the option of learning from traditions or converting 
and setting out for other shores.  
 
The point of Habermas’ critique is that collective rights that override the 
theory of rights tailored to individual persons are illegitimate: it is 
inconsistent to ask for the protection of a form of life and tradition in the 
name of recognition of the group’s members, while at the same time 
demanding collective rights that would perhaps trump some members’ 
interests.12  
                                                
12 Elsewhere (Himanen 2001, 80) I have discussed the practical problem that relates to 
Taylor’s theory, using John Tomasi’s (1995, 603) argument according to which “[w]e 
best respect the group members by not insisting on respecting them as individual holders 
of the full set of liberal rights”. I argued that this kind of argument is problematic in at 




K. Anthony Appiah (1994, 162-163) shares Habermas’ critique and 
argues that group recognition may tie individuals too tightly to scripts over 
which they have too little authoritative control. According to Appiah, 
“[b]etween the politics of recognition and the politics of compulsion, there is 
no bright line.”  
 
 
Theoretical framework for the analysis of empirical data 
Models for analysing multicultural policies 
As I wrote in the introduction to this chapter, my main focus in this chapter is 
to evaluate the policies of Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Denmark in treating cultural diversity. I do so by exploring, first of all, in 
what respects difference is recognised, secondly, what changes have occurred 
with regard to this matter. The discussion of group rights provides a useful 
background for this purpose. In order to accomplish a more comprehensive 
analysis, however, I also introduce and discuss three different models of 
multicultural policy. 
One theoretical framework for analysing how difference is recognised in 
a multicultural society is provided by Jeffrey C. Alexander (2001). His 
framework is based on the question of how the identities or qualities of those 
who do not belong to the mainstream culture are treated in the public sphere. 
Alexander makes use of three key concepts. The first of these, the ‘civil 
sphere’, refers to “a social sphere or field organized around a particular kind 
of solidarity”. This second concept, ‘solidarity’, refers to collective 
obligations and goodwill toward the members who compose the sphere. 
(Alexander 2001, 239-240.) Finally, the concept of ‘primordial qualities’ 
refers to elements that are essential ingredients of personal identity. These 
may relate to race, religious identity, sexuality, or previously adopted 
national identity (Alexander 2001, 246).  
According to Alexander, the “modes of incorporation” in a multicultural 
society are assimilation, hyphenation, and multiculturalism. Assimilation 
means that a person’s culturally driven (primordial) identities are not 
welcome in the civil sphere. Quite the contrary; individuals are “separated 
from their primordial qualities” through different socialising channels, for 
example through education. (Alexander 2001, 243; italics in original.) As 
Alexander defines it, “assimilation takes place when out-group members are 
allowed to enter fully into civic life on the condition that they shed their 
polluted primordial identities”. This means that outsiders’ culturally born 
identities must be shed when they enter into the civil sphere. A typical 
example of assimilation is when the state provides members of an out-group 
with a civil education in order to impart to them the competences they will 
                                                
acceptable failure to respect individual rights; secondly, we would have to regard children 
as bearers of some particular culture from birth.  




need in order to function properly in the society. It is worth noting that in this 
model the distinction between the private and public spheres is quite clear: 
“because the polluted qualities of stigmatized group membership are even 
more firmly restricted to the private sphere, this split becomes sharper and 
more unyielding” (Alexander 2001, 244). 
According to Alexander, assimilation is an unstable state of affairs. 
When assimilation creates dissatisfaction, one possible positive outcome is 
hyphenation. In this model, the particularities of outsiders are not viewed in 
one-sidedly negative ways. Outsiders are considered “ethnic” rather than 
“foreign”, and are tolerated better in public life. This makes it easier to create 
cross-group bonds, since “opportunities for dialogue, understanding, and 
emotional bonding” are provided, which may result in “the creation of a 
common collective identity”. (Alexander 2001, 245.) 
However, while there are positive sides to such a development, 
“significant stigmatization remains” when it comes to the qualities of 
outsiders. The point is that outsider qualities are still defined one-sidedly. In 
hyphenation, “ambition does not extend to redefining outsider qualities as 
much as to allowing members of denigrated groups to be separated from 
them” (Alexander 2001, 245).  
The third model, multiculturalism, according to Alexander, is preferable 
to assimilation or hyphenation, since it creates the possibility of “expanding 
and revising the civil sphere”: more precisely, “all ... primordial qualities are 
open to reinterpretation as representations of the ‘sacred’ qualities of civility” 
(Alexander 2001, 246). Alexander argues that in a truly multicultural 
community “universal solidarity is deepened” and “particularity and 
difference become the guiding themes of the day”. This means “a dramatic 
decrease in the negative identification of the previously subordinated”. 
(Alexander 2001, 246.) The outcome is wide acceptance of others as well as 
their cultures. An example of this is the emergence of the slogan “Black is 
beautiful”; according to Alexander, this slogan arose in order to invert its 
negative identification. (Alexander 2001, 247.)  
 
In their article ‘Dealing with Diversity: Mapping Multiculturalism in 
Sociological Terms’ (2005), Douglas Hartmann and Joseph Gerteis offer a 
theoretical framework for analysing how different nations deal with cultural 
diversity that takes more variables into account than that of Alexander. 
However, their framework too is fundamentally about how different identities 
are taken into account in a public sphere.  
The model is two-dimensional (see figure 2). The first dimension 
describes the basis for solidarity, in terms of two alternatives: thick and thin. 
Among citizens, thick solidarity is achieved by emphasising moral bonds 
among them. Solidarity is thinner, on the other hand, if “shared procedural 




social order even in the face of deep moral divisions”. (Hartmann & Gerteis 
2005, 223.) 
The second dimension describes the basis for association. Here “the core 
distinction is between visions that propose that the basis for social association 
is individual interactions and those that suggest a more central role for 
groups” (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 223).  
 
Figure 2 (Hartmann and Gerteis 2005, 224): 
 
  Dimension 1:  
  Basis for Cohesion 
    
  Substantive  Procedural  
Dimension 2:  Moral Bonds Norms 
Basis for Association      
     
Individual in Society  Assimilationism Cosmopolitanism 
      
      
      
  Interactive Fragmented 
Mediating Groups  Pluralism Pluralism 
      
    
    
 
The essential feature of assimilationism is that moral cohesion is 
achieved by upholding and creating substantive moral bonds among citizens 
(Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 226). It is common values that create the ‘centre’ 
of society (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 227). The importance of mutual 
responsibilities is also emphasised. In considering the basis of association, 
the emphasis is on the individual. At the micro-level, the mediating role of 
the groups is denied; at the macro-level, on the other hand, the group and the 
nation are the same. Here we see similarities to Alexander’s theory, since the 
idea of identity based on group membership is denied in the public sphere. 
Individuals are expected “to shed their previous markers of group identity 
and adopt those of the social whole”. Difference is removed and the emphasis 
is on cultural homogeneity. (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 226.) “By 
minimizing distinctiveness, particularly with regard to cultural values 
systems, the bonds of mutual understanding as well as mutual responsibility 
are maximized.” National culture is the one to be cherished, and its outlines 
are clear. Differences in the private sphere are tolerated, however, as long as 
they are not pushed into the public sphere. (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 227.) 
According to Hartmann and Gerteis, France is a good example of this kind of 
policy (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 228). 




In cosmopolitanism the value of diversity is recognised and cherished to 
a certain degree. The limit is that group restrictions placed on individuals are 
not considered welcome. If diversity leads to increased individual rights and 
freedom, it can be valorised and defended. However, group identity is not the 
source of public rights, and group membership is a matter of individual 
choice. When it comes to values, there is no thick commitment; rather the 
role of procedural norms is emphasised. The values to cherish are tolerance 
and individual choice. At the national level inclusive elements of 
identification are not strong, since the model does not insist that all members 
share the same core traits. (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 228-229.) “[T]he 
social whole is one among many sources of identity, and it is not necessarily 
the most salient” (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 228).  
In fragmented pluralism the social whole is dissolved into collective 
units. Procedural norms form the basis for social cohesion. A salient feature 
is the heavy role of groups. “The individual, in short, gets subsumed by the 
group rather than the nation.” The state is largely empty of content. 
(Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 229-230.) 
Finally, interactive pluralism means that membership in a group is seen 
as a primary source of identity, and that group identity claims are regarded as 
legitimate. However, there is a thick substantive form of cohesion. 
Substantive moral order is something that has emerged from interaction. The 
focus is on mutual recognition and respect for difference, not so much on 
citizens’ responsibilities to each other. This model implies a decentralised 
vision of national culture. It is groups in action that create the society as a 
whole. (Hartmann & Gerteis 2005, 231-232.) 
 
The third framework that I find useful in analysing different nations’ 
approaches to diversity is the model proposed by Erik Bleich (1998). 
According to Bleich, national diversity policies are either non-multicultural 
or multicultural. The former can be further divided into assimilationist and 
preparationist models, the latter into passive and active multicultural models. 
Assimilative cultural policies aim at erasing cultural differences and 
promoting homogeneity. The preparationist model nourishes cultural 
differences but only because it aims at the eventual disappearance of cultural 
minorities. (Bleich 1998, 82.) 
In multicultural models, passive multiculturalism is “an attempt to allow 
for a measure of cultural diversity by making certain exceptions for 
minorities while limiting the effect of changes on the majority”; active 
multiculturalist policies, on the other hand, “go further by attempting to 
create a new national culture which encompasses minority as well as majority 
cultures and perspectives” (Bleich 1998, 83).  
 
The three models described above provide useful tools for analysing how 




their culturally driven identities are treated in the public sphere in Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. Applying these models, we 
can determine whether or not difference is recognised, and if so, in what way. 
Applying a rough scale: at one end we find a policy of ‘assimilation’, 
according to which out-group members are expected to gradually shed their 
primordial identities, while at the other end is a policy under which an 




Relevant questions for the analysis of empirical data  
In 1999, Will Kymlicka (1999a, 113) wrote that “multiculturalists have won 
the day” in making their demands as to greater accommodative respect. 
However, soon afterwards, scholars in the fields of sociology and political 
philosophy began to recognise a shift within Europe in government policies 
with regard to diversity.13 In the following I analyse the four nations’ current 
immigration policies, in order to determine whether or not multiculturalism 
has ever been a dominant policy in these countries. I also try to specify in 
what respects and to what degree multiculturalism has occurred. However, as 
noted, the main task is to investigate how cultural diversity is treated in these 
countries. The models proposed by Alexander, Hartmann and Gerteis, and 
Bleich, along with the discussion of group rights, provide appropriate 
questions for these purposes. I limit my enquiry to two areas: society’s 
expectations towards citizens, and the recognition of groups. Both areas are 
important for my further enquiry in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. With regard to 
society’s expectations towards citizens, my main questions are the following: 
 
(i) What kind of civil sphere is proposed? How important is civic 
identity as a source of personal identity?  
(ii) What is the role of society’s core values? Are they meant to be 
moral bonds or procedural norms only?  
(iii) What responsibilities do citizens bear towards the nation and 
towards each other? 
(iv) What kind of solidarity among citizens is expected? Here I refer 
to Alexander’s (2001, 239-240) definition, according to which 
solidarity means collective obligations and goodwill towards 
other members of society. 
                                                
13 In 2001, Brubaker argued that France, Germany, and the United States have faced ‘the 
return of assimilation’. Two years later, Tariq Modood (2003, 101) claimed that “[a]cross 
Europe, multiculturalism — a policy suitable where communities want to maintain some 
level of distinction — is in retreat and ‘integration’ is once again the watchword.” An 
article by Han Enzinger from 2003 is titled ‘The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The 
Case of the Netherlands’. In 2004 Christian Joppke (2004) wrote of the ‘retreat of 
multiculturalism’ in Australia, Britain and the Netherlands. 




(v) How are primordial qualities treated in the civil sphere? Are they 
expected to be shed when people enter the public sphere? 
(vi) Does a nation allow opportunities for immigrants to enrich the 
public culture? (This question was inspired by Bleich’s 
distinction between active and passive multiculturalism.)  
 
The second series of questions has to do with the treatment of groups: 
  
(vii) What is the unit of incorporation – the group or the individual?  
(viii) What is the overall goal of incorporation – equality among 
groups or equal opportunities for individuals?  
(ix) Who bears responsibility for upholding cultural diversity? (This 
question is derived from the debate over the relationship between 
identity and group. What is interesting here is in what respect(s) 
identity is a source of public rights.) 




Coping with cultural plurality in Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Denmark 
 
Great Britain 
Tahir Abbas (2005, 157) writes that in Britain, from the 1950s through the 
1970s, immigrant treatment policy aimed at making them more like the 
majority. According to Abbas, this “assimilationist model” did not 
adequately take into account the social psychology of group identity. A 
change of policy took place in the late 1960s, and multiculturalism emerged 
as the official policy allowing for the recognition of ethnic diversity in 
Britain. (Abbas 2005, 158; italics added.) Abbas describes this 
multiculturalism as providing a framework within which ethnic diversity 
could be recognised by policymakers. Nevertheless, he reminds us, it was 
difference that was still perceived as a problem. (Abbas 2005, 158.) 
What kind of multiculturalism might this arrangement have promoted? 
In terms of Bleich’s model it looks like passive multiculturalism, since it was 
not the case that the majority adopted cultural practices from minorities; in 
terms of Alexander’s model it could not be called multiculturalism at all, not 
to mention the kind of multiculturalism discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter. What is lacking is (1) active encouragement and enabling of ethnic 
and religious minorities to contribute to the creation of a new national 
culture; (2) the recognition of groups with their own group-specific rights. It 
is also worth noting that “[t]hrough the late 1970s and into the mid-1980s, 
multiculturalism was critiqued by members of ethnic minority communities 




Some scholars who have written about British multicultural policy have 
argued that at the turn of the millennium there was a short period of time 
when government actions aimed at better recognition of minorities. Abbas 
(2005, 158), for instance, argues that “New Labour was keen to embrace 
Britain’s multicultural and ethnically diverse mix of people”, while Back et 
al. (2002, 446) write that “New Labour was keen to present a commitment to 
... embracing diversity and valuing cultural mix”. Joppke (2004, 249) goes 
even further, suggesting that in 2000 “British multicultural orthodoxy” was 
affirmed in the publication of the Runnymede Trust Commission’s report, 
The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain.  
But as Joppke (2004, 250) writes, “[t]his reassertion of orthodox 
multiculturalism proved rather short-lived”. For instance, Home Secretary 
Jack Straw publicly dissociated himself from the findings of the Commission 
(Abbas 2005, 158), and soon thereafter the Labour government declared that 
it was time to move ‘beyond multiculturalism’ (The Economist 2001; in 
Joppke 2004, 251).  
In the light of this information, it is relevant to ask whether there ever 
existed a policy that could be called multiculturalism at all. There may 
perhaps have been a change of tone at the rhetorical level; in practice, 
however no major changes occurred during the brief period of ‘orthodox 
multiculturalism’ indicating an actual response to minority claims.14 
What, then, did this new political course, of going ‘beyond 
multiculturalism’, mean? How can British multicultural policy in the 
following era be defined? In the previous chapter I argued, first of all, that 
articulated national identity is strongly based on Western values, secondly 
that even when cultural plurality is welcomed, cultural practices that conflict 
with these values are not regarded as legitimate. Another important feature of 
the documents dealing with cultural plurality and immigration is that the 
government wanted to increase the sense of belonging and mutuality among 
citizens in the name of a more functional and secure society. In the 
Government White Paper Secure Haven, Safe Borders (2002), it is argued 
that “[c]ommunity cohesion and commonality of citizenship is weak” (Home 
Office 2002, 10 par 7), and that “[i]n an increasingly diverse world, it is vital 
that we strengthen both our sense of community belonging and the civic and 
political dimensions of British citizenship” (Home Office 2002, 11 par 9). 
Another White Paper, Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society: The 
Government’s strategy to increase race equality and community cohesion 
(2005), sets the goal of creating ‘a cohesive society’ that would “help people 
                                                
14 The most important change – keeping in mind the purposes of this enquiry – was the 
granting of public funding to two Muslim schools. Another change that is referred to in 
the scholarly debate is dropping the ‘primary purpose’ clause in immigration rules, which 
prevented people from marrying a spouse from overseas if the main purpose was to settle 
in Britain. (Abbas 2005, 158; Back et al. 2002, 446.) 




from all backgrounds to come together and develop a sense of inclusion and 
shared British identity” (Home Office 2005, 11 par 9). 
The idea of creating a cohesive society naturally means an effort to 
strengthen bonds among citizens; in other words, to encourage citizens 
become closer to each other. Now, the essential question is, why is there a 
need for this? The underlying threat is a society that is fragmented into sub-
groups, each with its own vision of the good life and values to be followed:  
 
In many areas, the diversity within and between communities has 
been a source of rich cultural interactions, but in other areas 
segregation has led to people leading ‘parallel lives’ with little 
interaction (Home Office 2005, 20 par 14). 
The reports into last summer’s disturbances in Bradford, Oldham and 
Burnley painted a vivid picture of fractured and divided 
communities, lacking a sense of common values or shared civic 
identity to unite around (Home Office 2002, 10 par 6; see also 22 par 
1.7). 
 
This idea is also explicitly stated for example in ‘Terrorism and Community 
Relations: The Government’s Response (Presented to Parliament by the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty)’, 
2005. According to this document, the analysis in the Cantle report 
(Community Cohesion), in which one of the key issues was found to be the 
need to overcome segregation, remains valid (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee 2005, 3). It is clear that in the eyes of politicians the 
policy of laissez-faire in interaction among groups has not succeeded as 
hoped. 
One reason for segregation is that members of minority ethnic groups 
are not provided enough opportunities. The White Paper Improving 
Opportunity, Strengthening Society admits that “coming from a minority 
ethnic community appears to carry added disadvantages (Home Office 2005, 
19 par 9) and that deprivation and lack of opportunity have been significant 
contributory factors to the riots in the summer of 2001 (Home Office 2005, 
19 par 11). Likewise ignorance about British life or language “may contribute 
to problems of polarisation between communities” (Home Office 2002, 32 
par 2.11). 
Another threat to cohesion is that posed by extremists who seek to 
promote hatred and divide communities. According to the Government, 
“some worrying developments” of this phenomenon can be found in British 
society. (Home Office 2005, 21 par 14.)  
What, then, are the characteristics of a cohesive society? First of all, all 
citizens are expected to contribute their share or fulfil their responsibilities. 
The White Paper Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society (2005) 





When a community feels that some groups are not contributing, 
divisions will increase. That is one of the reasons why, for example, 
we have made clearer the expectations we have of new British 
citizens, including language skills and a test of knowledge of life in 
the UK. (Home Office 2005, 42 par 4.3.)  
 
We also find a reference to a psychological dimension: “It is important that 
people feel that this approach works in practice, for everyone in society” 
(Home Office 2005, 42 par 4.3).15 
There are several ways in which citizens can fulfil their responsibilities, 
that is, “play their part in society” (Home Office 2005, 42 par 4.3). The 
explicitly stated “essential elements of Britishness” are respect for others and 
the rule of law, tolerance, mutual obligations among citizens and the 
necessary language skills (Home Office 2005, 42 par 4.4). However, there is 
more to it than that. The report also declares that people from different 
backgrounds should know and understand each other; furthermore, while 
“[i]n a diverse society, inevitably there will be differences in values and 
ambitions”, citizens must understand that “differences in values and customs 
need to be resolved through negotiation” (Home Office 2005, 42 par 4.4).  
Here we see a similarity to Rawls’ idea of the virtues of the ‘reasonable’ 
citizen: in this process of negotiation, “[n]o one set of cultural values should 
                                                
15 The argumentative structure of the White Paper goes as follows: P1 & P2: Compared to 
many societies, Britain has done well to build a sense of inclusive membership, among 
both the majority and minorities (Home Office 2005, 20 par 13). However, inequalities 
exist among members of the British society. For example, while many members of Black 
and minority ethnic communities already do well in Britain, “many still suffer particularly 
poor outcomes in education, employment, health and other life chances, for a complex 
mixture of reasons, including racial discrimination, lack of opportunities …” (Ibid, 8 par 
3.) Furthermore, “[i]n many areas, the diversity within and between communities has 
been a source of rich cultural interactions, but in other areas segregation has led to people 
leading ‘parallel lives’ with little interaction” (ibid, 21 par 14). Tensions have developed 
between different ethnic groups (ibid, 19 par 11). P3: One problem, along with inequality, 
is that some groups are not contributing enough (ibid, 42 par 4.3). Furthermore, “[i]n a 
period of general economic and social change, there is some evidence that extremists who 
promote hatred are increasingly seeking to divide communities” (ibid, 21 par 14). P4: The 
reasons for these disadvantages are complex and mutually reinforcing, but “where experts 
have looked at these issues in depth – such as at employment – coming from a minority 
ethnic community appears to carry added disadvantages” (ibid, 19 par 9). Deprivation and 
lack of opportunity have also been significant contributory factors (ibid, 19 par 11). P5 & 
conclusion: In order to correct the situation, the government’s intention is to put “greater 
emphasis to promoting a sense of common belonging and cohesion among all groups …” 
(ibid, 11 par 9), to reduce race inequalities (ibid, 8 par 4) and “to ensure that people are 
not discriminated against because of their race or religion, and that all can make a full 
contribution” to the British society (ibid, 8 par 2). As for the means to achieve the goal, 
“tailored approaches” are provided in order to meet “the specific needs of different 
minority communities, and to focus on those groups who still suffer particular 
disadvantage, rather than treating all minority groups as disadvantaged or having the 
same needs” (ibid, 19, 10i). 




be privileged more than another” (Home Office 2005, 42 par 4.4; italics 
added).  
In the White Paper Secure Haven, Safe Borders (2002) it is declared that 
the responsibilities of citizens should also be made clear to those who come 
from abroad: “The Government attaches great importance to helping those 
who settle here ... to understand the rights and responsibilities that come with 
the acquisition of British citizenship” (Home Office 2002, 29). 
 
To return to the framing questions established above: it can be argued that the 
government’s aim is clearly to create a strong civil sphere (first question). By 
‘strong’ I mean that every citizen is expected to take part, and that civic 
identity is definitely one major source of identity (see e.g. Home Office 2002, 
32 par 2.11). This is grounded by referring to a hypothetical negative 
outcome: 
 
Without this basic sense of common identity and commitment to 
participation, not only are these opportunities missed but, at worst, 
fear and conflict can develop. Achieving such cohesion is therefore 
important for all sections of society – Black and minority ethnic and 
majority populations. (Home Office 2005, 42 par 1.) 
 
The fundamental basis for cohesion consists of commonly shared values 
(second question). They create the ‘centre’, to use the expression by 
Hartmann & Gerteis (2005, 227). Although citizens can hold different values 
in private, it is expected that in a situation of conflict common values will 
take precedence over individual cultural ones:  
 
It will sometimes be necessary to confront some cultural practices 
which conflict with these basic values – such as those which deny 
women the right to participate as equal citizens. (Home Office 2002, 
30 par 2.3.) 
 
When it comes to citizens’ responsibilities (third question), in addition to 
active respect for core values, virtues that enable peaceful co-operation are 
also demanded: 
 
[T]he values of respect for others and the rule of law, including 
tolerance and mutual obligations between citizens ... are essential 
elements of Britishness (Home Office 2005, 42 par 4). 
 
The goal is to achieve a society where citizens have a strong feeling of 
solidarity (fourth question) and respect for each other: “We will ... strengthen 
the bonds of mutual understanding between people of diverse cultural 
backgrounds” (Home Office 2002, 11, par 9). The foundation of solidarity is 





Question number five concerned the treatment of primordial qualities in 
the civil sphere. It could be argued that there are no indications that they 
should be shed when a person enters the public sphere. At least the following 
statements point in that direction: 
 
People should not need to choose between their British identity and 
other cultural identities. They can be proud of both. (Home Office 
2005, 20 par 13.) 
[W]e will improve opportunities ... to develop an inclusive sense of 
British identity alongside their other cultural identities (Home Office 
2005, 11 par 9i). 
 
However, when it comes to the connection between religion and identity, the 
case is slightly more difficult. This is undoubtedly the hardest one for those 
religious people who cannot maintain the distinction. According to Modood 
(2003, 110), the political expression of religion should enter into the public 
discourse, since religion is “a key source of communal identity”. This form of 
primordial identity is seen as unwelcome in the civil sphere if its practices or 
values conflict with the nation’s central values. 
The sixth question concerned how actively a nation is creating a new 
national culture, one which encompasses both minority and majority cultures 
and perspectives. Here we see clear limits, since the central elements of the 
civil sphere are already in existence.  
The second pattern of questions (questions vii-x) are about how groups 
are treated in public. In the documents, groups are mentioned, but the main 
idea is obviously that while cultural background is acknowledged, the unit of 
incorporation is an individual (question number seven). However, the White 
Paper Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society also perceives a need 
for  
 
more sophisticated, tailored approaches to meeting the specific needs 
of different minority communities, and to focus on those groups who 
still suffer particular disadvantage, rather than treating all minority 
groups as disadvantaged or having the same needs (Home Office 
2005, 19 par 10i; italics added).  
 
It also states that it is now “time to move on from one-size-fits-all approaches 
to meeting Black and minority ethnic needs” (Home Office 2005, 19 par 10i). 
In this sense, it can be said that the way to achieve equality among 
individuals is to recognise the needs of those groups that are considered 
disadvantaged compared to the others, and to give them special attention. The 
White Paper also states the following:  
 




because diversity is such an important feature of British society, our 
approach to meeting the needs of a range of different minority ethnic 
communities is very much to build provision for such diversity (and 
differing needs within the majority population) into our overall 
vision for good public services (Home Office 2005, 29 par 2). 
In addition, a number of public services have set themselves further 
objectives, both to reduce disadvantage and inequalities as a whole 
(which will help disadvantaged members of Black and minority 
ethnic groups as well as other disadvantaged population groups) and 
to meet the specific needs of minority ethnic groups (Home Office 
2005, 29 par 4; italics added). 
 
Viewed from this perspective, group membership is seen as a source of 
public recognition (question number ten). It is worth noting that the Paper 
refers chiefly to Black and ethnic minority groups. Religion is not singled out 
as a basis for group identity. The overall goal of incorporation, however, is 
equality between individuals (question number eight). This is clearly 
expressed in the same White Paper: 
 
But such a cohesive society relies on more than equal opportunities 
for individuals. It also relies on a number of social conditions that 
help people from all backgrounds to come together and develop a 
sense of inclusion and shared British identity defined by common 
opportunities and mutual expectations on all citizens to contribute to 
society. (Home Office 2005, 11 par 9.) 
 
Finally, when it comes to the question of who bears the responsibility for 
preserving a distinct cultural identity (question number nine): there is nothing 
in the documents to suggest that the state is seen as having any obligation in 
this matter. This, however, is not to say that for example religious groups are 
not recognised at all as bearers of certain group-specific rights, enabling them 
to preserve their distinct culture. For example the Jews and the Sikhs are 
recognised as ethnic groups, and are seen as entitled to some group-specific 
rights (Barry 2001). But this is a rather exceptional arrangement and does not 
apply to all groups equally. Modood (2003, 103-104) points out that British 
courts do not accept Muslims as an ethnic group. Koopmans et al. (2005, 
177) note that a significant number of British Muslims’ group demands are 
made within the race relations framework; if Islam were categorised as an 
ethno-religion, these claims would easily be accommodated. According to 
Modood, the under-representation of Muslims is an indicator of inequality 
(Modood 2003, 104), and means that “Muslim identity is seen as an 
illegitimate child of British multiculturalism” (Modood 2003, 110). 
To return briefly to the question posed in the previous chapter, as to 
lessening vs. exaggerating differences among citizens or cultural groups: it 




degree. They are all expected to adopt a civic identity and to possess virtues 
that enable peaceful co-operation. This expectation of course also assumes 
that citizens can become alike in this matter. Thus cultural differences at the 
level of values are diminished, in the sense that in some cases citizens are 




As mentioned in the previous chapter, since the 1960s the Netherlands has 
accommodated a vast number of immigrants. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s it became apparent that immigrants were not just passing through but 
were there to stay. It thus became important to formulate an official 
immigration policy. The result, the Dutch ethnic minority policy presented in 
1983, applied to Turks, Moroccans, Southern Europeans, Moluccans, 
Surinamese, Antillians, refugees, Roma and Sints, and caravan dwellers 
(Vermeulen and Penninx 2000, 20). The policy was based on an expansion of 
the old idea of pillarization.16 According to the government’s White Paper, A 
memorandum on minorities (Minderhedennota) (1983), the policy was 
“aimed at the realization of a society in which the members of minority 
groups that live in the Netherlands individually and as a group have an equal 
place and full opportunities to develop themselves” (Minderhedennota 1983, 
10; cited in Musterd et al. 1998, 33). 
The official slogan of the ethnic minority policy was “integration while 
preserving one’s own identity”. The idea of “cultural equality” was referred 
to in various policy documents; the overall goal was that immigrants could 
not only preserve their own culture but also receive support for their social 
emancipation within that culture. (Karsten 2006, 27-28.) As a means of 
preserving their culture and group integrity immigrants were given the 
possibility of using semi-autonomous institutions (Vasta 2007, 716). Thus the 
immigrants’ special cultural character was not only recognised in principle 
but also taken into account in practice.  
This ethnic minority policy lasted from 1983 until 1994. To locate this 
policy in the models of Alexander, Hartmann and Gerteis, and Bleich, it is 
clear that the state was at that time active in embracing diversity. Ethnic and 
cultural identities were not only recognised but public support was also made 
available to help minority groups preserve their distinct culture and group 
integrity. In Alexander’s model of incorporation this arrangement resembles 
‘hyphenation’; outsiders were not only tolerated but were also given real 
possibilities to maintain their own culture. In the case of the Hartmann-
Gerteis model we observe similarities to ‘fragmented pluralism’, in the sense 
                                                
16 In the previous chapter I presented the Netherlands’ unique system of pillarization, 
based on the idea of making it possible for groups who maintain different religious 
beliefs, especially Catholics and Protestants, to create their own institutions. 




that groups played a strong role as a basis for association. With regard to the 
question of the creation of public culture, however it is debatable whether 
minority cultures were in fact actively encouraged and given real 
opportunities to create a new common culture. In this sense, and in reference 
to Bleich’s model, the ethnic minority policy thus resembles passive 
multiculturalism. For instance Vasta (2007, 735) argues that the kind of 
strong multiculturalism in which minority groups are guaranteed social 
equality and cultural recognition has never actually existed. 
In the early 1990s the meaningfulness and functionality of the ethnic 
minority policy came under question. In 1991 the parliamentary Liberal Party 
declared that the Netherlands should not accommodate certain practices 
carried out in the name of religion, and that tolerance should not be extended 
to intolerance. Moreover, the functionality of the minority policy became the 
subject of wide public discussion. It was argued that the ethnic policy not 
only fuelled segregation and separation from mainstream society but also had 
caused immigrants unemployment and economic marginalisation. (Karsten 
2006, 28.) 
As a result, a new integration policy was introduced in 1994. It differed 
from previous policy in emphasising integration and citizenship. (Enzinger 
2003, 72; Musterd et al. 1998, 33-34.) In the government’s White Paper, A 
report for integration policy for ethnic minorities (Contourrennota 
integatiebeleid etnische minderheden) (1994) the concept of citizenship was 
elevated as the guiding principle for the new vision for the presence of people 
from different cultures, even though the document did not give a precise 
definition for the concept. (Enzinger 2003, 75). The new policy was based on 
the idea that immigrants are regarded as ‘individuals’, who were to be, as the 
name of the policy implies, integrated into mainstream society. It was no 
longer seen as the state’s responsibility to uphold parallel institutions or to 
support the separation of different groups. The overall goal was the equal and 
full participation of individuals (and groups) in society. (Joppke 2004, 248; 
Vasta 2007, 717.) Similarly to Sweden, it was made clear that “the members 
of minority groups should decide for themselves whether and, if so, to what 
extent hey would like to retain and further develop their cultural identity” 
(Enzinger 2003, 72).  
The White Paper specified concrete actions to achieve better integration, 
such as obligatory language and social orientation courses designed to 
familiarise immigrants with Dutch culture. The new law, the Civic 
Integration of Newcomers Act (1998), prescribes the responsibilities of 
incomers, and stipulates that immigrants who fail to attend these classes will 
be deprived of their welfare benefits. (Vasta 2007, 718.)  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, criticism directed against 
immigration increased at the beginning of the 21st century. In 2002 an all-
party parliamentary report, the Blok Report, concluded that the attempt to 




government issued a statement:  
 
[t]he integration obligation will only have been met as soon as people 
have successfully passed their examination ... The newcomers and 
the settled immigrants will be in charge of their own integration ... If 
a newcomer has failed to integrate after five years an administrative 
fine will be imposed.. (The Dutch Ministry of Justice 2004; cited in 
Vasta 2007, 718.) 
 
In 2005 a proposal for a new Integration Act was introduced in the Dutch 
Parliament, specifying obligations, responsibilities and possible sanctions. 
(Vasta 2007.) The Act came into force in January 2007.  
 
In conclusion, it could be argued that when it comes to the current strategy 
for dealing with diversity, the case of the Netherlands has a lot in common 
with that of Britain. The tendency is to strengthen the common elements of 
citizenship. The aim of integration is to make the civil sphere thicker, in the 
sense that all newcomers are expected to integrate into the society, become 
familiar with Dutch culture, and achieve the necessary language skills 
(question number one). Furthermore, all citizens are expected to share the 
core values of the society, regardless of their cultural background. Consider, 
for example, the statement made in 2009 by the Justice Minister Ernst Hirsch 
Ballin, concerning Sharia (Islamic) law. According to Ballin, some aspects of 
this law, such as differences between men and women or practices relating to 
divorce, are not in accordance with the values and laws of the Netherlands. 
Thus, Ballin argues, it is the government’s duty to ensure the absence of a 
“parallel society in which people take the law into their own hands or 
maintain their own legal system which operates outside the framework of our 
own legal system” (Dutch News 2009). 
Vasta (2007, 732-735) argues that a shift has occurred in the 
Netherlands, from multiculturalism to assimilation. Here she is referring to 
the French model of assimilation, “based on the central idea that by 
becoming integrated into political community as French citizens, minorities 
will assimilate into a dominant culture based on linguistic homogeneity and 
civic nationalism” (Vasta 2007, 735). This all indicates that the role of norms 
or values involves more than serving as a fair playing field among citizens 
(second question). Enzinger (2003, 82) writes: 
 
The extreme cultural relativism, which lay at the basis of Dutch 
multiculturalism in the 1980s, has lost ground to the notion that … it 
is the task of the public authorities to protect and defend existing 
values and practices. ... Of course, this does not necessarily mean that 
there is no room for pluralism, but the dominant values clearly set the 
pace. 
 




It is also obvious that in order to be able to function in society, new citizens 
need to accept the fact that it is their responsibility to internalise relevant 
information about society and learn the language (third question). In the next 
two chapters, I show that when it comes to educational arrangements 
designed to take into account the plural nature of a society, all pupils are 
expected to acquire knowledge about other ways of life and to participate 
actively in the democratic decision-making process.  
With regard to the treatment of primordial qualities (fifth question), 
there is nothing to suggest that these are to be shed in the public sphere, 
except in cases where the immigrant identity, or an essential part of it, 
conflicts with the values of the public culture.  
What, then, about giving immigrants the opportunity to enrich the public 
culture (question number six)? In my analysis of the ethnic minority policy 
above, I expressed doubt as to whether minority cultures were actively 
encouraged or given real opportunities to create a new common culture. 
There is nothing to suggest that anything has changed in this respect; in fact, 
quite the opposite. According to Enzinger (2003, 85), the current Dutch 
policy is “based on a static interpretation of culture, rather than on a dynamic 
one”, and serves “to protect traditional values in Dutch society from new 
outside impulses”.  
The goal of incorporation is equality among individual citizens (question 
number eight). The Dutch government does not recognise any obligation to 
uphold parallel institutions of different groups (question number nine). The 
aim is to move from recognising groups towards the idea that the unit of 
incorporation is the individual (question number seven). As Enzinger (2006, 
132) writes: “acknowledging religious and ethnic diversity is no longer 
considered a public responsibility, let alone facilitating its 
institutionalization.” 
However, Koopmans (2003, 4) questions whether this kind of policy has 
actually succeeded: while the intention is to implement equal opportunity 
measures on universal principles, “organizations and activities based on 
ethnic and religious grounds are still generously supported – directly and 
indirectly – by the government”, and ethnicity and religion play an important 
role in public institutions. The government for example finances schools, 
hospitals, media channels, social work etc. on a religious basis. According to 
Koopmans, the Dutch system is 
 
one in which the state does not interfere in religious matters – 
although it pays for them – and in which religious organizations play 
a key role in areas that, in other countries, are the sole domain of the 
state. (Koopmans 2004, 4.) 
 
Thus it can be argued that in the Netherlands culture-based identity is a 
source of public recognition (question number x). In the case of Great Britain 




suffer particular disadvantage (Home Office 2005, 19 par 10i; italics added). 
In the case of the Netherlands it seems that groups can ask for public 
recognition because other groups already have certain rights. According to 
Koopmans (2003, 4), for example the claims of Muslims are mainly based on 
reference to other religious groups:  
 
If anything, Muslims have not misunderstood the Dutch system, but 
as non-Christians they demand nothing more than the same rights 
traditionally granted to a host of Christian groups – they do so in 
accordance with the principle of equality in the Dutch constitution.17 
(Italics added.) 
 
In sum, it can be said that while the intentions of policies in Great Britain and 
the Netherlands are quite similar, the Dutch system is still more sensitive to 




In an article entitled ‘Rhetoric, Practice and the Dynamics of Institutional 
Change: Immigrant Policy in Sweden, 1964-2000’ (2004), Carl Dahlström 
writes that before the 1960s Sweden did not have a government-defined 
policy for the treatment of immigrants. The 1960s, however, witnessed a 
dramatic increase in immigration, and the issue became a topic of daily 
debate in the press. (Dahlström 2004, 288; 296; 300.) In the debate two main 
lines of thought occurred: some writers were in favour of a multicultural 
society (flerkultursamhälle), in which the state has the role of supporting 
immigrant cultural activities, while others were in favour of mixed culture 
society (blandkultursamhälle), where there is no need for the state to support 
such activities. (Dahlström 2004, 29618.)  
Eventually, the Swedish parliament had to decide on the general 
direction of its policy towards immigrants. The first official policy statement 
was issued in 1975, under the title of Immigrant and Minority Policy 
(Riksdagen 1975; see also Dahlström 2004, 296-297; Graham 1999, 103; 
Soininen 1999, 687). Three major goals of this policy were explicated in the 
government’s White Paper, Government proposal for guidelines on 
immigration and minority policy (Regeringens proposition om riktlinjerför 
invandrar- och minoritetspolitiken m.m.) (1975). These goals or principles 
were ‘equality’ (jämlikhetsmålet), ‘freedom of choice’ (valfrihetsmålet), and 
‘partnership’ (samverkansmålet) (Riksdagen 1975, 15-16). They were 
                                                
17 As noted above, in Great Britain the case in different in the sense that group-specific 
rights are granted to ethnic groups. However, while the Jews and the Sikhs are recognised 
as ethnic groups, and entitled to some group-specific rights (Barry 2001), Muslims are 
not. 
18 Dahlström refers to Hansen (2001). 




derived from the report of a government commission on immigration, the 
Invandrarutredningen (IU). The IU defined the objective of ‘equality’ as 
meaning that immigrants and their children should be offered “real 
opportunities” for maintaining and “in the same way as the majority 
population, keeping and developing their languages and their traditions” 
(SOU 1974:69, 95; cited in Dahlström 2004, 297-298).  
In Sweden’s first official immigrant policy, the cultural rights of 
minorities were thus recognised. The White Paper states that immigrants and 
their children should be given a real chance to retain their own language and 
practice their cultural activities: 
 
[T]he various immigrant groups [should] receive financial and other 
support to develop their own cultural activities so that the overall 
cultural range in Sweden improves. (Riksdagen 1975, 15.) 
 
In concrete terms, this meant that an immigrant group that included more 
than 1000 persons qualified as an “ethnic minority”. Their cultural affairs 
were protected by actions such as mother-tongue education, their own TV 
and radio stations, support for ethnic newspapers, periodicals, and other 
cultural activities. (Joppke & Morawska 2003, 13.) 
One point worth noting is that the Constitution of Sweden declares that 
“[o]pportunities should be promoted for ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minorities to preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own” 
(Riksdagen 1974, Chapter 1 art 2[4]).  
Can this policy be called one of ‘multiculturalism’? Locating it in the 
models of Alexander, Hartmann & Gerteis and Bleich, we can reach rather 
similar conclusions as in the case of the Netherlands. In Alexander’s model, 
the treatment of minority groups would fall under hyphenation: foreigners’ 
identities are publicly recognised but there is no expansion or modification of 
the civil sphere. In Bleich’s model the policy would resemble passive 
multiculturalism, since there is no true effort to enrich the dominant culture. 
Placing it in the model of Hartmann and Gerteis, it is obvious that 
immigrants’ group membership is seen as an important source of identity. In 
this sense, the basis of association is the group. However, while the policy 
focuses on mutual recognition and a respect for difference, there is still a 
single strong, central national culture. Thus the policy cannot be defined as a 
pure case of interactive pluralism.  
Sweden’s Immigrant and Minority Policy lasted for a decade. In 1986 
the Swedish Parliament added some clarifications to the guidelines of the 
1975 parliamentary decision. In the previous chapter, I described 
parliamentary actions making it more explicit that the goal of ‘freedom of 
choice’ did not leave room for practices deviating from the basic values 
expressed in Swedish legislation and political decisions (Riksdagen 1986, 20-




difference was to change the status of immigrant groups: these groups were 
now no longer equated to ‘ethnic minorities’, namely the native Sami and the 
Tornedal Finns of northern Sweden, whose interests were protected by the 
Constitution and who enjoyed group-based rights. (Soininen 1999, 689.) 
Thirdly, it was declared that the government had legal responsibility for 
immigrants but no responsibility for their culture (see Dahlström 2004, 288).  
In the 1990s, concerns about the exclusion of immigrants from the 
labour market and about their increasing segregation forced the government 
to act toward a more unified nation. According to government’s White Paper, 
Active refugee and immigration policy (Aktiv flykting och 
immigrationspolitik) (1991), ethnic communities may protect themselves 
from the pressure of the majority “by building cultural defences against the 
outside world” (Riksdagen 1991a, 81). The document also saw a need to 
move forward: from questions focusing on immigrants, such as defining the 
limits of the policy goal ‘freedom of choice’ (Riksdagen 1991a, 81), to 
questions as to how to achieve equality among citizens (Riksdagen 1991a, 
83). It is argued that the plural nature of a society should be seen as a shared 
concern:  
 
[W]e should strive for better ethnic representation. The best way to 
handle questions related to culture or ethnicity is to create an 
environment in which people from different ethnic backgrounds can 
take part (Riksdagen 1991a, 83). 
 
After 1997, Swedish immigration policy can be seen as an integration policy. 
The Parliament adopted a White Paper entitled Sweden, the future and 
diversity: from immigration policy to integration policy (Sverige, framtiden 
och mångfalden – från invandrarpolitik till integrationspolitik) in which the 
leading idea was the universal treatment of citizens (Riksdagen 1997). It is 
admitted that the old immigration policy has been unsuccessful (Riksdagen 
1997, 17); on the contrary, it has reinforced the “breakdown of the population 
into ‘us’ and ‘them’ and thereby contributed to the emergence of the 
alienation that many immigrants and their children experience in Swedish 
society” (Riksdagen 1997, 18). 
As concrete action to combat social exclusion and segregation, the new 
policy stressed that all citizens should receive equal rights and opportunities 
regardless of their ethnic or cultural background. Along with equal rights, 
equal obligations were also stressed. The goal was a community in which all 
citizens tolerated and respected each other, and regardless of background 
would not only be involved in the society but would also feel responsibility 
for it. (Riksdagen 1997, 23.)  
Along with a new policy, the idea a society as a system of ethnic groups 
participating on equal terms was thus abandoned. The 1997 White Paper 
stressed that policies directed specifically at immigrants as a group should be 
limited to actions and measures that might be needed in Sweden during the 




early, transitional period. (Riksdagen 1997, 19.) It was also explicitly stated 
that “[c]ultural identity is primarily a matter of the individual” and that the 
society should therefore make it easier for an individual to integrate old and 
new patterns of life and lifestyles in the way he or she wishes. This was seen 
as a prerequisite for the citizen to develop a coherent identity [en hel 
identitet] and be proud of their background. (Riksdagen 1997, 23.)  
The White Paper also noted that the government has already initiated a 
dialogue between different groups concerning certain controversial issues, 
such as gender equality. By the same token, however, the idea is clearly 
expressed that gender equality is one of the fundamental values of Swedish 
society. (Riksdagen 1997, 24.)19 
In the previous chapter I suggested that while the population was 
regarded in Sweden as a whole, a distinction was nevertheless made at the 
level of culture, between the national culture and immigrant cultures. It was 
the dominant Swedish culture that was seen as entitled to protection. (SOU 
1996:55, 353-354; in Graham 1999, 120.) The government did not bear 
responsibility for the development of other cultural traditions or heritages, or 
for their transmission to successive generations. The preservation of 
immigrant cultures was left to individuals. Thus the state remained a 
guarantor of the social and political rights of immigrants, but not of their 
cultural rights. (Soininen 1999, 689-691.) The document also states that it is 
in the nature of a multicultural society that cultures – whether it is the 
majority or the minority culture – cannot be intact and remain the same (SOU 
1996:55, 354; in Graham, 120).  
In 2008 the Swedish government published a policy paper under the title 
Empowerment against exclusion: Government strategy for integration 
(Egenmakt mot utanförskap – regeringens strategi för integration), according 
to which the goals of future integration policy should be consistent with those 
previously endorsed: rights, obligations and opportunities for all, regardless 
of ethnic or cultural background (Riksdagen 2008, 33). The document 
                                                
19 The argumentative structure of the White Paper is as follows: P1: The first Swedish 
official immigration policy was directed towards a group. It was partly created as a 
specific policy for ethnic groups. Most immigrants had come to Sweden as migrant 
workers. (Riksdagen 1997, 17.) P2 & P3: Immigration policies, together with the special 
administration that was created to implement it, has reinforced the breakdown of the 
population in an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, and has thereby contributed to the sense of alienation 
that many immigrants and their children experience in Swedish society (ibid, 18). P4: The 
goal of ‘freedom of choice’ created expectations of a specific policy for ethnic groups, 
and has been seen as a threat to the Swedish national character (ibid, 18). P5: Equal rights 
and opportunities for all, regardless of ethnic or cultural background, should be an 
overarching goal of integration policy (ibid, 23). The society should be characterised by 
mutual respect and tolerance, and everyone, from any background, should be involved in 
and jointly responsible for the society. Swedish society should be based on plurality. 
(Ibid, 21; 23.) Conclusion: Policies directed specifically at immigrants as a group should 





declares that “the Swedish society is characterised by an increasing diversity 
in the population of various ethnic and national backgrounds, religions, 
cultural expression and individual life choices”, and that this situation is 
liable to cause conflict among citizens with incompatible value systems, 
goals and ambitions. The future integration policy should thus help to prevent 
and manage these conflicts; the starting point for the “government’s efforts in 
this area is that respect for fundamental values, such as human rights, 
democratic governance, and equality between men and women, is maintained 
and enhanced.” It is also recognised that community cohesion needs to be 
strengthened and exclusion should be stopped. (Riksdagen 2008, 59.) One 
way to strengthen unity among citizens is to promote and support dialogue: 
everyone, regardless of background, “should be given opportunities to 
participate in a dialogue on our common values.” Dialogue is seen as one 
way to bring about a better understanding of democracy and human rights. 
(Riksdagen 2008, 60.) 
  
It is time to summarise the main outlines of Swedish immigration policy and 
compare it to the policies of Great Britain and the Netherlands. As Soininen 
(1999, 693) points out,  
 
scholars around the world have often been positive about the 
Swedish immigrant policy. ... In international comparisons the 
Swedish legislation is noted for its generosity both in terms of the 
social rights of immigrants and their opportunity to influence politics.  
 
One reason for this is the fact that the Swedish policy for the treatment of 
immigrants “comprises a corporatist policy-making style”, in which “interest 
organisations comprise a channel through which interests are represented” 
(Soininen 1999, 686). This model is seen as an appropriate means both to 
achieve equality among ethnic groups and to preserve their collective identity 
(see Soysal 1994, 79-82).  
This conclusion, as Soininen rightly observes, may be true in theory, but 
in practice the case is different. It can be argued that the Swedish case shares 
similar features with that of the Netherlands. First of all, the former policy of 
giving immigrants the possibility of creating a society divided into sub-
groups has had unwanted consequences, in the form of unemployment, 
marginalisation, and – not least – confusion as to which values should be 
respected. Thus government actions have aimed at a more unified, cohesive 
society that would safeguard every citizen’s ability to function in all sectors 
of society. The goal of creating a thick civil sphere, whose essential features 
would become part of every citizen’s identity, is thus obvious (question 
number one). One interesting finding is that the distinction between the 
national culture and the civil sphere is not that clear. In the previous chapter I 
suggested that ‘Swedishness’ is located in social order, in the basic values of 
democracy and the equal rights, and the value of each individual (SOU 




1996:55, 354; in Graham 1999, 120). However, there are also hints that 
citizens should adopt parts of the dominant culture in order to be able to 
function in society. For instance, the National Curriculum for primary 
schools declares that “[a]wareness of one’s own cultural origins and sharing a 
common cultural heritage provide a secure identity” (Swedish National 
Agency of Education 2006, 4).20  
With regard to the question of the role of society’s core values (question 
number two), it can be argued that they are not only procedural norms but 
also serve as moral bonds: 
 
A nation’s history often serves as a connecting link between people. 
Since a large group of people have their origin in another country, the 
Swedish population lacks a common history. Current belonging to 
Sweden and commitment to the society’s fundamental values matter 
more for integration than a common history. (Riksdagen 1997, 23.) 
  
These fundamental values should be internalised as part of daily decision-
making. It is the citizens’ responsibility to adopt these and function according 
to them (question number three). This responsibility extends to adopting 
virtues such as respect and tolerance. The 1997 White Paper Sweden, the 
future and diversity: from immigration policy to integration policy declares 
that members of the majority always bear special responsibility towards those 
in the minority (Riksdagen 1997, 24). In this connection reference is also 
made to the parliamentary White Paper Kulturpolitik (Cultural policy) 
(Riksdagen 1996), which stresses that one important prerequisite for greater 
tolerance and understanding for people who come to live in Sweden and for 
their cultural heritage is for the majority to learn about different ways of life 
(Riksdagen 1997, 66). 
With regard to the treatment of primordial qualities (fifth question), we 
can infer that citizens are not expected to shed them. Rather, it is seen as 
necessary to combine old and new patterns of life and lifestyles in order to 
achieve a coherent identity. The nation is also active in promoting the 
enrichment of the public culture, encouraging lively debate and creating 
opportunities to encounter people who are different (question number six). 
(Riksdagen 1997, 24.) The plural nature of a society should also be reflected 
in the society’s institutions and in the democratic decision-making process 
(Riksdagen 1997, 24); there is a need to create “cross-over activities and 
common meeting places” (Riksdagen 1997, 25).  
Similarly to Great Britain and the Netherlands, the unit of incorporation 
is the individual (question number seven), and equality is only seen as 
equality among individuals (question number eight). The granting of 
collective rights, such as funding the preservation of immigrant culture, is not 
seen as the state’s responsibility (question number nine). 
                                                




Before concluding the Swedish case, I want to give an example of the 
practical consequences of reaffirming the importance of the society’s values. 
The state has recently become more assertive about protecting individual 
rights when they conflict with cultural norms and practices. This is especially 
the case when we are dealing with religious norms and practices. The 
Minister of Education and Research Jan Björklund and the Minister for 
Integration and Gender Equality Nyamko Sabuni published an article in the 
leading Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter for May 31 2009, in which they 
argued that the future Education Act (which came in force in 2011) did not 
allow exemptions from sex education or swimming or athletics classes. In 
writing that “a liberal and open society accepts and respects its habitants’ life 
choices as long as these choices do not come into conflict with others’ 
individual freedom” they were saying that parental authority should not 
override the child’s right to gain knowledge and learn important skills 
(Björklund & Sabuni 2009). 
Children’s rights are discussed by the same politicians in another article 
as well. On March 6 2008 they commented in the op-ed pages of Dagens 
Nyheter that “even immigrant girls have the right to swim, to participate in 
sport classes and to receive sex education” (Björklund & Sabuni 2008). 
The message sent by these ministers is essentially the same as 
Habermas’ critique of Taylor’s theory. Liberal rights are individual rights; 
thus collective rights, which would overtax the theory of rights tailored to 




In the previous chapter I briefly discussed the Danish government’s White 
Paper from 2003, The government’s visions and strategies for improved 
integration (Regeringens visioner og strategier for bedre integration), meant 
as a guide for Denmark’s immigrant policy. The document starts with a short 
description of the demographic changes that have taken place in Danish 
society: nowadays many of those living in Denmark were not born in that 
country, or are the children of parents who were not born there. According to 
the White Paper, cultural diversity should be considered, in principle, as 
something positive (Regeringen 2003, 11). It is also recognised that many 
immigrants have become successfully integrated into Danish society. 
However, immigration has also led to problems, mainly because society’s 
core values are challenged:  
 
                                                
21 The material for Denmark is too scanty (I present only the main outline of one 
document) to allow any firm conclusions as to former and current policies similarly to the 
other three nations. However, the Danish government’s White Paper presented here gives 
a coherent picture of how diversity is currently dealt with.  




[A] number of integration problems can be attributed to the fact that 
many people with a foreign background, for obvious reasons, have 
other ideas about what is right and wrong, than those prevailing in 
Denmark. 
There are still too many immigrants and refugees who live passively 
outside of the society – unfortunately this goes for the second 
generation as well. And there are still violations of society's 
fundamental values of liberty, duties, rights and equality for all, 
regardless of sex, colour or religious belief.  
Many minority families live … with traditional gender roles, where 
women and girls are not considered equal to men and boys. This 
means that there are many minority women living isolated at home, 
and especially young girls are subject to strong control by their 
families. (Regeringen 2003, 12.) 
 
This situation is naturally perceived with anxiety. Even when a problem can 
be identified, it cannot be easily removed, for example simply by changing 
the law. According to the Danish government, this is because cultural habits 
and ideas about what is right and wrong are difficult to change. (Regeringen 
2003, 12.) It is admitted that problems are largely due to ”an earlier failure or 
lack of effort” (Regeringen 2003, 8), and to the lack of proper discussion as 
to the direction of a multicultural society and the consequences that arise 
when different cultures are represented within a society (Regeringen 2003, 
12). 
The White Paper sets the goal of achieving “a coherent and open society 
within which ... citizens demonstrate responsible citizenship and an active 
respect for the [society’s] values” (Regeringen 2003, 8; italics added). Along 
with this goal, all citizens, regardless of ethnic or cultural background, should 
have equal opportunities to participate in and contribute to the society 
(Regeringen 2003, 8). When it comes to the question about immigrants’ 
responsibilities, in addition to an active respect for the society’s values they 
“should learn about our often different points of view, and to respect the 
society which they are to be part of” (Regeringen 2003, 4; see also 38). In 
connection with ‘intercultural competence’, citizens are expected to become 
aware of their own unwritten values and learn to accept that others do not 
necessarily see the world in a similar manner (Regeringen 2003, 16). It is 
worth noting that the White Paper recognises the need for a better dialogue 
between the majority and immigrants concerning morality, the principles of 
equality and freedom, and childrearing practices (Regeringen 2003, 13). 
The document contains no references to the idea that groups should be 
given special attention. The section dealing with freedom of religion includes 
a brief discussion of special rights, stating that “it is in the public interest to 
grant such rights in order to create a framework for opportunities for people 
to express themselves” (Regeringen 2003, 33). There is no suggestion that 




Taylor’s theory. Quite the contrary: it is made clear that special rights should 
not be in any way harmful to the society. In sum, equality is considered 
solely as a matter among individuals.  
We can conclude that the case of Denmark is similar to those of the 
other three countries presented above, in the sense that the objective is a 
strong civil sphere. Furthermore, citizens have similar responsibilities. They 
cannot ignore about what is going on in society. At a minimum, they are 
required to adopt society’s values and to acquire knowledge concerning 
different ways of life. 
 
 
Summary and discussion 
In this chapter I have analysed policy documents to find out how Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark have dealt with and are 
currently dealing with cultural plurality. As noted at the beginning of the 
chapter, supporters of a ‘politics of recognition’ argue that egalitarian 
difference-blind treatment does not ensure equal status to minorities along 
with the majority, since minorities cannot protect their own cultural interests. 
The philosophical argument in favour of special treatment, namely the 
granting of group-specific rights, was introduced in detail through the 
theories of Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor.  
We have seen that this discussion on group rights is closely linked to the 
question of who should have the power to decide the content of education in 
the case of the children of religious groups that do not regard liberal values as 
valid. I also suggested that while Kymlicka’s theory favours group rights, its 
scope does not extend to legitimising the demands of illiberal religious 
groups. By demanding more autonomy for religious groups, Taylor’s theory 
thus seems more relevant. However, this theory seems to be difficult to apply 
in practice in modern democracies, since from a liberal perspective – as 
shown by Habermas’s critique – it tends to undermine individual rights. 
What, then, can be said as to how nations have dealt and are currently 
dealing with cultural diversity? Using the discussion of group rights, and 
presenting three models for the recognition of cultural difference – those of 
Alexander, Hartmann & Gerteis, and Bleich – I formulated certain framing 
questions, which I then answered with regard to each of the four nations. One 
conclusion is that while there has been a change in policy, at least at the level 
of rhetoric, in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden, the policy has 
never been something that could be described as active multiculturalism.22 It 
is true that immigrants have been recognised, for example in the Netherlands 
and Sweden, as bearers of a collective identity; nevertheless, different groups 
or cultures have never had a freedom of their own, as described under 
                                                
22 The term should be understood in its most popular usage. 




interactive or fragmented pluralism in the model of Hartmann and Gerteis or 
under multiculturalism in that of Alexander.  
By the same token, it should also be noted that the four nations’ current 
policies should not be seen as aiming at full assimilation or acculturation 
either. At the beginning of this chapter, I wrote that assimilation and 
acculturation are domain-specific phenomena and always take place with 
regard to a particular issue. Each nation’s current policy of treating cultural 
diversity is based on two ideas: that segregation or fragmentation is an 
undesirable situation, and that a strong unified, cohesive society is a desirable 
objective. It is the effort of creating a cohesive society that involves active 
assimilation or acculturation, but government programmes for immigrant 
integration are mainly focused on the civil sphere. This means two things. 
First, citizens are expected to adopt the society’s fundamental values as part 
of their civic identity. In Sweden and Denmark we also see an attempt to 
include historical cultural tradition as part of that identity. Here I also refer to 
the findings presented in Chapter 2. Secondly, it is seen as the citizens’ 
responsibility to embrace a certain kind of attitude. Citizens should have 
virtues such as tolerance and respect, and they are also responsible for 
acquiring knowledge about other life choices. Citizens cannot ignore about 
what is going on in the society they live in.  
This effort is not, however, equivalent to making citizens similar in 
other respects. Current policies do not mean that these nations are aiming at 
erasing cultural differences among citizens. It is left up to individuals to what 
extent they want to retain their cultural tradition – with the important 
exception that cultural practices that conflict with the nation’s values are not 
tolerated. Here Sweden provides an illuminating example in protecting 
children’s universal rights from the cultural practices they learn at home.  
Finally, with regard to the interpretation of equality in these four 
countries; we can say that equality is mainly seen as occurring among 
individuals. It is stressed that all citizens should have equal political rights. In 
Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden, however, it is also realised that in 
order to achieve equality among citizens there is a need to support some 
groups. In the Netherlands culture-born identity receives public recognition, 
and both ethnicity and religion play an important role in public institutions 
(Koopmans 2003, 4). In Britain and Sweden, the disadvantaged position of 
some minorities is seen as entailing that certain groups may need special 
attention. In Britain, it is in fact explicitly stated that there is a need “to focus 
on those groups who still suffer particular disadvantage, rather than treating 
all minority groups as disadvantaged or having the same needs” (Home 
Office 2005, 19 par 10i, italics added). According to the Swedish 
government’s White Paper, Sweden, the future and diversity: from 
immigration policy to integration policy, policies directed specifically at 
immigrants as a group should be limited to actions and measures that may be 




countries, however, the purpose of any such special attention to certain 
groups is not the preservation of a distinct ethnic or religious identity. 
 
With regard to the issue of the ‘appropriate’ place of religion in these four 
countries, several conclusions can be drawn. First of all, in the documents 
presented here religion is almost completely invisible. In all four countries, 
issues related to religion receive only cursory attention in the documents. In 
Great Britain and Denmark religion is mentioned in connection with equality 
among citizens. In the White Paper Improving Opportunity, Strengthening 
Society, religion is mentioned in reference to the need to extend the scope of 
the Race Relations Act – which already protects Jews and Sikhs from 
discrimination in the provision of goods and services – to people of other 
faiths and those who do not belong to any religious group (Home Office 
2005, 40 par 52). The Danish government’s White Paper, The government’s 
visions and strategies for improved integration, lists equal opportunities for 
all religious groups as one objective of immigration policy (Regeringen 2003, 
33). In Denmark and Sweden, the principle of religious freedom and the right 
to practice religion under the constitutional framework are also mentioned as 
important rights of citizens (Regeringen 2003, 33; Riksdagen 1997, 68). The 
possible positive value that a religion can provide to those who come to live 
in the country from abroad is recognised in the White Paper Sweden, the 
future and diversity: from immigration policy to integration policy: the role 
of religion in one’s life often increases when one leaves one’s home country. 
This is because religion provides a sense of security and of belonging. 
(Riksdagen 1997, 68.)  
However, it should be noted that despite these rights that are related to 
religion, nothing suggests that religion is a reason to expand the rights that 
are already granted to some or all citizens.  
One interesting finding is that the documents, as well as opinions issued 
by politicians, contain references to religion in connection with undesirable 
attitudes or practices. In the case of the Netherlands and Denmark, it is Islam 
and its practices that are most often referred to in the context of 
contradictions between certain practices and the society’s norms. The point is 
that the states – including Great Britain and Sweden – are ready to intervene 
in the sphere of religion in case of a threat to the rights of individual citizens. 
In this sense religion is not regarded as an issue that should be left intact 
merely because it is normally seen as belonging to the private sphere.  
However, when we look at the actions suggested to overcome the 
problems that religions are believed to cause, we can conclude that religion is 
not seen as an issue to be treated independently or apart from the overall 
approach to achieving a cohesive society. There is nothing to suggest that 
accommodating religious diversity needs special arrangements.  
In the Chapter 1, I wrote, referring to Turner (2011, 103) that the states 
in the West “have become involved in the management of religions, thereby 




inevitably departing from the traditional separation of state and religion in the 
liberal framework.” However, it should be noted that religion is explicitly 
and visibly considered as an issue that needs to be controlled only in some 
cases, such as women wearing headscarves or limiting the rights of women. 
As Lehmann (2006, 281) points out, empirical research has shown that 
certain features of religious practice, such as dress and sexual regulation, 
have “become political and their ethnic character is accentuated”. My point is 
that in these four countries a strategy used in order to control religion, 
conscious or not, aims mainly at regulating citizens’ attitudes. As argued in 
the previous chapter, it is the attitude towards fundamental principles that 
serves to define who is to be regarded as a legitimate member of the society.  
In this chapter I have argued that the concept of ‘citizenship’ includes 
the idea that citizens should possess virtues such as tolerance and respect 
towards others. In addition, in the case of Great Britain it is explicitly stated 
that citizens should have the ability to negotiate in a peaceful manner when it 
comes to controversies among different value systems. In Denmark too the 
official documents refer to the idea of increasing intercultural competence, 
and to the need for a better dialogue among the majority and immigrants. In 
the case of Sweden, the government is reported as having initiated a dialogue 
between different groups.  
Besides possessing certain attitudes, citizens are also required to acquire 
knowledge about other ways of life. The rationale of this kind of thinking is 
simple, but needs to be made explicit here. We can ask what purpose 
knowledge serves, or is supposed to serve, in this particular situation. I 
suggest the following: one underlying assumption is that by acquiring 
knowledge about other ways of life, not only will citizens’ understanding of 
the nature of society increase, but they will also become more ‘reasonable’, 
in the Rawlsian sense; in other words, they will understand that since 
different ways of life co-exist within a society, one cannot claim that one’s 
own should occupy a privileged position. For example the Danish 
government’s White Paper, The government’s visions and strategies for 
improved integration, declares that citizens need to learn to accept that others 
do not necessarily see what is worthwhile in similar manner (Regeringen 
2003, 16).  
In sum, it can be argued that in addition to visibly regulating certain 
religious practices, for example expressing clearly what kind of practices are 
not in line with the national ethos, the states are also departing from the 
traditional separation of state and religion in more sophisticated ways: by 
attempting to create a ‘liberal state of mind’ in their citizens. In this process, 
education plays an important role. I expand on this issue in the following 
chapters, when I investigate how the educational system is harnessed to 





In the previous chapter, I also asked whether society’s core values are 
contrasted to cultural values, in the sense that the former are regarded not 
only as neutral but also as universal and ‘eternal’, while values that are 
culturally driven – for example the values of a particular religion – are 
regarded as contingent and changeable. There is no straightforward answer to 
be given. It is worth noting that in some cases it is recognised that the values 
of a particular nation, or general European values, are also culturally and 
historically driven and incorporate religious elements.23 It can also be argued, 
however, that a society’s values are presented as neutral, in the sense that 
they are seen as providing a context that is expected to be suitable for all. 
Finally, they are treated as universal, in the sense that they cannot be 
changed. 
 
How, then, can these conclusions be applied in the context of Durkheim’s 
theory of religion? It can be argued that Durkheim’s ideas are topical in a 
situation of increased plurality and a lack of mutual bonds among members 
of different cultural groups in plural Western societies. As noted in Chapter 
1, Durkheim (2001, 322) considers that in order to exist a society needs at 
regular intervals to “sustain and reaffirm the collective feelings and ideas that 
constitute its unity and its personality.” I have shown that in the four 
countries studied here, fragmentation is perceived as a real threat. This in turn 
has led to efforts to bring about a change of course and increase uniformity 
among citizens. It is not believed that an ‘invisible hand’ will do the job of 
holding citizens together in a culturally diverse society. Programmes or plans 
have been launched to advance the integration of immigrants and to achieve 
better cohesion. The central purpose of these programmes is to create a thick 
civil sphere; the central concept in the discourse of the documents that I have 
explored is that of ‘citizenship’. In sum, all four nations have focused on 
inducing collective feelings and solidarity among citizens, as well as on 
creating a ‘new’ identity, one that will accommodate all citizens. 
There is one further argument that can plausibly be made: given that a 
society’s values are seen as something that is not subject to any change or 
compromise, and given further that all citizens, without exemption, are 
expected to internalise these values and have faith in them, in the sense that 
they are seen as providing mutual trust and predictability, it follows that these 
core values of a society can be seen as representing ‘the sacred’. For 
Durkheim, the alternation between two types of time – one individual, the 
                                                
23 In Denmark, Vestager has argued that the current society’s values are driven by history 
(Danish Ministry of Education 2000, 7). Schwimmer (2001b) has claimed that the origins 
of what he calls ‘European values’ lie in Christianity, Judaism and Islam. In Chapter 5, I 
show that in Sweden it is also explicitly stated that the society’s current values are 
influenced by the values and standards of Christianity. In Chapter 6 I present the view of 
the Council of Europe, according to which the values upheld by the Council stem from 
those of the three monotheistic religions. 




other collective – is the social origin of the distinction between the profane 
and the sacred. I have argued that while citizens may have values of their 
own, the core national values are expected to form a framework or act as the 
foundation for a social structure. This framework exists independently, 
outside the individual, but at the same time exerts a significant moral force 
over the life of the individual, since citizens are expected to experience the 
society’s core values as obligatory to follow.  
Finally, it should be noted that all four nations perceive a need to 
achieve a strong centre, along with creating moral bonds between citizens; in 
this process, the idea of a homogeneous culture, whether or not it has ever 
actually existed, serves as an implicit prototype or goal to aim for. None of 
the four countries regards as a thinkable future scenario a society built on 













In this chapter I explore the practical consequences of promoting and 
maintaining social cohesion in the field of education. The term ‘cohesion’ 
can mean several things. In the documents presented and discussed in the 
previous two chapters, the following seven themes have emerged as elements 
of cohesion: (1) all citizens share the core norms and values of a society; (2) 
citizens share a common (civic) identity, (3) citizens feel attached to a 
common community; (4) citizens acknowledge their responsibilities towards 
the society; (5) citizens respect each other; (6) there is equitable distribution 
of rights; and (7) there is a strong civil sphere with active citizens.1 For 
example the definition of community cohesion given in the British guidebook 
for schools to promote cohesion, In Guidance on the duty to promote 
community cohesion (2007), includes almost all these features:  
 
By community cohesion, we mean working towards a society in 
which there is a common vision and sense of belonging by all 
communities; a society in which the diversity of people’s 
backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and valued; a society 
in which similar life opportunities are available to all; and a society 
in which strong and positive relationships exist and continue to be 
developed in the workplace, in schools and in the wider community. 
(Department for Children, School and Families 2007, 3; emphasis in 
original.) 
 
In this thesis, the term ‘cohesive society’ thus means that citizens live 
together in harmony under basic liberal values and norms, respect each 
other’s rights and contribute actively to the society (see e.g. Jane Jensen’s 
1998 definition in Green et. al 2003, 455). I want to stress here that the 
increased need to foreground the importance of cohesion is due to the fact 
that societies have become more plural, containing different – and 
undoubtedly conflicting – views of life. Moreover, it is not diversity as such 
                                                
1 The list of common characters of cohesion given by Green et. al (2003, 455) is almost 
identical with this list. 




that has been received with anxiety, but those belief systems that contradict 
society’s basic values.  
In the previous chapter I argued that the current interpretation of the 
equal treatment of citizens means that it is not regarded as the state’s 
responsibility to enable citizens to manage their distinctive cultures. The 
description (cultural plurality) does not entail prescription (the need to 
maintain the situation as such). In this sense, cultures belong to the private 
sphere. Thus the idea of granting some people collective rights due to their 
membership in a specific group is not regarded as necessary. Quite the 
contrary, special rights are seen as a possible cause of segregation.  
I start with a brief historical overview of the development of the 
educational system in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. I 
then discuss the possibilities of faith schools to accommodate and promote a 
religious way of living. My purpose is to explore how the trend of promoting 
cohesion has changed the political way of thinking about the task of 
education and in particular its content. What is interesting is that in all four 
countries the structure of the educational system makes it possible for parents 
to place their child in a school where the content of the curriculum is 
consistent at least to a certain degree with their religious beliefs. I want to 
find out whether this possibility has changed in recent years.  
The theoretical framework for my analysis is derived from the scholarly 
debate over the question whether or not faith schools can generate social 
cohesion. The answers can be roughly divided into two camps: those scholars 
who see a disparity between the aims of faith schools and enabling pupils to 
develop the capacities needed to live in a multicultural society, and those 
who disagree with this view. In the case of the former group faith schools 
have been criticised for being socially divisive, since pupils have no contact 
with pupils with different cultural backgrounds. For example Susan Moller 
Okin and Rob Reich (1999) argue that faith schools cannot provide an 
environment where pupils can “come to into dialogue with and negotiate 
issues of moral and cultural difference” (Okin & Reich 1999, 293). Similarly, 
Kymlicka (1999b, 88-90) argues that the deliberate separation of children by 
religion contravenes the principle of education for good citizenship: a proper 
education needs to include not only learning about different cultures but also 
interaction among pupils from different cultural backgrounds. Jackson 
(2004a, 52) shares this view in principle, arguing that “[t]here is a strong case 
for finding ways for children from different backgrounds to interact with 
each other at school.”  
In an article entitled ‘Social Cohesion, Autonomy and the Liberal 
Defense of Faith Schools’, Neil Burtonwood (2003, 419) refers to empirical 
evidence that demonstrates the positive value of dialogue across religious 
traditions. However, he also notes that the point is not being in contact as 
such: “it is the curriculum of the school that matters rather than opportunities 




418). Similarly, Geoffrey Short and Ruth-Ann Lenga (2002) argue that faith 
schools need not be socially divisive and undermine social cohesion.2 In their 
article, ‘Jewish Primary Schools in a Multicultural Society: responding to 
diversity’ (2002), Sort and Lenga divide faith schools into two types: 
moderate schools, which also teach other cultures, and more orthodox 
schools, which are “less than enthusiastic about engaging in multicultural 
education” (Short and Lenga 2002, 49). They see no disparity between the 
aims of moderate faith schools and the ability to equip pupils with the skills 
needed to function in a multicultural society (Short and Lenga 2002). 
Following the analysis of political ways of thinking in the four countries 
with regard to the content of education in a multicultural society, I look at 




History of educational arrangements 
The historical roots of the formal structure of the educational system of 
England (and Wales) go back to the second half of the nineteenth century 
(Lankshear 2007, 218). Before the first Education Act in 1870, the state was 
not in any way involved with either the provision of schooling or its 
regulation. The provision of education was limited to local action. All 
schools were private or charitable schools; the education of children was 
considered solely a private affair of the parents. If parents had enough 
money, they could hire a private tutor or send their children to a variety of 
grammar or other fee-charging schools. As for the poor, the only place to get 
their children educated were dame or charity schools. (Walford 2001, 360-
361.) 
It was through legislation (the Education Act of 1870) that the state 
became involved in the provision, maintenance and organisation of 
elementary schools of its own. A new kind of school was established, 
administered by local boards and funded with public money. (Walford 2001, 
361-362.) At the same time, school attendance became compulsory for all 
children (Lankshear 2007, 218).  
The 1870 Education Act set up what became known as the ‘dual system’ 
of education. Two kinds of school, namely church and board schools, were 
part of a single overall system subject to government inspection. Schools run 
by the Church received a similar sum of money as board schools. (Kay 2000, 
13-14.) According to Lankshear (2007, 218), the Education Act of 1944 
“confirmed the partnership between the state and the churches in the 
provision of schooling and set the framework within which the school system 
                                                
2 See also Short (2002; 2003). 
3 In this chapter I concentrate on the educational arrangements prevalent in England. 
 








In 2007 around 38 % of all primary schools and 15 % of all secondary 
schools had a religious character (Lankshear 2007, 218).4 Until 1998 there 
were no state-funded schools for children of the various new immigrant 
minority religions. Only established Christian and Jewish schools were 
eligible for public funding. At the beginning of New Labour governance 
Muslim groups increased their pressure on the authorities for public 
recognition, in the mode of state-funded schools. As a result, in 1998 two 
Muslim schools were granted state funding. (See e.g. Walford 2003, 282-
283.) 
Outside this ‘dual system’ are independent schools. At the beginning of 
2010, around 7 % of all schools were privately run independent schools 
(Independent Schools Council 2011). These schools do not have to follow the 
National Curriculum, while all state-funded schools, whether or not religious 
in character, have this obligation. Independent schools, for example, do not 
have to describe evolution as a ‘scientific fact’, and they have the freedom to 
include books that treat it as a theory that is in opposition to creationism. 
(Walford 2003, 286.) 
Geoffrey Walford has investigated independent faith schools in England. 
During the 1980s, the increased secularism of most state-maintained schools, 
including schools owned by the churches, caused various groups of 
evangelical Christians to establish their own schools in order to ensure that 
their Christian beliefs were fully reflected in the school’s teaching and ethos 
(Walford 2003, 283). As a result, small private schools were established. 
According to Walford, this trend also included many immigrants: 
 
[P]erception of growing secularism also led to concern amongst 
various other religious minorities parents, in particular Muslim 
parents who believed that their children were likely to be influenced 
away from their Islamic belief and practices. ... As a result, in the late 
1980s, various groups of parents and mosques, established small 
private Muslim schools for their children. (Walford 2003, 283.) 
 
In sum, “[i]n England both Muslims and evangelical Christians started their 
own private schools because they were deeply dissatisfied with the state 
sector” (Walford 2003, 287). This trend continued in the first five years of 
the new millennium, and the number of independent faith schools increased 
rapidly. Within two years (between 2003 and 2005) the number of faith 
schools doubled, from 170 to nearly 300; this figure included over fifty 
                                                
4 The majority of these schools are either Church of England or Roman Catholic in 




Jewish schools, around a hundred Muslim schools and over a hundred 
Evangelical Christian Schools (see e.g. Bell 2005). 
 
 
Government policy, political atmosphere and recent developments 
Now let us return to the question of what effects the government policy of 
promoting social cohesion has had in the field of education. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the Labour Government’s actions in the field of education seem 
to have increased parents’ opportunities to choose a school type that is in 
accordance with their philosophy of life. Indeed, at the beginning of the 
millennium parental choice became one of the key pillars of education policy. 
In 2001 the government published a White Paper entitled Schools Achieving 
Success, in which one leading idea was to expand the number of City 
Academies; this would also open up the possibility of creating new faith 
schools funded by the state (see Department for Education and Skills [DfES] 
2001, 47). According to the White Paper, “[a]s the system becomes more 
diverse, we want it to become more capable of responding to individual 
needs and to different groups in society” (DfES 2001, 39 par 5.7; italics 
added). It is worth noting that in the run-up to the 2001 general election, 
Tony Blair told a conference of religious organisations5 that church schools 
form an important part of the education system, “valued by very many 
parents for their faith character, their moral emphasis and the high quality of 
education they generally provide” (The Guardian 2001). 
The Labour Government’s policy of expanding the number of 
Academies, however, was heavily criticised in public, chiefly on the grounds 
of precisely the possible rise in the number of faith schools. The Chairman of 
the Education and Skills Committee, Barry Sheerman, argued that 
 
[i]f we are going to not have divided, ghettoised communities we 
have to be very careful of this enthusiasm that some in the 
Department for Education have for faith schools, and we have got to 
be very careful about the growth of very religious minorities getting 
a hold on academies (The Guardian 2005a).  
 
According to Sheerman, religious schools pose a threat to the cohesion of 
multicultural community. “Do we want a ghettoised education system?”, he 
asked: 
 
[s]chools play a crucial role in integrating different communities and 
the growth of faith schools poses a real threat to this. These things 
need to be thought through very carefully before they are 
                                                
5 The conference was organised by the Christian Socialist Movement. 




implemented.6 (The Guardian 2005b.) 
 
The majority of the public was also against the idea of increasing the number 
of faith schools. According to an opinion poll by The Guardian, the 
government’s education reform, designed to increase parental choice, was 
opposed by almost two thirds of the public (The Guardian 2005b). 
The Chief Inspector of Schools (Ofsted),7 David Bell, expressed a 
similar view. In a speech to the Hansard Society8 in January 2005, he warned 
that Muslim and other faith schools outside the state system were teaching a 
narrow curriculum that failed to prepare children for a life in a multicultural 
democracy. Referring to the fast-growing independent faith school sector, he 
said: 
 
I believe that it is right that parents should be able to choose how 
their children are educated and should be able to pay to do so. That is 
the mark of a free and open society. Yet, on the other hand, faith 
should not be blind. I worry that many young people are being 
educated in faith-based schools, with little appreciation of their wider 
responsibilities and obligations to British society. ... The growth in 
faith schools needs to be carefully but sensitively monitored by 
government to ensure that pupils at all schools receive an 
understanding of not only their own faith but of other faiths and the 
wider tenets of British society. We must not allow our recognition of 
diversity to become apathy in the face of any challenge to our 
coherence as a nation. I would go further and say that an awareness 
of our common heritage as British citizens, equal under the law, 
should enable us to assert with confidence that we are intolerant of 
intolerance, illiberalism and attitudes and values that demean the 
place of certain sections of our community, be they women or people 
living in non-traditional relationships. (The Guardian 2005c.) 
 
This speech expressed the same central themes presented in the previous two 
chapters, in the conclusion to the analysis of the empirical material: 
(i) It is the religious way of life that has to fit in with the needs of a 
                                                
6 Sheerman’s point is essentially the same as that provided by Okin & Reich (1999), 
Kymlicka (1999b) and Jackson (2004a): In a culturally plural society pupils should not be 
separated according to cultural background. However, Sheerman’s argument seems to be 
about reducing segregation or increasing integration between communities, while these 
scholars are concerned with promoting the pupils’ ability to live in a multicultural 
society. 
7 Ofsted is the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills. It 
regulates and inspects facilities to achieve excellence in the care of children and young 
people, and in education and skills for learners of all ages. See 
http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/Ofsted-home/About-us 
8 The Hansard Society is the UK's leading independent, non-partisan political research 




society – not the other way around.  
(ii) Citizens have responsibilities towards the nation. One of these 
responsibilities is to acquire knowledge as to the nature of a 
multicultural society and of different life stances.  
(iii) The core of national identity, as constituted by the society’s 
values, is non-negotiable.  
(iv) Certain illiberal practices that are in conflict with society’s core 
values are not tolerated. 
 
In short, even though some religious parents want to lead a particular 
religious way of life, their children need to be fully equipped for living in a 
multicultural society. This is made explicit when Bell talks about the 
education of Muslim children: a “traditional Islamic education does not equip 
Muslim children for living in modern Britain” (The Guardian 2005c). He 
refers to the annual Ofsted report: 
 
[m]any schools must adapt their curriculum to ensure that it provides 
pupils with a broad general knowledge of public institutions and 
services in England and helps them to acquire an appreciation of and 
respect for other cultures in a way that promotes tolerance and 
harmony. (Bell 2005; citing the Ofsted report from 2005). 
  
The government’s new educational policy, however, did not mean that the 
government was ignorant of what happens within the walls of faith schools. 
For instance in 2005 the Minister of State for School Standards, Stephen 
Twigg, urged faith schools to “promote understanding” between different 
religions: “[a]ll schools need to work together to meet the needs of every 
pupil. Faith schools can and should be part of this collaboration.” (The 
Guardian 2005d.) 
The question of control over independent faith schools also became a 
matter of public dispute. It was found that independent schools were not 
monitored properly. Although independent schools are not obliged to follow 
the National Curriculum, they still fall under the Ofsted inspection regime. 
As a consequence, better control was demanded. David Willets, the Shadow 
Education Secretary, stated that “[i]t is not acceptable that a significant 
number in a particular category, namely independent Muslim schools, appear 
to be escaping the rigour of the inspection regime” (Telegraph 2007). 
Before going on to the results of these inspections, it is worth 
mentioning that the actions of some Muslim schools have proved to be in 
conflict with Britain’s overall educational ideology. In 2007 the government 
closed an Islamic school in East Sussex, which had been raided by the police 
as part of an anti-terror operation, because it did not meet registration 
standards. Similarly, King Fahad Academy, a West London school funded by 
the Saudi government, was condemned for using textbooks that described 
Jews as “pigs”. (Telegraph 2007.) 




Except for these cases, however, the fear that faith schools do not 
contribute adequately to the promotion of cohesion seems to be exaggerated. 
The latest Ofsted report, Independent Faith Schools (2009), is based on the 
inspection of 51 independent faith schools drawn from the Christian, Jewish, 
Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu religions. In the following I present its major 
findings thematically.  
First, with regard to education for responsible and good citizenship, the 
report found that  
 
[g]ood citizenship was considered by all the schools visited to be the 
duty of a good believer because this honoured the faith. All the 
schools visited demonstrated the importance of respecting people of 
a different faith. (Ofsted 2009, 4.) 
The key role for the schools was to enable young people to be ‘good 
citizens’, committed to participating positively in society, even 
though they themselves may be subject to anti-Semitism and 
Islamophobia, for example. The schools worked hard to develop the 
personal confidence of young people to deal with negative influences 
without compromising their beliefs. (Ofsted 2009, 9.) 
 
When it came to imparting knowledge about other ways of life, on the other 
hand, the schools were less successful: 
 
Although most schools taught a general understanding of other 
faiths, particularly to older pupils, many of the schools visited were 
reluctant to teach about other faiths in great detail (Ofsted 2009, 9). 
Twelve of the schools visited raised concerns about any requirement 
to teach details of other faiths. In particular, leaders were concerned 
that it would be inappropriate to introduce younger children to the 
details of other faiths because they felt children were too young to 
distinguish between similarities and differences. A school leader 
summed up by saying: ‘We don’t want to know the details of what 
they believe but do need to know that they believe in something 
greater than themselves’. (Ofsted 2009, 10.) 
 
One finding was that schools serve the function of maintaining group identity 
and even increase its importance in the pupils’ lives: “In all the schools 
visited, pupils gained a strong sense of personal worth and of belonging to 
their faith community” (Ofsted 2009, 8). At the same time, a need to protect 
pupils from alien influences was stressed: 
 
Christian, Jewish and Muslim schools, to different degrees, were 
striving to protect their young people from the perceived negative 
influences of the wider secular society. All accepted and taught about 
diversity and saw the promotion of community cohesion as requiring 




their own faith, rather than being a homogeneous cultural mix. 
(Ofsted 2009, 9.) 
 
With regard to an important ingredient of cohesion, namely national identity, 
the finding was that schools were not sure about the values that form this: 
 
There was extensive debate about what was meant by the term 
‘modern Britain’, used in the letter sent by the Secretary of State 
when commissioning the survey. Schools were concerned that this 
term contained no specific values. A general consensus existed that, 
instead of the term ‘modern Britain’, the alternative should be 
‘preparing young people to be good citizens of the United Kingdom’. 
(Ofsted 2009, 9.) 
 
While the Ofsted report showed that the content of teaching in the faith 
schools inspected was in accordance with the nation’s overall educational 
policy, further investigations were immediately demanded. After publication 
of the report, School Secretary Ed Balls instructed Ofsted to carry out a 
survey of the ‘moral values’ of independent faith schools. The rhetoric used 
to justify the need for this further survey is familiar. According to Balls, 
“[s]ome concerns have been raised recently about practice in a small minority 
of independent faith schools and whether they are effectively preparing 
pupils for life in wider British society.” (The Guardian 2009.) 
As we have seen, the ability of faith schools to prepare pupils for life in 
a multicultural society has been questioned by politicians, by experts in 
educational matters, and the public. However, it is not only in this area that 
pressure is put on faith schools. There is evidence that schools overall are 
expected to fit into the framework of society’s basic convictions.9 Religious 
faith is no reason for exemptions in fundamental matters, such as equality 
among citizens. In 2007 the Equality Act was passed, prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in the provision of goods, 
facilities and services. The Joint Committee on Human Rights issued a 
report, ‘Legislative Scrutiny: Sexual Orientation Regulations’ (2007), to 
explicate how the Equality Act was to be applied in the exercise of public 
functions. With regard to education, the report stated the following: 
 
We do not consider that the right to freedom of conscience and 
religion requires the school curriculum to be exempted from the 
scope of the sexual orientation regulations. In our view the 
Regulations prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination should 
clearly apply to the curriculum, so that homosexual pupils are not 
subjected to teaching, as part of the religious education or other 
                                                
9 In the ‘Concluding remarks’ section of Chapter 2, I argued that each of the four nations, 
as well as the Council of Europe and the EU, have their own convictions, i.e. their vision 
of the good. 




curriculum, that their sexual orientation is sinful or morally wrong. 
(House of Commons 2007, 21 par 67.) 
 
This means that it is not for example allowed to teach that homosexuality is 
objectively wrong. The school can tell pupils that according to some religions 
homosexual behaviour is regarded as sinful, but not that homosexuality is 
objectively wrong:10 
 
Applying the Regulations to the curriculum would not prevent pupils 
from being taught as part of their religious education the fact that 
certain religions view homosexuality as sinful. In our view there is 
an important difference between this factual information being 
imparted in a descriptive way as part of a wide-ranging syllabus 
about different religions, and a curriculum which teaches a particular 
religion’s doctrinal beliefs as if they were objectively true. The latter 
is likely to lead to unjustifiable discrimination against homosexual 
pupils. We recommend that the Regulations for Great Britain make 
clear that the prohibition on discrimination applies to the curriculum. 
(House of Commons 2007, 21-22 par 67.) 
 
The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations came into force 30 April 





History of educational arrangements 
In the Netherlands, the state became involved with the provision of education 
as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century; the first Education Act 
was passed in 1801 (Walford 2001, 364). One distinctive feature of the Dutch 
educational system is that it has a very wide private sector that enjoys full 
public funding. The constitution calls for public and private schools to be 
treated equally,11 and since 1917 each religious community has had the right 
to establish its own schools with full state funding (Thijs et al. 2008, 11; 
Walford 2001, 364). This arrangement has its historical roots in pillarization, 
whereby the society was vertically segregated on the basis of religion, each 
pillar with its own political parties, schools, etc. funded by the state. 
Currently around two thirds of all primary- and secondary-school students are 
educated in private schools (Kuyk 2007, 135).  
Within this framework, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 
has prescribed minimum requirements for education; their implementation is 
                                                
10 Later in this thesis I return to the issue of how the ‘knowledge’ that religions provide 
should be treated in schools. 




monitored by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education (Inspectie van het 
Onderwijs).12 However, considerable freedom has been left to the schools to 
arrange education according to their own ethos. (Thijs et al. 2008, 11; 
Karsten 2006, 32; Shahid & Koningsveld 2006, 76; Driessen & Merry 2006, 
202-203.) If the requirements dictated by the state for example in history or 
biology are in conflict with the school’s religious beliefs – as in the case of 
evolutionary theory or certain historical events – the school has the 
possibility of formulating alternative targets. It is worth noting that the 
Inspectorate has not spelled out any guidelines as to how religion is to be 




Geert Driessen and Michael S. Merry (2006, 203) write that although the 
influence of religion in most social institutions and organisations has 
declined, the “denominational educational system has remained remarkably 
intact”. In general, however, religiously oriented private schools are far more 
secular than they once were (Walford 2001, 368). For instance the Catholic 
or Protestant churches no longer have a significant impact on the curriculum 
of their schools. This development reflects the overall secularisation of the 
society as a whole, and has also affected the content of religious education. 
Walford (2001, 368) writes that the teaching of religious education has in 
most religious schools been reduced to simple factual information about 
different worldviews. According to Elza Kuyk (2007, 136), in most schools 
the approach to religious education has become more multicultural and inter-
religious. Walford (2001, 368) also notes that “the religious affiliation of 
Dutch schools is no longer a major factor in choice” (Walford 2001, 368).  
Immigration has changed the composition of existing schools. Since it is 
quite easy to establish a new private school with full funding (Walford 2001, 
364), there has been a significant growth in the number of Muslim and Hindu 
schools (Walford 2001, 369). In 2007 there were 48 Islamic primary schools, 
containing 5 % of all Muslim children, and two Islamic secondary schools. 




The increase in the number of Islamic schools has given rise to public debate 
in the Netherlands as well. In their article, ‘Islamic Religious Education in 
the Netherlands’ (2006), Wasif A. Shahid and Pieter S. van Koningsveld 
distinguish three periods of public debate over Muslim schools. The first of 
these, from 1988 to 1997, focused on the desirability of Islamic schools, their 
advantages and disadvantages. Those who favoured Muslim schools argued 
                                                
12 See, http://www.onderwijsinspectie.nl/site/english 




that these schools could promote Muslim integration, at the same time 
allowing students to preserve their distinctive group identity. It was also 
argued that parents would be more involved in their children’s education. 
Opponents, on the other hand, considered that private Islamic schools upheld 
barriers between groups, since the children’s social contacts are limited. 
(Shahid & van Koningsveld 2006, 83-84.) 
The second period of the public debate can be located between 1998 and 
2000. The main theme of public concern at this time was the quality of 
education in Muslim schools. A study by the Inspectorate of Education 
indicated that the pedagogical climate and teaching expertise in Muslim 
schools were worse than in the average primary school. (Shahid & van 
Koningsveld 2006, 84-85.) 
The third period began in 2001, following the events of 11 September. 
Concerns were raised in the public debate over the influence of political 
Islam and the successful integration of immigrants. (Shahid & van 
Koningsveld 2006, 85). The fear was that the reason Islamic schools were 
attracting increasing numbers of parents was “precisely because [the schools] 
adhere to traditional norms and values, even when these are in direct conflict 
with the values of modern society” (Karsten 2006, 32). According to Sjoerd 
Karsten (2006, 29), while the Netherlands has always publicly respected the 
norms and values of different minorities, the question was raised “whether 
the state should fund only the ‘common’ secular state school which provides 
a neutral curriculum and is equally accessible to all”.13  
As scepticism towards Muslims increased, the Inspectorate of Education 
(Onderwijsinspectie) was given the task of investigating the “anti-integrative 
tendencies” of Muslim schools, to find out whether these promote hatred 
toward Western society. The Inspectorate investigated thirty-seven Muslim 
primary schools and published a report under the title Islamic Schools and 
Social Cohesion (Islamitische scholen en sociale cohesie) (2002). Its major 
conclusion was that almost all Muslim schools played a positive role in 
creating conditions favourable for furthering social cohesion. (Shahid & van 
Koningsveld 2006, 85-86; Driessen & Merry 2006, 212.)  
The Dutch Secret Service (BVD) carried out its own investigations into 
the content of education in Muslim schools. In its report, The Democratic 
Legal Order and Islamic Education: Foreign interference and anti-
integrative tendencies (De democratische rechtsorde en islamitisch 
onderwijs: Buitenlandse inmenging en anti-integratieve tendensen) (2002) it 
focused on foreign interference in Islamic schools and their possible anti-
integrative tendencies. One finding of the report was that the boards of 
Muslim schools were overly authoritative. The BVD also criticised the 
Inspectorate of Education for not supervising classes in religious education. It 
                                                
13 Kuyk (2007, 140) notes that this question is also raised occasionally by those who want 




argued that the influence of foreign organisations was in general rather 
limited, but that religious education classes formed an exception. In many 
cases the same teachers, opposed to the idea of integration of Muslims into 
Dutch society, taught both RE and MLC (minority language and culture). 
(Driessen & Merry 2006, 212.)  
As a result, the Lower House demanded a further investigation. The 
Inspectorate of Education published a new study, Islamic Schools Revisited 
(Islamitische scholen nader onderzocht) (2003), in which twenty Muslim 
schools were analysed in depth. The final conclusion was that education in 
Muslim schools “was not contradictory to the basic values of democratic 
state” and “to a lesser or greater extent furthered conditions favourable to the 
integration of the students”. However, when it came to religious instruction, 
the conclusion was that “the pedagogical-didactic quality left much to be 
desired in many schools”. (The Dutch Inspectorate of Education 2003; cited 
in Shahid & van Koningsveld 2006, 86.) As mentioned above, no legal 
conditions have been prescribed with regard to the teaching and content of 




The Netherlands Education Council14 (Onderwijsraad) declared in 2002 that 
the schools should promote social cohesion (Leeman & Pels 2006, 64). In 
2004 the Minister of Education presented a memorandum to the Lower 
House, under the title Education, Citizenship, and Integration (Onderwijs, 
Integratie en Burgerschap). Shahid and van Koningsveld (2006, 86) 
summarise the main points of the memorandum as follows:  
 
The first point discussed the issue of preventing the founding of new 
Muslim and Hindu schools, on the grounds of their purported 
contribution to segregation. ... A second issue was the functioning of 
Muslim school boards. The government contemplated making Dutch 
nationality a condition for membership to such a board and 
stipulating that new requests for the founding of Muslim schools be 
accompanied by a school plan indicating what the school could 
contribute to the forming of citizenship. Finally, the government 
announced that the development of an adequate method of religious 
education (one that guarantees the teaching of a non-conservative 
Islam) was in preparation. (Italics added.) 
 
Driessen and Merry (2006, 215) write that Liberal Party (in the government 
in 2003)  
 
                                                
14 The Council is an independent governmental advisory body that advises the Minister, 
Parliament and local authorities in education, policy and legislation. 




wants to put a halt to the expansion of these [Islamic] schools. ... 
[P]robably the most important reason why the Liberals are against 
Islamic schools is because they fear that the Muslim children be 
indoctrinated with anti-Western, anti-democratic, and anti-integrative 
ideas. To prevent this, the Liberals are calling for ethnically mixed 
schools; in their opinion, such schools offer the best opportunities for 
integration. 
 
The Christian-Democratic Minister of Education also proposed that the 
members of a school board needed to have Dutch nationality; in addition, 
they had to adopt an integration plan, and explain how they proposed to 
adhere to Dutch norms and values (Driessen & Merry 2006, 215).  
A new legislative proposal was also issued, according to which new 
schools had to accommodate diversity: no more than 80 % of pupils could 
come from a disadvantaged background (Karsten 2006, 31). This proposal 
weakened the possibility of establishing new Islamic schools. Driessen & 
Merry (2006, 201) cite studies showing that at the time (2006) there was a 
need for 120 new Muslim schools. 
As in the case of Britain, investigations have found that some Islamic 
schools are not doing enough to encourage students towards social 
integration and have failed to respect and instill the basic values of 
democracy. In 2009 the Deputy Education Minister, Sharon Dijksma, said 
that the government was going to withdraw part of the government funding 
from an Islamic school, As Siddieq, unless the school changed its attitude. 
This announcement was due to a critical report by the Educational 




History of educational arrangements 
Compulsory elementary schooling was introduced in Sweden in 1842. Since 
then the state has borne the responsibility for the provision of education. At 
the beginning, the connection between the education system and the church 
was strong. (Almen 2000, 62.) 
When universal suffrage was enacted in the Constitution in 1918, some 
parents wanted to establish private schools corresponding to their religious 
beliefs (Almen 2000, 62). Since national unity within the educational system 
– the idea of a single school type common to all – was highly valued by the 
government, this right was not granted; the character of religious education, 
however, was changed from a confessional Christian, Lutheran education to a 
non-denominational Christian form, allowing the schools to better serve their 
function as common to all. (Larsson 2007, 194; Almen 2000, 62-62.)  
In 1953 Sweden signed the Protocol to the Convention of Human 




the European Court of Human Rights if the fundamental freedoms set down 
by the Council of Europe were violated. The Swedish government stuck to 
the idea of a unified educational system, once again denying the possibility of 
public support for separate schools for special religious groups. (Almen 2000, 
63.) 
In the early 1960s an educational reform introduced significant changes 
in the subject of RE. It was defined as an objective and neutral, non-
confessional subject. Its name was changed to ‘Knowledge of Christianity’; 
by the end of the decade (in 1969) this in turn became ‘Knowledge of 




In 1991 the government changed course with regard to the funding of 
independent schools. It issued a White Paper, Freedom of Choice and 
Independent Schools (Valfrihet och fristående skolor), according to which 
parents would have a wide range of choice between public schools and 
independent ones (Riksdagen 1991b). The Independent School Reform which 
took place in 1992 made it possible for families to send their children to any 
school — public or private — without having to pay fees. Today the state 
finances all public and private schools that are accepted by the Swedish 
National Agency for Education (Sweden.se 2011).  
This opportunity has radically increased the number of independent 
schools. While in the school-year of 1990-1991 some 0.9 % of all Swedish 
pupils in compulsory education were enrolled in independent schools 
(Swedish Association of Independent Schools 2010), in 2008 9 % of primary-
school students and 20 % of high-school students attended private schools 
(Riksdagen 2010, 233). Of the independent primary schools, 13 % have a 
religious profile (Larsson 2007, 197).  
Immigrants too have founded private schools; in 2009 there were seven 
Islamic schools in Sweden. 
With regard to the regulations that control schooling, independent 
schools are in a similar position compared to state schools. They have the 
same legal requirements regarding the general curriculum, course syllabi and 
fundamental educational values. This means that for example religious 
education has to be a knowledge-based subject. (Ministry of Education and 




Although the possibility for parents to choose among different school types 
has expanded radically, faith schools have faced a similar rise of public 
suspicion and state control as in Britain and the Netherlands. Larsson (2007, 
197) notes that “[s]ome confessional schools have been criticised recently for 




a perceived deficiency in openness and the practice of democratic values, 
which have justified a discussion about special restrictions for confessional 
schools.” In 2007 the Minister of Education, Jan Björklund, declared that 
control over faith schools would be doubled, and that this might result in 
closing the school or denying funding. The Minister for Integration and 
Gender Equality, Nyamko Sabuni, demanded the full closure of religious 
schools, while the Secretary of the Social Democratic Party, Marita Ulvskog, 
called these schools ‘child prisons’. (Dagens Nyheter 2007a.) 
This trend can be seen as an attempt to domesticate faith schools to fit 
into the framework of liberal democracy. In 2007 the Minister of Education 
issued a statement that all religious content will be removed from education 
except for RE classes. “Students should be protected from all kinds of 
fundamentalism”, he said. This would mean, according to the Minister, that 
schools are not allowed to teach creationism anymore. The Minister indicated 
that future legislation (Education Act, 2010) will make this very clear.  
 
Now it will be crystal clear: it won’t be allowed. Some statements 
from independent schools have led to a very worrying picture ... It 
will still be allowed to hold Morning Prayer, but as soon as teaching 
starts, the curriculum, and only the curriculum, will apply. (Dagens 
Nyheter 2007a.) 
 
In 2010 the government presented a proposal for a new Education Act.15 In 
this proposal, one goal was put all school types under similar or same 
legislation: 
 
A fundamental principle in the proposition for a new school law is 
that all types of activities and all types of schools should, as far as 
possible, be based on the same legislation, whether the authority is 
the municipality, the county, the state or an individual (Riksdagen 
2010, 207). 
 
The idea of the non-confessional character of all education is formulated as 
follows: “The government proposes that education conducted by a public 
authority should always be non-denominational” (Riksdagen 2010, 224). 
With regard to the teaching of religion in any type of school, the proposal 
states the following: 
 
It will also ... within the limits of the pupil’s choice or the school’s 
choice in primary school and corresponding types of schools, or 
within the individual’s choice in secondary school be possible to 
offer education in religion, history or civics, meaning the deeper 
                                                
15 The new Education Act came into force July 1 2011, see Lagen.nu (2012): Skollag (The 




study of Christianity, Islam, Judaism etc. for instance by studying the 
Bible or the Qur’an. This education must nevertheless be non-
denominational, i.e. it must be based on scientific grounds and be 
factual and comprehensive. (Riksdagen 2010, 227; italics added.) 
 
Reference is made to the European Convention, according to which no 
person shall be denied the right to education and that the State will respect 
the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with 
their own religious or philosophical convictions (Riksdagen 2010, 226).16 The 
point seems to be, however, that despite respecting the pupil’s choice – or, 
more precisely, that of their parents or other legal guardians, the government 
wants to control what kind of ‘knowledge’ is provided in religious education 
classes. In the previous chapter I argued that Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Denmark are attempting to create a ‘liberal state of mind’ in 
their citizens; in other words, to cultivate the virtue of ‘reasonableness’ in the 
Rawlsian sense. I have hypothesised that this is expected to increase the 
possibilities of co-operation among citizens who hold differing or even 
conflicting visions as to how to lead a good life or what is worthwhile. In 
addition, as I shall show later in this thesis, these four nations, as well as the 
Council of Europe, are also encouraging pupils, as future citizens, to 
approach religion-related issues with a scientific attitude. The point is that in 
a culturally plural society pupils are being exposed to different sources of 
‘knowledge’, while in the schools only one source seems to qualify as 
legitimate. As in the case of Great Britain in connection with teaching about 
homosexuality, likewise in Sweden information imparted in the schools is to 
be impartial and “based on scientific grounds”. One underlying assumption 
seems to be that if the schools succeed in this, it will increase the chances of 
better cohesion. This is because citizens will have impartial or neutral 
knowledge, which in turn will improve the possibility of a fair, democratic 
decision-making process.17  
In the previous chapter I wrote that the Swedish conservative-liberal 
government is also anxious to protect children’s rights with regard for 
example to health education or swimming lessons. The new legislation 
allows no exemptions in the name of religious practices or norms. In a 
proposal for the new Education Act, under the heading ‘Special attention to 
the best of the child’ (‘Särskild hänsyn til barnets bästa’), states the 
following: 
 
                                                
16 In Chapter 6 I discuss the rights of the state with regard to the content of religious 
education under the European Convention. 
17 In Chapter 1 I discussed one dimension of the distinction between the public and the 
private sphere, according to which political actions or decisions cannot be legitimated by 
principles or views derived from a particular religion but have to be based on principles 
or views that all are expected to accept. 




To be able to assess what is in the child’s best interest, it is required 
to impose a child’s perspective before making any decisions or 
actions concerning children. The best interest of the child, as the 
basis for all education, means that education will strive to give the 
child the best possible conditions for his or her personal 




History of educational arrangements and faith schools 
The evolution of the Danish educational system is quite similar to the 
Swedish one. The Folkeskole (the publicly funded school system) was 
formally established in 1814, and by the beginning of the twentieth century a 
modern system of general education had taken shape in cities and towns.  
Until 1975 the Folkeskole shared responsibility for Christian nurture 
(dåbsoplæring) with the Church of Denmark. After that the responsibility 
was split: the schools have the responsibility for passing on knowledge and 
enabling cultural individualisation (Dannelse),18 while the church and the 
parents are responsible for Christian nurture. This means that the school 
subject, ‘Kristendomskundskab’, is non-confessional. The approach is 
scientific, with the aim of transmitting knowledge of Christianity and other 
religions. Lessons do not involve instruction in religious practice. (Monrad 
2007, 49-51.) 
Along with this state-maintained system there are also private schools,19 
which receive governmental funding regardless of the ideological, religious, 
political or ethnic motivation behind their establishment. Funding is allocated 
‘per pupil per year’, and it matches public expenditures on state schools. In 
2007, around 13 % of all children at the elementary school level were 
attending independent schools. (Danish Ministry of Education 2008a, 1-2.) 
All these schools have to follow the general rules for the Folkeskole, for 
example in teaching religion. The religious dimension, however, may play a 
larger role in the daily life of the school. (Danish Ministry of Education 




In recent years, religiously oriented private schools have faced the same 
suspicion from the government as independent faith schools in Great Britain, 
the Netherlands and Sweden. Here too the fear is that some of the activities 
                                                
18 According to Monrad (2007, 55: footnote) ”[t]he Danish word dannelse is 
approximately equivalent to the German word Bildung of which there is no direct 
equivalent in English.” 




of the faith schools will lead to greater segregation, rather than contributing 
to the reproduction of functional democracy and the transmission of the 
society’s fundamental values. In the summer of 2009 the Trade and Economy 
Minister, Lene Espersen, stated at the Conservative Party convention that the 
idea of a Muslim ‘parallel society’ should be resisted. She also referred to 
current educational arrangements that may serve as an obstacle to integration: 
 
We have children who grow up in this country, who in principle 
could just as well be living in Saudi Arabia. This is because the TV 
they see at home, the language they speak at home, and what goes on 
at various private schools, has nothing to do with Denmark. 
(Politiken 2009; italics added.) 
 
The remedy, according to the Minister, is that more democracy and Danish 
values should be taught in schools. She also demanded stricter legislative 
regulation for private schools. For example, teachers should have the same 
professional qualifications as teachers in public schools. (Politiken 2009.) 
These suspicions as to the private schools’ ability – or willingness – to 
produce citizens equipped with democratic skills has led to closer scrutiny of 
these schools. In 2009 the Minister of Education, Bertel Haarder, said that 
twenty-five Muslim and Catholic schools would be inspected in the near 
future to see whether they prepare their students to live in freedom and 
democracy. These inspections were part of the government’s decision to fight 
extremism. The minister also stated that inspections would continue in the 
future. (Kristeligt Dagblad 2009a.) 
The Social Democratic Party was also open to stricter supervision of 
private schools. Christine Antorini, the education spokesperson, said that they 
supported the proposal. The Party was in favour of the idea that all religious 
private schools should be investigated; they also saw it as problematic that 
some Christian private schools taught creationism. (Politiken 2009.) 
According to the chief consultant of the Board of Education 
(Skolestyrelsen), Anders Andersen, the Board had formulated four objective 
criteria for the inspections. Private schools which met at least two of the 
criteria were likely to get an inspection visit. These criteria were as follows: 
 
1. The school was based on religious or political views.  
2. The school did not explicitly state how it fulfilled the legal requirement to 
prepare students for a society of freedom and democracy like Denmark. 
3. There was a concern that pupils were isolated (or isolated themselves) 
from others based on their religion, skin colour or political convictions. 
4. Former inspections had indicated that the schools did not meet the 








The Council of Europe and the need to promote intercultural 
education 
As I have shown in this chapter, the presence of different religions – more 
precisely, of religious beliefs – has in recent years forced governments to 
take measures to inhibit or reduce social segregation. The Council of Europe 
has also been interested in advancing peaceful co-existence among citizens. 
James Wimberley20 (2003, 200) notes that since the 1980s the Council of 
Europe has “frequently discussed policy matters arising from religion, and 
adopted several texts on both religion in a democratic society”. One of these 
textual contributions is Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1396 
Religion and Democracy (1999). The Recommendation recognises that  
 
[t]here is a religious aspect to many of the problems that 
contemporary society faces, such as intolerant fundamentalist 
movements and terrorist acts, racism and xenophobia, and ethnic 
conflicts (Council of Europe 1999, par 3).21  
 
Actions by the Council of Europe are usually limited to advising or making 
recommendations to its member states. Since the events of 11 September 
2001, however, its course has been more pragmatic and it has been eager to 
create programs that would “promote intercultural understanding in general, 
and also to address in this framework the specific issues that arise on 
religion”. The Secretary General, Walter Schwimmer, hoped that 
intercultural and interfaith dialogue would become one of the major themes 
of the Council’s activities. (Wimberley 2003, 201.)  
In those Council programs that are designed to promote intercultural 
understanding, education plays an important role. Between 1970 and 2003 
the Council of Europe has issued twelve official documents concerning the 
role of education in fostering intercultural dialogue (Council of Europe 
2004), but the first explicit statement that intercultural and inter-religious 
dialogue is a vital ingredient of civic education occurs in Recommendation 
(2002)12, ‘On Education for Democratic Citizenship’ (Council of Europe 
2004, 19).  
The Appendix to the Recommendation, under the heading ‘Educational 
objectives and contents of education for democratic citizenship’, calls for 
particular attention to be paid “to the acquisition of the attitudes necessary for 
life in multicultural societies, which respect differences”; it further states that 
“it would be appropriate to implement educational approaches and teaching 
                                                
20 In 2003 Wimberley was Head of Educational Policies and European Dimension 
Division in the Directorate of School, Out-of-School and Higher Education, Directorate 
General IV, Council of Europe. 
21 It is worth noting that exactly the same sentence is used in Recommendation 1720 





methods which aim at learning to live together in a democratic society” 
(Council of Europe 2002b). 
Another document that deals with intercultural education is Resolution 
Res(2003)7, ‘On the youth policy of the Council of Europe’. The resolution 
reaffirms the concept of “pluralist democracy”, and “the promotion of 
intercultural dialogue and peace” is the first item in the list of “thematic 
priorities for the years ahead” (Council of Europe 2003, II a). The promotion 
of social cohesion is also mentioned as an important educational goal, along 
with human rights education and the promotion of human dignity (Council of 
Europe 2003, II b). 
Two programmes have followed: The Challenge of Intercultural 
Education today: Religious diversity and dialogue in Europe (2002-2005), 
and Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention (2002-2004). 
 
 
How does the curriculum reflect the need to achieve cohesion? 
Great Britain 
In 1997 Britain’s Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett, set up an 
Advisory Group “[t]o provide advice on effective education for citizenship in 
schools” (QCA 1998, 4). Its report, Education for Citizenship and the 
Teaching of Democracy in Schools, was published in 1998.  
The report argues that Britain is facing “worrying levels of apathy, 
ignorance and cynicism about public life” (QCA 1998, 8 par 1.5). What is 
needed is a nation of ‘active citizens’ who are able “to think for themselves”, 
who have “critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and acting”, 
and who are willing “to have an influence in public life” (QCA 1998, 7 par 
1.5). 
The report suggests an effective citizenship education, based on three 
major ‘strands’: (1) promoting social and moral responsibility, (2) 
community involvement and (3) political literacy. With regard to the first of 
these, the aim is for children to learn “self-confidence and socially and 
morally responsible behaviour both in and beyond the classroom”. The 
second strand, community involvement, has to do with pupils “learning about 
and becoming fully involved in the life and concerns of their communities”. 
The third strand, the idea of political literacy, means that pupils learn “about 
and how to make themselves effective in public life through knowledge, 
skills and values”. (QCA 1998, 13 par 2.12; 40-41.)  
Central learning outcomes are divided into three areas: (1) values and 
dispositions, (2) skills and aptitudes, and (3) knowledge and understanding” 
(QCA 1998, 41). It is worth noting that not only knowledge but also skills, 
such as an empathetic understanding and respect for others and their 
perspectives, are emphasised as important goals (QCA 1998, 44). 
The report also suggests that citizenship education should be “a vital and 
distinct statutory part of the curriculum” (QCA 1998 13, par 3.1; see also 7 




par 1.1; 22 par 4.1): 
 
It can no longer sensibly be left as uncoordinated local initiatives 
which vary greatly in number, content and method. This is an 
inadequate basis for animating the idea of a common citizenship with 
democratic values. (QCA 1998, 7 par 1.1.) 
 
The government accepted this recommendation. Citizenship education 
became a statutory foundation subject in 2002, as part of the statutory cross-
curricular theme Personal, Social and Health Education (PSHE).  
In addition, since September 2007 the schools also have the duty to 




Using education as a tool to prepare students to live in a multicultural society 
is not a new thing in the Netherlands. Already in 1981 the Ministry of 
Education and Science published its agenda, under the title Policy Plan for 
Cultural Minority Groups in Education (Beleidsplan culturele minderheden 
in het onderwijs): 
 
education should prepare and enable members of minority groups for 
full participation and functioning in the socioeconomic, social, and 
democratic aspects of Dutch society, with the possibility of doing so 
from their own cultural background (Dutch Ministry of Education 
and Science 1981, 6; cited in Leeman & Pels 2006, 66).  
 
Here we see two goals being set: the preparation of all students to function 
successfully in a society, and the maintaining and cherishing of distinct and 
different cultural identities. The publication also explicitly states that 
education should enable students to learn from each other’s cultures. In this 
sense, it is not only about acquainting immigrant students with the majority 
culture; an effort should also be made to enrich the dominant culture:23 
 
Education, through intercultural and other forms of instruction, 
should promote the acculturation of both minority groups and other 
members of Dutch society. We define acculturation here as a 
bilateral or multilateral process of learning from, accepting and 
appreciating each other, and being open to each other’s culture or 
elements of it. (Dutch Ministry of Education and Science 1981, 6; 
                                                
22 The Education and Inspections Act 2006 inserted a new section 21(5) into the 
Education Act 2002, introducing a duty on the governing bodies of maintained schools to 
promote community cohesion.  





cited in Leeman & Pels 2006, 66.) 
 
As a consequence, in 1985 intercultural education made it legally 
compulsory (by the Primary Education Act) for all schools to prepare their 
students for life in a multicultural society (Leeman & Ledoux 2003, 387). 
Schools had the freedom to choose specific areas of emphasis in the content 
of these lessons, and to decide whether intercultural education would form an 
independent optional subject or be integrated into other subjects. The usual 
solution was for the subject to be integrated. (Leeman 2008, 52.) The core of 
intercultural education consisted of world religions, colonial history, 
multicultural society, and migration (Leeman & Pels 2006, 70), but all 
schools were also obligated to devote attention to socio-philosophical 
movements such as feminism, socialism and humanism; it was regarded as 
necessary to give students insight into a range of intellectual and spiritual 
movements in an objective way (Leeman 2008, 52).  
In 1994 the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, together with 
the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, decided that intercultural 
education should be more effective; they set up the Intercultural Education 
Project Group (Projectgroep ICO), to stimulate intercultural education and to 
facilitate its implementation as a regular school activity in all schools. One 
outcome of the group’s work was the Intercultural Learning in the Classroom 
Project. (Leeman & Ledoux 2003, 388-389.)  
In 2002 the Education Council of the Netherlands (Onderwijsraad) 
stated in a document Learning to live together: An Exploration (Samen Leren 
Leven. Verkenning) that in the case of the integration of immigrants the 
economic dimension is not sufficient; education too has to contribute to 
social cohesion (Onderwijsraad 2002; Leeman & Pels 2006, 64). According 
to Leeman (2008, 51), between 2003 and 2004 doubts were raised in 
numerous policy documents issued by the Lower Chamber of Parliament as 
to the loyalty of parts of the minority population toward the central values of 
Dutch society.  
In 2003 the Education Council of the Netherlands issued a 
recommendation on ‘Education and Integration: learning from the past’ 
(Onderwijs en integratie: leren van het verleden), according to which 
citizenship education was to be explicitly included among the general 
objectives of educational legislation (Council of Europe 2009). In 2004 the 
Ministry of Education published a White Paper Education, Integration and 
Citizenship (Onderwijs, integratie en burgerschap) (Leeman 2008, 51).  
Statutory citizenship education in all primary and secondary schools was 
introduced in 2006. Both the Primary Education Act and the Secondary 
Education Act were amended, with an additional specification obligating 
schools to offer education that ‘stimulates active citizenship and social 
integration’. The Acts also state that education should enable pupils to 
become acquainted with the various cultural backgrounds of their fellow 




pupils. (Thijs et al. 2009a, 39; 44.). Both Acts state that education 
  
a) begins among other things with the assumption that pupils grow 
up in a multiform society 
b) aims among other things at the promotion of active citizenship 
and social integration  
c) is directed among others things towards increasing the pupils’ 
knowledge of and acquaintance with their fellow pupils’ various 
backgrounds and cultures (Thijs et al. 2008, 27). 
 
According to an explanatory memorandum attached to the Acts, the 
educational goal of ‘active citizenship’ means “willingness and ability to 
belong to a community and to make an active contribution to it.” ‘Social 
integration’ means the ability to participate in the society and its institutions, 
together with an awareness of Dutch culture. It is the school’s responsibility 
to promote citizenship and to ensure that pupils not only acquire knowledge 
of different cultures and philosophies of life but also become acquainted with 
children of the same age from different backgrounds. (Thijs et al. 2008, 27; 
2009a, 44.) Leeman (2008, 53) argues that loyalty to the Netherlands and its 
central values must also be instilled. 
The Dutch curriculum institute provides work schemes and materials for 
citizenship education. The Education Inspectorate monitors the measures 




In Sweden there have been no recent changes in the curriculum. There is an 
independent subject called Civics, forming part of social studies. The 
introduction to the syllabus for Civics describes it as follows: 
 
The subject of civics should provide basic knowledge about different 
societies, impart democratic values and stimulate participation in 
democratic processes. ... The subject contributes to pupils’ ability to 
understand their own and others’ conditions and values, and thus also 
to be able to distance themselves from and actively counteract 
different forms of repression and racism. Education should be open 
to different ideas and encourage their expression, as well as promote 
respect for each person’s intrinsic value, regardless of gender, class 
and ethnic background. The equal rights and opportunities of boys 
and girls, women and men should be actively and consciously 
clarified. (Swedish National Agency for Education 2008, 75.) 
 
Under the heading ‘Goals to aim for’, it says that pupils should “understand 
and practice the fundamental values of democracy”, and should “develop 




diversity, and the importance of this for relations among people” (Swedish 
National Agency for Education 2008, 75-76). 
Alongside with Civics, the subject ‘Knowledge of Religion’ 
(Religionskunskap) also includes a component for understanding diversity in 
society and acting with responsibility (Swedish National Agency for 




In 2007 the Danish Government set up a committee, with the task of drawing 
up a democracy ‘canon’ or agenda that could be applied in education. The 
committee’s report, entitled The Danish Democracy Canon, was published in 
2008.  
In the Foreword, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen writes as 
follows:  
 
We must face the fact that support for democracy and respect for the 
fundamental freedoms are not self-evident. ... The Danish 
Government therefore wishes to strengthen knowledge of the 
principles of freedom and democracy on which Danish society is 
based.25 (Danish Ministry of Education 2008b, 5.)  
 
Suggestions have also been made for establishing a distinctive subject, aimed 
at upholding and creating democracy. In the summer of 2009, for instance, 
Trade and Economy Minister Lene Espersen stated that democracy classes 
should be part of the curriculum from grades 1 to 10, so that all students 
would know about the rule of the people, equality, freedom of speech and the 
right to decide about their own lives (Politiken 2009). 
In 2007 the concept of citizenship was officially incorporated into 
teacher education in Denmark, as part of the subject ‘Christianity studies, life 
enlightenment, and citizenship’ (Haas 2008, 59). 
 
 
Summary and discussion 
In this chapter I have traced measures taken by governments in the field of 
education in the name of increasing social cohesion. At the beginning the 
chapter I pointed out that governments, along with the general public, have 
become suspicious about what is going on within faith schools. Faith schools’ 
autonomy to provide education in line with their religious beliefs has been 
limited. Religious schools are not only monitored carefully, but have also 
been publicly accused as a potential source of intolerance and anti-
                                                
24 I return to this issue in the next chapter. 
25 In the next chapter I present and discuss the content of The Danish Democracy Canon. 




democratic action. These are concrete examples of how the public is 
defended from the impact of the religious sphere by secular officials. 
Religion, more precisely ideas that are regarded as products of the religious 
domain, are presented as partly responsible for creating and/or maintaining 
the undesired outcomes that societies have faced along with increased 
immigration. In Great Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark, religious 
schools, above all Islamic ones, have been accused of inhibiting the 
promotion of social cohesion. In Sweden too, some religious schools have 
been criticised for a perceived deficiency in openness and the practice of 
democratic values.  
It is also interesting that in Great Britain and the Netherlands, despite the 
positive conclusions arrived at by independent investigators as to the ability 
of faith schools to produce cohesion, integration or democratic character, 
negative attitudes towards religious schools have not changed.  
In Great Britain and the Netherlands a new compulsory subject, 
citizenship education, has been adopted in the curriculum, and similar 
suggestions have been made in Denmark. In Sweden the subject already 
exists. All of these countries, as well as the Council of Europe, regard it as 
essential that all children not only learn about different ways of living but 
also acquire the necessary ability to co-operate peacefully with other citizens 
and have a positive attitude towards the nation. In the previous chapter I 
argued that the states are departing from the distinction between the public 
and private sphere by aiming at regulating the minds of citizens, more 
precisely at creating ‘a permanent liberal state of mind’ in them, and that 
education plays a significant role in this process. The official state actions 
described in this chapter are concrete examples of this. I also want to stress 
that in all four countries the plural nature of society is seen as something that 
needs to be managed by applying certain selected choices in the field of 
education.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse in depth the content of 
citizenship education.26 However, there is a point that I want to make here. In 
their award-winning article,27 ‘What kind of Citizen? The Politics of 
Educating Democracy’ (2004), Joel Westheimer and Joseph Kahne write that 
“there exists a vast and valuable array of perspectives on the kinds of citizens 
that democracies require and the kinds of curricula that can help to achieve 
democratic aims” (Westheimer & Kahne 2004, 239). One possible point of 
criticism is that the strategies adopted by the four countries studied here may 
                                                
26 In the next chapter I analyse the education for morality and values provided by the 
schools in each nation. 
27 The article received the Outstanding Paper Award for Research in Social Studies from 
the American Educational Research Association, as well as the Outstanding Paper of the 






implicitly represent the interests of the state, but do not necessarily or 
optimally fulfil the needs entailed by the plural nature of a society: “[f]or 
example, a focus on loyalty or obedience (common components of character 
education as well) works against the kind of critical reflection and action that 
many assume are essential in a democratic society” (Westheimer & Kahne 
2004, 244). 
This can be seen as the fundamental issue of the legitimacy of 
civic/citizenship education. Since the assumption is that the reproduction of a 
nation’s policy or ethos is an important task of education, and keeping in 
mind that schools are powerful socialisers, there is a risk that the schools will 
use indoctrination to achieve this. The problem goes as follows: liberal 
democracy depends on consent for its legitimacy. However, “the quality of 
that consent is compromised if it is simply manufactured by the state through 
the school system” (Barry 2001, 231). Thus, while the schools provide an 
appropriate understanding of citizenship, this can lead to distorted attitudes.  
Some scholars have raised this issue and expressed their concern over 
civic education. Rhys Andrews and Andrew Mycock (2007, 75) point out 
that in Great Britain the Labour Party’s stress has been on the socialisation of 
young citizens. The focus of socialisation  
 
has been reframed to address issues of community cohesion, 
multiculturalism, immigration and identity. The teaching of 
citizenship in English schools is therefore increasingly justified as 
necessary for the inculcation of ‘British’ values.  
 
In the Netherlands, as Leeman and Pels (2006, 66) argue, the Dutch 
educational policy  
 
is now completely oriented to promoting full participation of all 
children ... Assimilation has become the dominant ideology, in which 
culture is regarded as a private matter ... In line with this view, the 
Ministry of Education no longer actively promotes intercultural 
education. The focus now is on assimilation in the sense of education 
in the core values of Dutch society.  
 
This criticism is appropriate to a certain degree; in previous chapters we have 
seen that in all four nations the inculcation of fundamental liberal values is 
considered necessary, along with the adoption of civic responsibility by all 
citizens. But we have also seen that the kind of citizenship these nations 
pursue is not based on these values alone. At least at the level of rhetoric, 
understanding and ability to create dialogue are high on the list of educational 
goals. In Great Britain the Crick report states that among the essential 
elements to be reached by the end of compulsory schooling are the abilities 
“to co-operate and work effectively with others” and “to consider and 
appreciate the experience and perspective of others” (QCA 1998, 44). 




According to the Education Acts (for both elementary and secondary schools) 
of the Netherlands, citizenship education is “among others directed towards 
the pupils’ knowledge of and acquaintance with their fellow pupils’ various 
backgrounds and cultures” (Thijs et al. 2008, 27). In Sweden the Civics 
syllabus states that the courses “should be open to different ideas and 
encourage their expression, as well as promote respect for each person’s 
intrinsic value, irrespective of gender, class and ethnic background” (Swedish 














In the previous three chapters I have traced the ways in which cultural 
plurality is treated in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. I 
have argued that along with every nation’s commitment to the equal and 
neutral treatment of their citizens and the strong emphasis placed on 
fundamental values, a new ‘super-value’, cohesion, has been introduced as an 
essential ingredient of multicultural policy. Promoting cohesion is seen as a 
remedy for the unwelcome consequences arising out of increased cultural 
plurality.  
I have also shown that a multicultural society has an increased need to 
induce people from different backgrounds to tolerate and respect each other, 
and the schools are regarded as an important institution in this process. As 
Carolyn Evans (2008, 449-450) writes, “[t]he school curriculum has become 
the place to solve a whole range of social ills”. There is no room for an 
education where children may become intolerant towards other citizens’ 
ways of life or beliefs. Along with instilling core values, intercultural 
education – i.e. education aimed at dealing with difference – is also to be 
promoted. 
In this chapter I focus on the inculcation of values and morality in the 
schools. The empirical material consists of policy documents that dictate 
educational goals, in particular the content of values education. Needless to 
say, what happens in practice – that is, what actually happens in the 
classroom – can be completely different. Nevertheless, these texts are 
designed to guide public education and they represent the state’s official 
ethos in this matter. It is therefore possible to discuss the different strategy 
representations adopted by various countries in their policy documents. The 
survey takes into account all statements referring to values or virtues and 
dealing with the issue of the plural nature of a society. To give a 
comprehensive view, the findings are divided into three main themes: (1) 
explicitly stated values that students are expected to internalise and share; (2) 
                                                
1 This chapter deals with policies and approaches concerning educational activities in the 
area of values, morality and ethics. The term ‘values education’ is used here to cover all 





the ethical attitude desired in a student after completing a successful 
education, and (3) the means and contents of ethical reflection. Each theme is 
explicated in detail below.  
With regard to explicitly stated values, I explicate in the case of each 
nation which values form the society’s value base, how they are grounded, 
and how they are interpreted at different levels of the legislation guiding 
educational arrangements. I also look at how they differ from country to 
country. This approach can show what strategy a nation has adopted to deal 
with the situation of a plurality of convictions. As we have seen, all four 
nations have had a strong commitment to their basic values. Is this 
commitment equally clear in education as well? 
In Chapter 2 I suggested that in Sweden and Denmark the policy for 
treating difference also involves the effort to include a historic cultural 
tradition as part of civic identity. Especially in the case of Denmark it was 
emphasised that the central values of society are derived from religion. 
Dominique MacNeill (2000, 351) argues, based on her research on school 
syllabi in Great Britain, Germany and France, that in these countries even 
today the definition of national identity incorporates a religious element. In 
this chapter, I explore whether this is the case in the four countries of concern 
here, and if so, in what respects this aspect of identity is expected to be 
adopted or assimilated by students. 
A desirable ethical attitude here means not only what values and virtues 
students are expected to assimilate, but also – and more importantly – what is 
the expected depth of assimilation. My main focus is on exploring the 
relationship between publicly shared values and those culturally adopted 
values that a person holds privately. I have argued that Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark have been interested in creating a strong 
civil sphere; that citizens adopt a civic identity that is based on the society’s 
core values. But can this distinction between private and public be 
maintained in education? The concrete question is, how are the society’s core 
values to be dealt with in education? Are they meant to be internalised in 
such a way that they become part of daily choices, and thus perhaps gradually 
also part of personal identity, or is the distinction between the public and 
private spheres maintained? The latter alternative would mean that after a 
successful process of value transmission, it would still be possible for a 
person to hold (in private) values that may conflict with the society’s central 
values. It is useful here to quote Terence McLaughlin (1995, 248), who 
considers that in a multicultural state schools should point out to students that 
“[w]hether a given action should be accepted or tolerated within a public or 
civic domain and be legal does not ipso facto make that action fully 
acceptable morally from all points of view”. Although common values are 
needed for example for political purposes, wider moral perspectives do exist, 
and those wider perspectives make a fuller moral appraisal possible. 




gaining a distorted perception of the moral life.” Therefore, according to 
McLaughlin,  
 
the school has a principled responsibility to try to avoid giving illicit 
salience to ‘public’ matters and underplaying the role that reasonable 
moral views in the ‘non-public’ domain play in overall moral 
evaluation. 
 
One point I consider here is whether or not the distinction between the 
private and public is maintained, and if so how. 
With regard to the means and content of ethical reflection four points are 
taken into account. The first one arises from the concept of autonomy.2 As we 
have seen, some religious parents want to shelter their children from alien 
influences. What is often behind this claim is the wish to prevent the child’s 
development towards a morally autonomous life.3 Especially in the case of 
some illiberal religions, there is a tendency to emphasise obedience at the 
expense of full moral autonomy.4 According to this very strict interpretation 
of morality, the values dictated by a given religion are regarded as non-
negotiable and are this not a matter of personal choice at all.  
I find it useful to frame my enquiry into this matter in terms of the 
scholarly debate: to what extent does a parent has the right to decide the 
content of their child’s education, and vice versa to what extent should 
critical thinking be encouraged in children? Some scholars consider that 
parents’ should have wide freedom to decide the content of their child’s 
education, even though the resulting education may not promote the child’s 
subsequent development towards an autonomous life. Arguments favouring 
this view tend to be closely connected to the idea that autonomy is not 
necessarily a crucial value of a liberal theory. Halstead’s argument, presented 
in Chapter 3, is one example of this; according to Halstead, Muslim parents 
should have the right to select for their children a form of school that is in 
accordance with their distinct beliefs and values. Similarly, Chris Hewer 
(2001, 522) argues that Muslims have a need for a strong cultural identity 
                                                
2 Joseph Raz (1986, 369) defines four prerequisites for an autonomous life, as follows: (i) 
independence, i.e. the ability to make choices without being coerced or manipulated to do 
so; (ii) integrity, i.e. the ability to identify with one’s choices and be loyal to the projects 
and relationships one chooses; (iii) appropriate competence in mental abilities, i.e. a 
capacity for deliberating, planning, and making choices; and (iv) an adequate range of 
options for choices, not only between good and evil but also between different goods, 
(Raz 1986, 369). 
3 By moral autonomy I mean that a person is able to think whatever they like about moral 
matters, make up their own mind in moral issues, decide for themselves what they ought 
to do, choose their own moral position, etc. 
4 In Chapter 3 I introduced the criticism of Kymlicka’s autonomy-based liberalism 
presented by Tamir (1995) and Strike (1998), and their arguments in favour of non-





school, whose pedagogy reflects an epistemology of divine revelation: there 
are no secular subjects within the Islamic world view, and thus “[e]very 
aspect of study of should be permeated by Islamic values and the divinely 
ordained harmony should be brought out by educational process.”  
The logic of the criticism of education for autonomy can be formulated 
as follows: if autonomy entails the ability of a person to choose for 
themselves a good life, or a “commitment to sustained rational examination 
of self, others and social practices” (Galston 1995, 521), then by demanding 
for example an education that endorses autonomy a choice is already made 
for many people, since one conception of a good life is preferred to others. 
To embrace autonomous choice in education, Galston (1995, 523) argues, is 
“in fact to narrow the range of possibilities available within liberal societies”. 
Thus, the argument goes, the inculcation of autonomy is a violation of 
neutrality by the state.  
There are, however, a number of scholars who, like Kymlicka, interpret 
liberal theory completely differently; they see legitimate parental interests 
with regard to the content of their children’s education as much more narrow 
than argued for example by Halstead and Hewer. According to Barry (2001 
224), the inherent goal of education is not to produce autonomous citizens 
but to provide students with the widest possible range of the arts, the 
humanities and the sciences. Barry’s view is based on a conception of what 
capacities citizens need in a multicultural society. He does not argue that the 
capacity for autonomy should not be developed. Rather, autonomy is a by-
product of successful teaching. Piet van der Ploeg (1998, 178), on the other 
hand, considers that education should enable pupils not only to assert a 
particular view of the good life, but also to step back from this view and 
subject it to critical analysis: democratic government must protect children 
from an education that frustrates their “ability to think and judge for 
themselves”. It is in fact a government responsibility to safeguard children’s 
future autonomy. 
Jackson (2004a, 54) writes that in principle there is no rigid dichotomy 
between religious nurture and the development of autonomy; autonomy is 
always ‘relative’, in the sense that “consideration of others in relation to 
oneself is an important factor in autonomous decision making”. However, he 
is strongly of the opinion that the schools should teach critical thinking; one 
of the key issues for all types of schools is that “pupils are taught and 
encouraged to use skills of critical enquiry so they can scrutinize and reflect 
upon beliefs and values they encounter.”  
There are also scholars who agree that the development of students 
towards an autonomous life is an important educational goal, but see faith 
schools as capable of achieving this goal. For example McLaughlin (1984, 
82) argues that “[i]f the parent avoids indoctrination and takes ... steps to 
safeguard autonomy such as accepting the eventual exposure of his child to 




fear that the development of the child’s personal or moral autonomy will be 
in danger.5 According to him, “[t]his has important implications for the kind 
of rights they can legitimately claim over the subsequent formal education 
and schooling of their children.” Johan De Jong and Ger Snik similarly 
defend the right of denominational schools to exist, on the basis that they 
provide “the child with an initial and stable conception of the good as a 
starting point for autonomous reflection” (De Jong & Snik 2002, 583). 
The second point to be taken into account with regard to the means and 
content of ethical reflection can be formulated in the form of a question: 
What is the depth and content of values education? For example Graham 
Haydon (1995, 60) argues that the relevant capacities needed by pupils as 
future citizens in a culturally diverse society involve knowledge, 
understanding, and critical reflection. The essential point, however, is that 
these capacities should be exercised on moral issues, because many of the 
decisions and choices that come up within the public forum involve such 
issues. According to Haydon it is not enough even to be able to offer reasons 
for one’s own moral position, since “very often it is also necessary to 
understand something of the opposing positions, in order to be able to 
counter objections which will come from them” (Haydon 1995, 61; italics 
added): 
 
there is a need for education, not just in morals, but about morality; 
an education that will give people some knowledge and 
understanding not just of the variety of moral positions in the world, 
but of the various ways in which moral values enter into people’s 
lives and some knowledge, too, of the kinds of arguments that have 
been used to support moral positions and, unavoidably, of the 
existence of various sorts of scepticism about morals (Haydon 1995, 
62-63). 
 
Haydon (1995, 63) considers that the discussion of moral issues is important 
in educating pupils to be able to co-operate in a plural society. Giving pupils 
access to the realm of morality will enable them to understand not only their 
own moral positions but also each others’.  
                                                
5 In his article ‘Religious upbringing reconsidered’ (2002), Michael Hand asks whether or 
not it is (logically) possible to give religious instruction and simultaneously be able to 
avoid indoctrination. Hand’s negative answer is based on the position that religious facts 
are not known to be true. According to Hand, religious beliefs should be held on the basis 
of evidence and should be open to revision and correction; the indoctrinated child’s 
beliefs are locked, and thus immune to rational appraisal. (Hand 2002, 553-554). 
Charlene Tan, in criticising Hand’s argument, points out that “scientific knowledge is not 
metaphysically neutral, since research functions within a paradigm involving 
metaphysical assumptions” (Tan 2004, 259; citing Puolimatka 1996, 112). See also Jim 
Mackenzie’s (2004) critique of Hand. With regard to the question of proof, MacKenzie 





The third point to be taken into account with regard to ethical reflection 
is that, while from the public perspective some ways of life are seen as 
undesirable because they do not consider certain democratic values 
legitimate,6 it would be wrong to say to someone who has grown up to 
cherish those values that they are completely false.7 This leads to the 
question: from what perspective should moral evaluation take place in 
schools? According to Jackson (2004b, 4) issues concerning the truth of a 
particular religion “cannot be resolved publicly”. His solution is based on the 
idea that in evaluating for instance the truth-value of a particular moral belief, 
the reference point is the individual pupil: pupils are encouraged to 
participate in epistemological and ethical debate at their own level. The 
Council of Europe has launched a program entitled A New Challenge to 
Intercultural Education: Religious diversity and dialogue in Europe (2007). 
Micheline Milot (2007) writes of the capacities for tolerance, reciprocity and 
civic-mindedness that a school should promote in children. According to 
Milot, civic-mindedness is primarily a cognitive ability, consisting of the 
capacity to stand back from one’s own conviction. This should not be 
confused with radical criticism of traditional norms or with relativism, 
although it “does involve a certain ability for distancing oneself from values 
and beliefs to which one subscribes”. The essential point is to make pupils 
“acknowledge that convictions are always valid from a particular point of 
view, in particular that of the community that holds them”. (Milot 2007, 27.)  
Fourth and finally, I examine the documentary material to see whether 
morality is seen as a phenomenon with its own independent existence, or as 
dependent on religion. In other words, when moral issues are considered, 
does this take place within a framework of moral principles provided by one 
or more specific religions, or does moral reflection, and the discussion of 




Explicitly stated values 
The British Education Act does not explicate the values that should guide 
schooling; this takes place in the National Curriculum. Under the heading 
‘Values and purposes underpinning the school curriculum’ in the National 
                                                
6 A common example of such a value is gender equality. It is also possible that in a 
certain culture equality between the sexes is valued but is interpreted differently from the 
way it is understood in Western democracies. It might be the case that there are for 
instance different tasks for each sex. 
7 This is essentially the same notion presented by McLaughlin (1995, 248) concerning the 
importance of maintaining the distinction between the public and private in values 
education (see above).  




Curriculum for England, for pupils between 5 and 11 years old we find the 
following: “[e]ducation influences and reflects the values of society, and the 
kind of society we want to be”. The text goes on to say that it is important “to 
recognise a broad set of common values and purposes that underpin the 
school curriculum and the work of schools” (QCDA 2010). 
These ‘common values’, however, are not explicated in detail; the text 
merely mentions that schools “may wish to take account of the statement of 
values” by the National Forum for Values in Education and the Community 
(1997). There we find four core values briefly explicated, along with 
recommendations as to what should be done “on the basis of these values”. 
This “statement of values” appears rather general: 
 
(i)  The self: “We value ourselves as unique human beings capable of 
spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical growth and development.”  
(ii)  Relationships: “We value others for themselves, not only for what 
they have done or what they can do for us.” 
(iii)  Society; “We value truth, freedom, justice, human rights, the rule of 
law and collective effort for the common good.” This includes for 
example “respect for religious and cultural diversity.” 
(iv) The environment. (National Forum for Values in Education and the 
Community 1997.) 
 
The generic nature of the list is due to the need to define values that are 
widely accepted. Compared to the documents presented in the previous 
chapters, the difference is that these values are not being prescribed. Rather, 
their validity is justified by referring to the imagined fact that there is general 
agreement on them: “The remit of the Forum was to decide whether there are 
any values that are commonly agreed upon across society, not whether there 
are any values that should be agreed upon across society” (National Forum 
for Values in Education and the Community 1997; italics added). It is also 
maintained that regardless of the supposed agreement on these values, they 
are not derived from one single source, and thus may have different 
interpretations when it comes to applying them in practice:  
 
Agreement on the values outlined below is compatible with 
disagreement on their source. 
Agreement on these values is compatible with different 
interpretations and applications of them. (National Forum for Values 
in Education and the Community 1997.) 
 
It is worth mentioning that the values explicated in the National Curriculum 
for England for secondary education are exactly the same as those stated in 
the National Forum for Values in Education and the Community (QCDA 





religious education, Religious Education: The non-statutory national 
framework (QCA & DfES 2004). 
In sum, it can be argued that the values that guide schooling are 
presented with some caution; in this sense, the policy differs from the 
government statements discussed in previous chapters. It is worth noting that 




Desirable ethical attitude 
In considering what kind of ethical orientation pupils should possess after a 
successful education, there are two perspectives that need to be taken into 
account: the individual’s development towards moral autonomy, and the 
interests of the society. It is obvious that the overarching aim of education, at 
least in a present-day Europe, is the personal development of the individual. 
Interestingly, the objectives explicated in this respect are rather abstract. The 
National Curriculum for pupils between 5 and 11 years says, simply, that 
“education should promote pupils’ ... moral development”. For children 
between 11 and 16 it is mentioned that pupils should have “secure values” 
and “principles to distinguish right from wrong”. These “secure values and 
principles” are the ones referred to above. (QCDA 2010.) 
Moral autonomy as an educational goal does not mean complete 
freedom in moral matters. Freedom is exercised within a certain framework, 
and here the interests of British society enter into the picture. The main 
objective in this area is for pupils to recognise their responsibilities and be 
willing to contribute their share to the common good. According to the 
National Curriculum for pupils between 5 and 11, education should “prepare 
all pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of life.” In 
the section ‘Aims of education’ for pupils between 11 and 16, it is stated that 
education should “enable all young citizens to become ... responsible citizens 
who will make a positive contribution to society”. (QCDA 2010.) 
The question to ask is, what does ‘responsibility’ mean in this context? 
In the case of pupils between 11-16 in the National Curriculum, responsible 
citizens have the following virtues: they are able to manage diversity in a 
respectful manner and to work co-operatively, they understand one’s own 
and other people’s cultures and traditions, they appreciate the benefits of 
diversity, and they are committed to human rights while challenging injustice 
(QCDA 2010).  
The same goes for the non-statutory framework for the subject 
‘Religious Education’ (QCA & DfES 2004). Under the heading ‘The 
importance of religious education’, respect for others is clearly emphasised: 
RE “offers opportunities for personal reflection and spiritual development”, 
but it also plays an “[i]mportant role for preparing for adult life” by enabling 




whose faiths and beliefs are different from their own.” Religious education 
also promotes discernment and enables pupils to combat prejudice. (QCA & 
DfES 2004, 7.) Under the heading ‘The contribution of religious education to 
the school curriculum’, specific emphasis is placed on the celebration of 
diversity in society through an understanding of similarities and differences 
(QCA & DfES 2004, 8; see also p. 13 and the section ‘Attitudes in religious 
education’). 
In previous chapters I have shown that every citizen is expected to 
assimilate the virtues that enable peaceful co-operation among citizens. The 
goals of moral education are quite similar. The non-statutory framework for 
religious education provides a good example:  
 
Religious education provides opportunities to promote moral 
development through enhancing the values identified within the 
National Curriculum, particularly valuing diversity and engaging in 
issues of truth, justice and trust (QCA & DfES 2004, 14; italics in 
original).  
 
In sum, the outcome of the right moral development is a person who values 
diversity, has a positive attitude towards others, and has the ability to co-
operate. The point is that it would be a matter of educational failure if a 
student did not possess these values and virtues. 
What is said above might be regarded as a rather trivial conclusion. It is 
clear that peaceful co-existence requires that citizens tolerate each other and 
share certain common values. The point is, however, that special programmes 
are needed, designed to achieve this goal. It is not believed that an ‘invisible 
hand’ can do the job. From this perspective, doubts as to the possible 
contribution by faith schools in promoting cohesion becomes more 
understandable, since in those schools ‘understanding of others’ is perhaps 
less prominently stressed.9  
 
 
Means and content of ethical reflection 
Schools have two subjects where the practice of moral reflection takes place: 
‘religious education’ and ‘citizenship education’. One important difference 
between them is that citizenship education is a compulsory subject, with no 
possibility of exemption; in contrast, a pupil can be “wholly or partly excused 
from receiving religious education given in the school” (OPSI 2010, 
Education Act 1996, section 389).  
An important part of the content of RE consists of ethical issues. 
                                                
9 In the previous chapter I introduced the most recent Ofsted report on faith schools. The 
report noted that the schools were less successful in giving knowledge about other ways 
of life: “many of the schools visited were reluctant to teach about other faiths in great 





According to the non-statutory framework for religious education, “[a]t the 
heart of this national framework for religious education is a focus on ultimate 
questions and ethical issues” (QCA & DfES 2004, 8). The goal is for pupils 
to have an ability to independently reflect upon matters that influence moral 
decisions:  
 
Religious education ... enhances the capacity to think coherently and 
consistently. This enables pupils to evaluate thoughtfully their own 
and others’ views in a reasoned and informed manner. (QCA & 
DfES 2004, 8; italics added.) 
 
According to the recommendations for the content of education, the 
development of moral autonomy starts with issues of religion; this is 
followed by a gradual expansion towards philosophical argumentation and 
everyday matters. In this sense, morality is not tied to any particular religion. 
In the section ‘Knowledge, skills and understanding’ for pupils between 7 
and 11, we find that learning about religion means that “pupils should be 
taught” to be able to “describe and begin to understand religious and other 
responses to ultimate and ethical questions”. Learning from religion, on the 
other hand, means that pupils should be taught to “reflect on ideas of right 
and wrong and their own and others’ responses to them”. (QCA & DfES 
2004, 26.) At the next stage (pupils from 11 to 14 years) we see a widening 
perspective on philosophical argumentation. Learning about religion at this 
level means cultivating the ability to “analyse and compare the evidence and 
arguments used when considering issues of truth in religion and philosophy”, 
while learning from religion means that pupils are able to “reflect [upon] and 
evaluate their own and others’ beliefs about world issues such as peace and 
conflict, wealth and poverty, and the importance of the environment, 
communicating their own ideas” (QCA & DfES 2004, 28). At this level 
‘Breadth of the study’ means, among other things, “reflecting on and 
carefully evaluating their own beliefs and values and those of others in 
response to their learning in religious education, using reasoned, balanced 
arguments” (QCA & DfES 2004, 29). 
Finally, for pupils 14-16 years of age, learning about religion means that 
they should be taught to “think rigorously” and be able to “present coherent, 
widely informed and detailed arguments about beliefs, ethics, [and] values” 
as well as to draw “well-substantiated conclusions.” Learning from religion 
should enable pupils to “reflect on, express and justify their own opinions in 
light of their learning about religion and their study of religious, 
philosophical, moral and spiritual questions”, and to “develop their own 
values and attitudes in order to recognise their rights and responsibilities in 
light of their learning about religion”. (QCA & DfES 2004, 30.) 
In sum, morality is seen as a phenomenon independent from religion, 
and the aim of education is clearly to make pupils self-sufficient in making 




through reflecting upon the evidence, not relying for example on religious 
authority.  
 
At this point, it is illuminating to focus on how ‘controversial issues’ are to 
be dealt within the British education system. In the Crick report, a 
controversial issue is defined as follows: 
 
A controversial issue is an issue about which there is no one fixed or 
universally held point of view. Such issues are those which 
commonly divide society and for which significant groups offer 
conflicting explanations and solutions. There may, for example, be 
conflicting views on such matters as how a problem has arisen and 
who is to blame; over how the problem may be resolved; over what 
principles should guide the decisions that can be taken, and so on. 
(QCA 1998, 56 par 10.2.) 
 
The report also states that controversial issues are likely to arise in RE:  
 
Controversial issues can arise in the teaching of virtually every 
subject. ... Religious Education probably embraces the very essence 
of controversy, dealing as it does in foundations of moral behaviour 
and the purpose and meaning of life. (QCA 1998, 56 par 10.3.) 
 
The starting point in the Crick report is that issues that might be seen as 
difficult to deal with because of their controversial nature are not set aside, 
but on the contrary are seen as an essential element in the content of 
education in a plural society. Two independent arguments are given in favour 
of this kind of action. The first is based on society’s interest in producing 
citizens who are open-minded, the second on the individual’s need to live in a 
multicultural nation. The point is that the introduction and discussion of 
controversial issues in education will enhance not only “a willingness and 
empathy to perceive and understand the interests, beliefs and viewpoints of 
others”, but also “a willingness and ability to apply reasoning skills to 
problems and to value a respect for truth and evidence in forming or holding 
opinions.” (QCA 1998, 57 par 10.6.)  
The Crick report also refers to the Education Act from 1996:  
 
The Education Act 1996 aims to ensure that children are not 
presented with only one side of political or controversial issues by 
their teachers. Section 406 of the Act (Political indoctrination) 
requires school governing bodies, head teachers and local education 
authorities to forbid the promotion of partisan political views in the 
teaching of any subject in schools; and to forbid the pursuit of 
partisan political activities by pupils under age 12 while in school. 
Section 407 (Duty to secure balanced treatment on political issues) 





where political or controversial issues are brought to pupils’ 
attention, they are offered a balanced presentation or opposing views. 
(QCA 1998, 56.) 
 
In sum, the Crick report argues that children need to know about the nature of 
society:  
 
Many controversial topics are major issues of the day: moral, 
economic, political and religious issues which young people ought to 
know about either because the issue could directly affect them or 
because they will in some way in a democratic society have 
opportunities to take a part in influencing the outcome. ... [Thus] to 
omit informing about and discussing them is to leave a wide and 
significant gap in the educational experience of young people, and is 
to fail to prepare them for adult life. (QCA 1998, 57 par 10.4.) 
 
The same ideas are found in the guidebook Citizenship: A scheme of work for 
key stage 3.10 Teachers Guide (QCA & DfES 2001). The guidebook states 
that teachers will need to “ensure that pupils have access to balanced 
information and differing views, on which they can then clarify their own 
opinions and views, including contributions made by visitors to the 
classroom” (QCA & DfES 2001, 46; italics added). But there are also skills 
that a student needs in order to be able to function successfully in a society:  
 
Learning from real-life experience is central to citizenship, and 
sensitive and controversial issues are certain to arise. Pupils should 
not be sheltered from them; through them pupils can develop an 
important range of skills, including listening, accepting another point 
of view, arguing a case, dealing with conflict, and distinguishing 
between fact and opinion. (QCA & DfES 2001, 46; italics added.) 
 
The same ideas are also to be found in the handbook Making Sense of 
Citizenship: A continuing professional development handbook (2006).11 In 
the chapter ‘Learning and Teaching Strategies’ we find the following:  
 
Topical and controversial issues are part of life. Students are aware 
of and want to talk about and understand such issues. To shelter 
students from them is to leave them ignorant about some of the major 
issues of the day and unprepared to deal with them. (Huddleston & 
Kerr 2006, 106.) 
 
                                                
10 Key stage 3 means pupils between 11 and 14 years. 
11 The handbook was developed by the Citizenship Foundation and the Association for 




As a conclusion, it can be stated that given the British educational system’s 
strategy for dealing with controversial issues, the attempt to have pupils 
obtain information and understanding about different moral positions may 
lead to a situation where pupils start to question the moral authority of the 
family. This in turn means that pupils may start to think that the society 
offers reasonable alternatives to the moral positions learned at home, or even 




The possibility of analysing the position of values education in the 
Netherlands as comprehensively as that in England is limited due to the 
absence of any centrally prescribed curricula or syllabi for religious or 
citizenship education. The Dutch education system is based on a model 
where the general aims and purposes of education are laid down legislatively 
in education acts. Each type of education – primary, secondary, adult, special, 
vocational, and higher education – has its own legislation. The Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Science then sets quality standards that apply to both 
public and private education, prescribing for instance the subjects to be 
studied and their attainment targets. Within this framework, schools have the 
freedom to define their own specifications and choose their own pedagogical 
approach, their own curriculum, textbooks and other educational materials. 
(Bron & al. 2007, 16; 19; 27.) 
In this system, religious education has quite a peculiar status. While 
under the terms of the Primary Education Act religious and ideological 
movements must be included in the curriculum, RE is not a compulsory 
school subject. It is up to the individual school to decide whether the subject 
is compulsory or optional. In either case, RE is not taught by school staff but 
by representatives of churches or other religious groups. It was not until 2004 
that the government decided that RE teachers in public primary schools 
should have the same professional competence as other teachers. The practice 
is different in public secondary schools, where the subject is taught by special 
RE teachers. (Kuyk 2007, 137-138.)  
One obvious outcome of this kind of arrangement is that the content of 
RE differs from school to school. As Kuyk (2007, 137-138) writes:  
 
The aims of RE can differ widely, ranging from getting the pupils 
related to a particular denomination or confirming that particular 
denominative affiliation to aiming to help pupils to relate to their life 
world including the religious aspect. Any other special aim is 








Explicitly stated values and desirable ethical attitude 
According to the Primary Education Act of the Netherlands, the schools must 
instil in pupils skills and insights, such as behaviour that shows respect for 
generally accepted norms and values, as well as knowledge of and respect for 
religious and other beliefs that play an important role in Dutch society 
(Eurybase 2006/07, 45). As indicated in the previous chapter, one important 
issue in recent policy discussions has been the aim of strengthening social 
cohesion and stimulating active citizenship. According to the publication by 
the Netherlands Institute for Curriculum Development (SLO), Inclusive 
Education in the Netherlands (2009), “‘belonging and connectedness’ are 
important values” in Dutch education (Thijs et al. 2009a, 41). 
Following the decision to implement citizenship education as an 
obligatory subject, the Primary and Secondary Education Acts were amended 
in 2006 with an additional specification: education should enable pupils to 
become integrated into society and to be familiar with the various cultural 
backgrounds of their fellow pupils (Thijs et al. 2009a, 39). The Acts oblige 
the schools to promote active citizenship and ensure that pupils not only 
acquire knowledge about different cultures and philosophies of life but also 
get to know children of the same age from different backgrounds. Annette 
Thijs et al. (2009a, 44) define these aims as follows:  
 
Active citizenship refers to the willingness to be part of a community 
and to make an active contribution to it. Social integration refers to 
the participation of citizens (irrespective of their ethnic or cultural 
background) in society, which means social integration, as well as 
participation in society and its institutes, and eventually familiarity 
with and involvement in cultural phenomena in the Netherlands. 
(Italics added.) 
 
Here we see clear indications of the kind of citizen aimed at in citizenship 
education. The implementation of citizenship education is controlled by the 
Dutch Inspectorate of Education. Schools have an obligation to inform the 
Inspectorate as to the goals and activities they organise to foster active 
citizenship and social integration. However, although obligatory, citizenship 
is not an independent subject. Schools are free to determine how it is 
integrated into their curriculum. (Thijs et al. 2009a, 44.) 
Despite the absence of centrally prescribed curricula or syllabi for RE or 
citizenship education, the desired ethical attitude can be tracked in at least 
two documents. The first is A School Culture That Unites, published in 2007 
by the Netherlands Education Council (Onderwijsraad); it lays down 
guidelines for the schools to create a ‘sense of community’. The basic idea in 
the document is that a school should be a multicultural community, a ‘world 
school’; “a meeting place for different cultures”, where no priority is given to 
any conviction or religion. The framework binding this community together, 




schools with Dutch standards and values”. (Onderwijsraad 2007, 1.) 
The need for pupils to assimilate core values is also present in the 
following recommendation by the Education Council for schools to “[u]rge 
pupils to share responsibility through citizenship education”: 
 
Citizenship education should be a part of daily school life as well as 
the curriculum. It should focus on essential values and principles, but 
also on smaller virtues such as respect for others and common 
courtesy (Onderwijsraad 2007, 2; italics added). 
 
The desired ethical attitude can also be tracked from those general objectives 
that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science has assigned to schools. 
The most recent version of core objectives for primary education in the 
Netherlands was published in 2006, and includes 58 objectives. In the 
introduction, one of the three important functions of core objectives is 
defined as “equipment for participation in society” (Bron & al. 2007, 19). 
One ‘learning area’ where core objectives have been defined for primary 
education is ‘Personal and world orientation’. It is described as follows: 
 
In this learning area, pupils orientate on themselves, on how people 
relate to each other, how they solve problems, and how they give 
meaning to their existence. ... At the same time, society, in which the 
children are growing up, is making its demands. Children are 
fulfilling, and will fulfil, tasks and roles, for which education is 
preparing them. These concern the role of consumer, the role of 
traffic participant, and the role of citizen in a democratic 
constitutional state. Knowledge about and insight in important values 
and standards, and knowing how to act accordingly, are 
preconditions for coexistence. Respect and tolerance are forms of 
these. (Bron & al. 2007, 80; italics added.) 
 
Part of ‘Personal and world orientation’ consists of Social Studies. Among 
the core objectives for social studies are the following: 
 
(i) Pupils should learn about the essentials of Dutch and European 
politics and the duties of a citizen (objective number 36);  
(ii) They should learn to behave from a sense of respect for generally 
accepted standards and values (objective number 37); 
(iii) They should learn about the essentials of religious movements 
that play an important part in the pluralistic Dutch society, and 
should learn to respect people’s differences of opinion (objective 
number 38). (Bron & al. 2007, 81.) 
 
Summing up, it can be argued that there is a strong tendency to have pupils 
assimilate the responsibilities of citizens. These include the core values and 





may have different visions as to how to lead a good life. In this sense, the 




In 2006 a new set of core objectives was introduced to the secondary 
education as well. In those objectives the idea of developing moral 
independence in pupils is expressed. Under the heading ‘Man and society’ we 
find twelve objectives; the first one (objective number 36) is that “[t]he pupil 
learns to ask meaningful questions about social issues and phenomena, take a 
substantiated point of view concerning these, defend it, and deal with 
criticism in a respectful way” (Bron & al. 2007, 88; italics added). According 
to the eighth goal (objective number 43), 
 
[t]he pupil learns about agreements, differences and changes in 
culture and religion in the Netherlands, learns to connect his or her 
own, as well as someone else’s lifestyle with these, and learns that 
respect for each other’s views and lifestyles will enhance society 
(Bron & al. 2007, 89). 
 
It is clear that the purpose of moral reflection is to enable pupils to 
independently create their own moral point of view. With regard to the means 
or content of moral reflection, however, teachers are not provided with 
similar guidelines as in Britain. Thijs et al. (2009b) refer to a study indicating 
that teachers are concerned about this; they do not always feel adequately 
equipped to deal with diversity in a positive way. They would like to learn 
more for example about how to discuss moral issues that touch upon deeply 
rooted cultural and religious ideals and assumptions. This also applies to 
other dimensions of citizenship education, such as creating a positive attitude 
towards each other’s way of life.  
It seems to be the case that citizenship education in the Netherlands has 
not succeeded as planned. According to a publication by the National 
Institute for Curriculum Development (SLO), 
 
[a] recent study of the Dutch Inspectorate (2007) shows that most 
schools currently engage in some [form] of promoting active 
citizenship and social integration. While there is a lot of willingness 
and many initiatives are developed, a wider vision and a systematic 
approach to achieving the set objectives is not always in place. (Thijs 
et al. 2009a, 44.) 
 
In another study, Dealing with cultural diversity (Omgaan met culturele 
diversiteit), under the heading ‘From vision to policy and what is offered’, we 
find the following: 




the investigated schools there is no structural and explicit translation 
from vision towards policy and what is offered. Policy is formulated 
fractionally and does not connect with learning how to deal with 
differences. What they offer in most schools is dependent on the 
individual teachers and the general method that is used in teaching. 
(Thijs et al. 2009b, 38.) 
 
It may be that the broad freedom of schools guaranteed by the Constitution 
may have become an obstacle to achieving the goals set for citizenship 
education. According to the SLO publication Core affairs - The Netherlands,  
 
What we now see in the Netherlands, is a movement towards 
deregulation and increasing autonomy of schools. Development of 
individual talents is supported and schools are looking for ways to 
design learning environments in which these talents will flourish. At 
the same time, there is a continuous concern for quality and social 
stability, among other things infused by societal values and common 
standards. (Bron & al. 2007, 6.) 
 
It is also worth noting here how intercultural education was carried out before 
the implementation of citizenship education. On the basis of several studies, 
Yvonne Leeman and Trees Pels (2006, 70) argue that intercultural education 
is mainly about tolerance and about facing the situation of diversity in a safe 
atmosphere in the classroom, with a focus on individual rather than group 
differences. What has been lacking, Leeman and Pels argue, is a “reflective 
stance on inequalities” (Leeman & Pels 2006, 71) and an orientation toward a 
critical analysis of Dutch society “in terms of distributive and cultural 
justice” (Leeman & Pels 2006, 64). The writers would want greater emphasis 
on cultural meanings and on the role of cultural identities (Leeman & Pels 




Explicitly stated values 
As we saw in previous chapters, Sweden’s strategy for dealing with a 
plurality of convictions is a strong commitment to what are perceived as 
central democratic values. In Chapter 2, I wrote that in the mid-1980s 
Sweden was forced to make some clarifications to the concept of ‘freedom of 
choice’. It was made explicit that freedom of choice did not apply to “all 
lifestyles, norms, values, customs and practices” (Riksdagen 1986, 20). In 
1990s the government further took the position that ‘Swedishness’ does not 
lie in a common historical origin but in a contemporary commitment to 
Sweden and its social order, the basic values of democracy and equal rights, 
and intrinsic human values (SOU 1996:55, 354; in Graham 1999, 120).  





shall promote the ideals of democracy as guidelines in all sectors of society” 
(Riksdagen 1974, Ch 1, Art 1, par 3). These same values also form the 
foundation of the Swedish educational system. The concept of “society’s 
fundamental values” is referred to in the Education Act, in the National 
Curriculum, and in the syllabi for the ‘compulsory school’, i.e. the primary 
and secondary school common to all children.12 In the National Curriculum 
the terms “society’s fundamental values” and “fundamental democratic 
values” seem to have the same meaning. The values and virtues explicitly 
defined in the Curriculum are the intrinsic value of each person, the 
importance of the shared environment, the rejection of racism, the 
inviolability of human life, individual freedom and integrity, the equal value 
of all people, equality between women and men, and solidarity towards the 
weak and the vulnerable. (Swedish National Agency of Education 2006, 4.) 
In addition to these democratic values, and perhaps surprisingly, another 
ethical perspective is also introduced in the curriculum:  
 
In accordance with the ethics borne by Christian tradition and 
Western humanism, this [internalising the society’s basic values] is 
achieved by fostering in the individual a sense of justice, generosity 
of spirit, tolerance and responsibility (Swedish National Agency of 
Education 2006, 3).  
 
This is the only time that these two traditions are mentioned in the National 
Curriculum. What is interesting, however, is the clear role assigned to 
Christianity as an essential part of Swedish heritage, especially the 
contribution of Christianity to the current values of Swedish society. In the 
syllabus for RE, this is expressed as follows: “Swedish society is strongly 
influenced by the values and standards of Christianity” (Swedish National 
Agency for Education 2008, 73). It is also regarded as vital that students 
understand the role played by Christianity in the course of Sweden’s history: 
 
[Pupils should] have a knowledge of the influence of Christianity on 
Swedish society, its basic values, traditions, art and literature 
(Swedish National Agency for Education 2008, 74). 
An understanding of Swedish society and its values is deepened 
through a knowledge of the Christian traditions which have been 
dominant in Sweden (Swedish National Agency for Education 2008, 
71). 
The school in its teaching of Religion should aim to ensure that 
pupils ... develop an understanding of how Christianity has 
influenced Swedish society (Swedish National Agency for Education 
                                                
12 The Education Act states that “[s]chool activities shall be structured in accordance with 
fundamental democratic values”; in the National Curriculum the first sentence says that 
“Democracy forms the basis of the national school system”, and the syllabus refers both 






An important finding with regard to the National Curriculum is that when it 
comes to tradition it is not only about giving pupils knowledge but also about 
having pupils adopt Sweden’s national cultural heritage, in which 
Christianity is an essential element: 
 
In a deeper sense education and upbringing involve developing and 
passing on our cultural heritage – values, traditions, language, 
knowledge – from one generation to the next (Swedish National 
Agency for Education 2006, 5). 
 
The point seems to be that the condition for being able to function well in 
society is that pupils assimilate the Swedish cultural heritage at least to some 
extent: “[a]wareness of one’s own cultural origins and sharing a common 
cultural heritage provide a secure identity” (Swedish National Agency for 
Education 2006, 4). Interestingly, the idea of sharing a common heritage is 
represented here exclusively as a helpful benefit for the pupil. It is worth 
noting that neither in Britain nor in the Netherlands do we find similar ideas, 
at least in the official documents discussed and referred to in this thesis. 
 
 
Desirable ethical attitude  
With regard to the ethical attitudes that are the goal of Sweden’s values 
education, it can be said without hesitation that pupils are intended to deeply 
assimilate democratic values. The expressions used in the National 
Curriculum and in the Syllabus for Social Studies, which includes RE and 
Civics, leave no room for speculation:  
 
The school has the important task of imparting, instilling and 
forming in pupils those fundamental values on which our society is 
based (Swedish National Agency for Education 2006, 3).  
It is important that each person develop a personal attitude and a 
belief in the fundamental values of democracy as a starting point for 
their thinking and action over political, economic and existential 
issues (Swedish National Agency for Education 2008, 59; italics 
added). 
 
It is equally clear that these values are regarded as non-negotiable: 
 
All who work in the school should uphold the fundamental values 
that are stated in the Education Act and in this curriculum, and 
should very clearly disassociate themselves from anything that 






From the perspective of equal treatment of citizens, and especially from the 
parental point of view, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter, a 
possible point of criticism is the depth of internalisation of these fundamental 
values. The objective of values education in Sweden seems to be for 
democratic values to become the reference point of the student’s overall 
moral reflection. For example the following sentence in the curriculum 
supports this conclusion:  
 
The school should actively and consciously influence and stimulate 
pupils into embracing the common values of our society and [should] 
express these in practical daily action (Swedish National Agency for 
Education 2006, 8).  
 
A possible and even desirable consequence of values education is that the 
society’s values will gradually supersede conflicting values adopted at home. 
It is thus obvious that the distinction between public and private values 
cannot be maintained. 
However, while fundamental values are to be assimilated, this is not the 
whole picture of Sweden’s values education. Another important goal is to 
prepare students for life in a multicultural world and to help them accept the 
fact that people think differently in moral matters:  
 
The internationalization of Swedish society and increasing cross-
border mobility place great demands on people’s ability to live 
together and appreciate the values that are to be found in cultural 
diversity (Swedish National Agency for Education 2006, 3-4).  
In an international society based on ethnic and cultural diversity, how 
people think, act and shape their lives is of growing importance. The 
subject [RE] contributes to an understanding of traditions and 
cultures, and thus provides a foundation for confronting xenophobia, 
as well as developing pupils’ respect for tolerance. (Swedish 
National Agency for Education 2008, 71.) 
[Social] studies cover cultural diversity as a basic feature of Swedish 
society, where different traditions, belief systems and views of life 
exist side by side and influence each other (Swedish National 
Agency for Education 2008, 59-60). 
 
In addition to teaching pupils to tolerate difference, there is also a tendency to 
create in them a respect or empathy towards different value systems:  
 
[I]t is important to develop ... the ability to empathise with the values 
and conditions of others. The school is a social and cultural meeting 
place with both the opportunity and the responsibility to foster this 
ability among all who work there. (Swedish National Agency for 





What is interesting here is that the ability to empathise is extended to other 
people’s values, not only to other citizens.  
 
 
Means and content of ethical reflection 
There are two subjects where moral matters are dealt with, RE and Civics. 
The main responsibility falls on RE; here an important goal is to make 
students aware of different ethical positions and to make them independent in 
moral matters. Discussion or reflection is used as a device in the process of 
developing students’ moral autonomy:  
 
An ethical perspective is of importance for many of the issues that 
are taken up in the school. This perspective should permeate school 
activity to provide a foundation and support for pupils to develop 
their ability to form personal standpoints. (Swedish National Agency 
for Education 2006, 6.) 
An important element in social studies is to encourage pupils to 
differentiate between and work through situations involving ethical 
choices, arguing for and seeing the consequence of different views 
and approaches (Swedish National Agency for Education 2008, 59). 
 
In the RE syllabus, the goal by the end of fifth year is for the pupils to be 
“able to discuss ethical problems and provide reasons for their views”; by the 
end of the ninth year they should “be able to reason ethically and see the 
consequences of different ethical views” (Swedish National Agency for 
Education 2008, 74). 
How does this happen? According to the chapter “Goals and Guidelines” 
of the Curriculum, the teacher should “openly present and discuss different 
values, ideas and problems” (Swedish National Agency for Education 2006, 
9). This approach is not limited to religion as a phenomenon. Rather, it starts 
with the lives of young people:13 
 
Everyday ethical issues are a starting point for reflection and 
discussions in the subject [of Religion]. Discussion on ethical issues 
may be deepened through familiarity with ethical principles, thinking 
and systems from different religions and outlooks on life. (Swedish 
National Agency for Education 2008, 73.) 
 
                                                
13 Almen (2000, 85) writes that this approach has its roots in the 1940s, since “many 
atheists and agnostics felt that the religious education of that time implicitly denied that it 
was possible to have a serious and well grounded morality when you were not a 
Christian”. As noted in Chapter 4, in Sweden the aim was to have a unified school that 






Above, I suggested that one aspect of a desirable ethical attitude is empathy 
towards others and the values they hold. One tool for achieving such an 
attitude is to present information about values as contingent. In other words, 
information about values is treated as a mental construction about reality, not 
necessarily as a ‘true’ reflection of that reality:  
 
A basis for tolerance towards those who think differently is created 
by an understanding that phenomena can be understood in different 
ways by different people, depending on, for example, gender, class 
and ethnic affiliation (Swedish National Agency for Education 2008, 
59). 
 
This approach is close to the ideas of Rawls and Milot, discussed above. The 
point is that convictions are meant to be presented as valid specifically from a 





Explicitly stated values 
The Danish school system is regulated by the ‘Folkeskole (Consolidation) 
Act’ (2000) which provides the overall framework for the school activities. 
According to the Folkeskole Act,  
 
The school shall prepare the pupils for participation, joint 
responsibility, rights and duties in a society based on freedom and 
democracy. The teaching of the school and its daily life must 
therefore build on intellectual freedom, equality and democracy. 
(Danish Ministry of Education 2010, par 1.3.) 
 
Similarly to the Netherlands, the state does not provide any common 
curriculum for schools to follow. Each individual school has to develop its 
own curriculum, which must be approved by the municipal council. There 
are, however, certain ‘Common Goals’ (Fælles Mål), provided by the 
Ministry of Education for each subject, in which the aims and standards are 
explicated in detail. The most recent set of Fælles Mål was introduced in 
2009.  
The previous Fælles Mål (published in 2004) for the subject Knowledge 
of Christianity (Kristendomskundskab) included one reference to a ‘value 
base’: the description of the common aims of the subject included the 
requirement that students should “understand the meaning of Christianity as a 
value base for our culture” (Danish Ministry of Education 2004, 11). This 




As already noted, Christianity is regarded as an essential element in 
Danish culture. The Danish constitution enunciates an intimate relationship 
between the state and the Evangelical Lutheran church. This relationship has 
also had a great impact on RE. As noted in the previous chapter, until 1975 
the Folkeskole and the Church of Denmark shared joint responsibility for 
Christian nurture. Since then the school’s responsibility has been limited to 
imparting knowledge about Christianity; the role of Christianity in the 
Folkeskole is nevertheless still very prominent. (Monrad 2007, 49-50.) For 
example, between 1993 and 2006, the ‘objectives’ clause of the Education 
Act (the Folkeskole Act) prescribed that “[t]he Folkeskole shall familiarise 
the pupils with Danish culture (including Christianity) and contribute to their 
understanding of other cultures and man’s interaction with nature” (cited in 
Monrad 2007, 49). Here Christianity was the only explicitly named example 
of Danish culture.  
While the objectives clause was changed on August 2006, and 
Christianity is no longer explicitly mentioned, according to the Ministry of 




Desirable ethical attitude 
The only reference to a desirable attitude in the Folkeskole Act is the 
sentence cited above (“The schools shall prepare pupils for participation, 
joint responsibility, rights and duties in a society based on freedom and 
democracy”). In 2002 the Danish Ministry of Education published a 
document entitled Rights and Duties in the Danish Comprehensive Primary 
and Lower Secondary Schools (Rettigheder og pligter I folkeskolen), 
according to which the schools should teach pupils (i) to understand what the 
above sentence means; (ii) “to interact in a community based on intellectual 
freedom, equality and democracy”; (iii) “to become familiar with Danish 
culture”; and (iv) “to understand other cultures” (Danish Ministry of 
Education 2002, 5).  
In the previous chapter I referred to The Danish Democracy Canon, 
published in 2008 by the government committee established for the purpose 
of drawing up a ‘democracy canon’ – a list of “key events, philosophical 
trends and political texts” that have contributed to the development of Danish 
democracy (Danish Ministry of Education 2008b, 8) – and by the Danish 
Ministry of Education. The Danish Democracy Canon is designed for schools 
to use in “strengthening knowledge of the principles of freedom and 
democracy on which Danish society is based” (Danish Ministry of Education 
2008b, 8). In the foreword, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
expresses his hope that  
                                                






the democracy canon will be used actively and dynamically in 
teaching, in associations, in liberal adult education, and everywhere 
in society to strengthen awareness, consciousness and discussion of 
the fundamental principles of democracy (Danish Ministry of 
Education 2008b, 5). 
 
One of the main motives for drawing up these canons was to enable citizens 
to live peacefully in a multicultural society. In the chapter ‘The Present 
Conditions for Democracy – Four Challenges’ the first challenge on the list is 
“multiculturalism”.15 The document provides several solutions to this 
challenge. The primary solution, the “democratic solution” is “to put law 
before culture” (Danish Ministry of Education 2008b, 87):  
 
Even though a democratic society allows people freedom to express 
their opinions and to choose their religion and ideology, it does not 
permit religion and ideology to supersede law. ... In this way 
restraints are put on fundamentalist groups, in the hope that many 
cultures can find their place next to each other. (Danish Ministry of 
Education 2008b, 88-89.) 
[Democracy] allows freedom of choice regarding creed and way of 
life, but it obliges such choices to fit into a common system of order, 
so that politics triumphs over both religion and ideology (Danish 
Ministry of Education 2008b, 89). 
 
What is interesting is that the phrase “to put law before culture” is in itself 
quite trivial. It is obvious that the law must be followed. The reason for 
listing this as the primary solution to the challenge of multiculturalism may 
be the fact that in some cases a child’s upbringing in the home is not in 
accordance with society’s values.  
Another, equally evident aim of the document is to state that democracy 
cannot accommodate fundamentalism. Citizens should accept a common 
moral ground for peaceful interaction: 
 
Democracy represents an attempt to foster civilised social interaction 
between different cultures that all contribute to a rich society. The 
American philosopher, John Rawls (1921-2002), believed that it 
required an area of overlapping consensus – an area of principles that 
everyone can agree on, despite disagreeing otherwise. (Danish 
Ministry of Education 2008b, 89.) 
 
Also needed is an ability to make compromises: 
 
A society with many cultures each nurturing its own Truth will be 
                                                




like a powder keg that easily explodes. Such an explosion can 
perhaps be prevented by physical force. Democracy employs another 
method. It seeks to create social order by spelling all truths with a 
small ‘t’. These truths can be discussed in public, and everyone can 
personally agree or disagree with them. A democratic election is not 
concerned with what is true and what is false, but with which views 
can gain majority support. All views have a right to be voiced and 
discussed; none are automatically wrong. (Danish Ministry of 
Education 2008b, 87-88.) 
 
The obstacles in the way of this are close-minded citizens: 
 
This [finding an area of principles that everyone can agree on] is still 
unacceptable for those who insist on having Truth with a capital ‘T’ 
on their side. (Danish Ministry of Education 2008b, 89.) 
 
Although the ‘talk’ about truths in the above citations mainly refers to the 
political decision-making process, the document also takes a stance as to the 
epistemological nature of different value positions and ways of life: 
 
[N]o ideological or religious Truth can prove itself true. If it had such 
proof, it would be a matter of knowledge, not faith. (Danish Ministry 
of Education 2008b, 89.) 
 
Here the approach is similar to the Swedish one: knowledge is distinguished 
from belief.  
Tolerance too is discussed in the document. It is regarded as a necessary 
characteristic of citizens: “The demand is for different cultures to tolerate 
each other, even when it hurts to do so” (Danish Ministry of Education 
2008b, 89). But not everything should be tolerated: 
 
tolerance is a self-contradictory concept, which in its radical form is 
also self-destructive. Showing tolerance towards those who are 
intolerant allows intolerance to run unchecked and thus undermines 
tolerance.  
 
In sum, one could argue that in the Democracy Canon the main challenge to 
democracy in a multicultural society is (religious) faith that is in conflict with 
the values of that society. In this sense the Democracy Canon is in line with 
the ideas of the Danish government described in previous chapters. Cultural 
diversity should be accepted and tolerated within certain limits. Equality in 
cultural matters is a matter of non-discrimination, but not of cultural 








Means and content of ethical reflection 
In the Danish education system the only subject that is designed to enable 
pupils to develop their moral reflection is ‘Knowledge of Christianity’. One 
of the four central areas of proficiency and skills covered by the subject is 
‘Philosophy of Life and Ethics’ (Livsfilosofi og etik) (mentioned first on the 
list) (Danish Ministry of Education 2004, 10; see also Danish Ministry of 
Education 2009). The aim in this ‘area’ is to help students orient themselves 
in this world and find their own personal point of view in moral matters. 
According to the characterisation of the subject, the objective is to enable the 
student  
 
to find their personal approach regarding fundamental life questions 
and ethical dilemmas, and to act accordingly (Danish Ministry of 
Education 2004, 10). 
 
After nine years (in some cases ten years) of education, pupils are expected to 
have the ability to evaluate different ethical principles and to practice moral 
inference (Danish Ministry of Education 2004, 12; Danish Ministry of 
Education 2009, 4), and to understand how different norms and ethical 
principles are related to the values behind them (Danish Ministry of 
Education 2004, 16). Areas of ethical reflection are Christianity and non-
Christian religions, as well as other views (or perceptions) of life (Danish 
Ministry of Education 2009, 4).  
The question of the extent to which morality as a phenomenon is tied to 
religion remains open; the Fælles Mål (2004) does not offer any explication 
of this. However, one goal after the nine years of education is for the pupil to 
be “able to explain how the stories of the Bible are related to present-day 
values (Danish Ministry of Education 2004, 16). This suggests that the Bible, 
and the values of Christianity, form an important part of ethical reflection.  
 
 
Summary and discussion 
In this chapter I have explored various aspects of values education in Great 
Britain (England), the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. The first area of 
interest concerned those values that are explicitly stated as the guiding 
principles of education. We can observe interesting differences in the 
strategies applied in these four countries. As indicated in previous chapters, 
in each country the need for citizens to assimilate the society’s basic values is 
expressed quite clearly; the role of values in achieving cohesion is especially 
striking. In the documents issued to guide education, on the other hand, it is 
only in Sweden that the values of the society are presented in detail. 
Fundamental values are mentioned in the Education Act, the National 
Curriculum, and the Syllabuses. In England we saw that values are not that 




while the only reference in the National Curriculum is to four core values. 
Furthermore, these values are derived from an idea according to which all 
citizens share these in practice. Liberal values are not stressed, and for 
example gender equality is not mentioned at all. The Education Act of 
England does not refer to any values. This also applies to Denmark; 
important values are not explicitly referred to in the Education Act or in 
Fælles Mål for different subjects.  
Another interesting finding is that in both Denmark and Sweden 
Christianity is mentioned as an important element in the society’s value 
foundation. In this sense the definition of national identity also incorporates a 
religious element.16  
With regard to the second aspect of values education, the desired ethical 
attitude, I have argued that in Sweden the goal of education is a citizen who 
has deeply internalised and assimilated the society’s fundamental values. 
What this means is that the distinction between private and public values 
cannot be meaningfully maintained. In this sense, the interests of the state 
supersede for instance the desire of religious parents to inculcate illiberal 
values in their children.17 In the other countries this goal is not stated as 
clearly or strongly. Rather, students are expected to understand the 
importance of the society’s basic values in enabling co-operation among 
citizens. In England, we find the declaration that “education provides 
opportunities to promote moral development through enhancing the values 
identified within the National Curriculum, particularly valuing diversity and 
engaging in issues of truth, justice and trust” (QCA & DfES 2004, 14). In the 
Netherlands the point is stressed that students need to acquire “respect for 
generally accepted standards and values” (Bron & al. 2007, 81) and “insight 
in important values and standards” (Bron & al. 2007, 80). In Denmark the 
Democracy Canon states that the law should take precedence over any 
cultural practice (Danish Ministry of Education 2008b, 87) and that 
democracy obliges different ways of living to fit into a common system of 
order “so that politics triumphs over both religion and ideology” (Danish 
Ministry of Education 2008b, 89).  
What all four nations have in common is that the desired ethical attitude 
is essentially about possessing virtues that enable citizens to co-operate 
peacefully. In other words, after a successful education students would have 
the ability to tolerate or even empathise with others and their values. The key 
method in achieving this goal is giving students explicit knowledge about 
different ways of life. In some cases this may also entail a conflict of interests 
between the state and the parents. In the 1980s in the U.S. some 
                                                
16 We may recall that in the beginning of this chapter I referred to the findings of 
MacNeill (2000, 351), according to which in the syllabi of Britain, Germany and France 
the definition of national identity incorporates a religious element. 






fundamentalist and evangelical families in a rural Tennessee school district 
wanted to withdraw their children from reading classes in grades one through 
eight because the children were exposed to a variety of religious points of 
view evenhandedly, thus refuting the idea of their own particular religious 
beliefs as an absolute truth. The parents also argued that the textbooks 
contained objectionable issues, such as women’s liberation and evolution. 
(See Macedo 1995b, 470-471.) This kind of appeal on behalf of the parents 
would not be respected in any of the countries discussed here.  
We have seen that in England teachers are required to present 
controversial issues and discuss them with pupils. According to the 
Education Act, pupils should be “offered a balanced presentation of opposing 
views”. In Sweden a teacher is expected to “openly present and discuss 
different values, ideas and problems” (Swedish National Agency for 
Education 2006, 9). In the Netherlands and Denmark it is considered 
essential that pupils become acquainted with different ways of life; in 
Denmark, open discussion is a central approach to the treatment of moral 
matters.  
A conflict of interest between the state and the parents may also occur 
because the aim of moral education is for students to become independent in 
moral matters: they are encouraged (1) to engage in individual moral 
thinking, (2) to act according to the outcome of this independent reflection. 
According to R.S. Downie, independent thinking consists of three essential 
factors. Firstly, “[w]e begin to be independent of other people in our thinking 
to the extent that we base our beliefs on evidence or argument, as distinct 
from the testimony and authority of others”. Another factor that makes us 
independent-minded “is our ability to understand what we claim to have in 
our minds”. This simply means that we understand the relevant concepts and 
background information about the things we are talking about. Thirdly, “we 
are independent-minded to the extent that we are critical of the evidence or 
arguments for a belief”. (Downie 1988, 82-83; italics in original.) 
This, of course, contradicts the idea of blind reliance on the testimony of 
an author, for example the Bible or the leader of religious community. I am 
not claiming that all religions are antithetical to the idea of critical thinking or 
all religions are favouring traditional sources of authority. However, as 
presented in Chapter 1, there are parents who want to shelter their children 
from alien influences, and it seems that Muslims in particular are afraid of 
losing their children to the dominant culture and see “fundamental 
discrepancies between the values of dominant culture presented by schools, 
and the values emanating from religious and cultural traditions of the family” 
(Sakaranaho 2006, 316). My point is that the governments’ requirements put 
on pupils as future citizens trump these parental interests. The following 
normative statement by Macedo seem to be reality: 
 




field for all the religions and ways of life that people might adopt and 
sincerely espouse. That some people have a hard time passing on 
their convictions to their children in circumstances of peaceful, 
liberal diversity is not anything to apologise or (necessarily) adjust 
for. (Macedo 1995a, 227.) 
  
I have also been interested in exploring how morality as a phenomenon is 
tied to religion. Since RE is the subject where moral reflection is often 
systematically practiced, it was interesting to see to what extent moral 
reflection takes place through religious concepts. As a conclusion, it can be 
argued that religious values and examples serve as a starting point for the 
pupils’ moral reflection; in the upper grades, however, the point of view is 
expanded in the direction of philosophy. In this sense, religious education, as 
a school subject with a long history of passing on specific religious values 
and ethos, has changed in a direction that serves the needs of pupils living in 
a plural society.  
 
In summing up some of the strategic choices that protect the ‘secular’ from 
the impact of the ‘religious’, a few conclusions can be drawn. First of all, as I 
have shown, pupils are encouraged to be independent in moral matters. 
Different views of life are presented and discussed in the classroom, with the 
assumption that they may be seen as valid from one point of view but not 
necessarily from another. Thus the epistemic status of ‘knowledge’ 
concerning the norms and values promulgated by a particular view is 
considered relatively weak. In Sweden, the syllabus for RE states that 
“phenomena can be understood in different ways by different people, 
depending on, for example, gender, class and ethnic affiliation” (Swedish 
National Agency for Education 2008, 59). According to the Democracy 
Canon of Denmark, “no ideological or religious Truth can prove itself true” 
(Danish Ministry of Education 2008b, 89). In these cases ‘knowledge’ is 
monopolised as the property of a scientific procedure, based on the 
”Enlightenment-inspired secularist preoccupation with proof or evidence” to 
use the expression of Knott and Franks (2007, 24). 
It should also be noted that ‘knowledge’ given to pupils concerning 
different ways of life is assumed to have a high extrinsic value. It is believed 
to be an important component in creating tolerant and respectful citizens. The 
underlying assumption is that knowledge is useful for this purpose only if it 
is correct and provided in an impartial and neutral manner. For example, in 
the previous chapter we saw that there is doubt as to the ability of faith 
schools to prepare pupils for life in a multicultural society. One cause of this 
doubt was the fact that the ‘knowledge’ given in these schools was not 
believed to meet these conditions.  
What, then, are the consequences of all this? If pupils are encouraged 
and/or helped to develop critical intellectual skills with regard to the 





simultaneously enabled to diverge from thinking in terms of religion in 
general. We have seen that pupils are encouraged to approach issues related 
to religion with a scientific attitude. In this process the key words are 
‘knowledge’, ‘proof’, ‘evidence’, ‘discussion’ and ‘argumentation’. If the 
schools succeed in this aim, i.e. in implementing critical thinking in pupils, 
the ‘public’ or the ‘secular’ will be less easily exposed to what is seen as the 
ill effects of the ‘religious’.  
It is worth noting that in the schools of these four countries religion is 
regarded as a public matter, in the sense that issues relating to it are discussed 
openly. However, it is likely that everything that relates to this issue is treated 
more or less in scientific terms and using scientific language.  
One more point needs to be made before ending this chapter. In this 
thesis I have argued that regardless of their cultural backgrounds, citizens are 
expected to become alike with regard to their attitudes towards the society’s 
core values. In the ‘Summary and discussion’ section of Chapter 3 I argued 
that politicians seem to have a vision of a unified society with a strong 
‘centre’, in which citizens are bound together by moral bonds and 
responsibilities. In this chapter we have seen that the schools play an 
important role, not in only in reaffirming the collective feelings and ideas that 
constitute the society’s unity and its character but also in creating 
predictability and trust in citizens’ behaviour with regard to values. It should 
be noted, however, that despite this tendency to underline the importance of 
the essential core of the society, its plural nature is strongly present in the 
documents. Thus the reaffirmation of the national ‘personality’ of Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark is not only about passing on 
to pupils certain ‘old’ ideas about their nation’s character, but also about 












In this chapter I explore the recent debate over the appropriate content and 
organisation of religious education.1 Underlying this issue are two questions: 
(i) what kind of religious education on the one hand treats all pupils equally, 
on the other respects the rights of parents (or legal guardians) and children; 
(ii) what is seen as the purpose of religious education in present-day Europe. 
With regard to the first question, we have already seen that in all of the four 
countries studied here, policies with regard to cultural plurality in values 
education are based on an interpretation of equality that can be called 
‘difference-blind’; in other words, culturally defined identity does not 
legitimate any form of special treatment.  
In a number of European countries religious education is the only 
subject where pupils are divided into separate classes according to their 
religious affiliation (or lack of any such) (see Religious Education in Europe 
2007; Religion and Education in Europe 2007). Within this kind of 
arrangement we find both non-confessional approaches, as for example in 
Finland, and confessional ones, as for example in Spain and Greece. The 
obvious advantage of separating students according to their belonging (or not 
belonging) to a particular religious affiliation is that religious freedom, in this 
case the convictions of the pupils and/or their parents or legal guardians, are 
respected.2  
Within Europe, however, there are also countries where all pupils attend 
the same non-confessional religious education classes. Among the countries 
explored in this thesis, three – namely Britain (England), Sweden and 
Denmark – have unified religious education within the public school system. 
This arrangement has been criticised: the content of religious education either 
(i) includes something that is seen as inappropriate from some point of view 
(inclusion complaint) or (ii) excludes something that from some point of 
view is considered of crucial importance (exclusion complaint).  
                                                
1 Since the main purpose of this chapter is to explore what kind of content international 
actors suggest for religious education, I do not separately analyse the religious education 
given in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. 
2 By ‘conviction’ I mean not only theistic beliefs but also non-theistic and atheistic ones. 




In the case of inclusion complaints, for instance, some religious groups, 
as well as parents who do not belong to any denomination, want to have a 
greater or even an exclusive say in matters concerning their children’s 
religious instruction because the content deals with controversial issues.3 In 
the case of exclusion complaints, it is argued that this form of education does 
not – and cannot – accommodate diversity or adequately reflect the pluralistic 
nature of a modern society. According to one claim, the content of liberal 
democratic education excludes a large range of educational possibilities. 
Bonna Devora Haberman (1994), for instance, argues that one of the central 
areas of education should be dealing with substantive claims concerning the 
‘good life’. According to Haberman, democratic education provides 
insufficient content to enable the initiation of the children of certain religious 
groups into the culture endorsed by their parents:  
 
[o]ften this life-style might only be achieved through very intense 
procedures of study and initiation, depending on how drastically it 
differs from the common norms and behaviours of the surrounding 
culture. The education required for this process of passing on 
traditional life-styles from one generation to another is by definition 
education in content, the content consisting in the specific 
worldview, customs, etc., of each tradition. It is this genus of 
education which makes pluralism meaningful. (Haberman 1994, 
185.)  
 
Another type of exclusion complaint is that used in Finland in the debate over 
the appropriate organisation of religious education, in connection with the 
proposed revision of legislation on religious freedom. According to this 
argument, pupils have a positive right to receive instruction according to their 
denominational affiliation; given a unified approach, this right cannot be 
guaranteed (see Seppo 2003).4 
What these two types of exclusion complaints have in common is the 
idea that religious identity needs to be protected and/or cultivated. It may be 
asked under what conditions unified religious education respects the 
convictions of the pupils and of their parents or legal guardians. The issue of 
fair treatment, however, cannot be treated solely as a matter concerning the 
students and their parents alone; the state too has a legitimate interest in the 
content of education. Here we come to the second question set above: that 
concerning the purpose of religious education. As we have seen, nations set 
quite explicit standards as to what kind of citizens they want to have. The 
current political and ideological trend emphasises that all citizens should be 
                                                
3 I return to this issue later in this chapter. 
4 The starting point in the new law of religious freedom is to emphasise the pupils’ 
positive right to receive education in one’s own religion (Seppo 2003, 179; 




open to religious and philosophical plurality. As I have also argued, religious 
education in the schools, along with citizenship education (or civic 
education) plays a significant role in achieving this openness and tolerant 
atmosphere, as well as providing knowledge about different ways of life. It is 
thus understandable that states have become more interested in the content of 
religious education. Faith schools have faced criticism and are under 
surveillance precisely because it is not believed that they can achieve this 
goal; even worse, they may inculcate in children an intolerant attitude 
towards their fellow-citizens.  
If we look at the results of comparative studies in the field of religious 
education in Europe, we find considerable variation as to how the subject is 
organised and who is responsible for teaching it. Certain core trends can 
nevertheless be identified. One such trend is an increased openness to the 
religious and philosophical plurality of European societies. In those 
approaches that can be called non-confessional, non-religious options, for 
example atheism and secular humanism, have gained an equal footing with 
religious ones. The overall trend in non-confessional approaches is that the 
subject has moved in the direction of an ordinary, knowledge-based school 
subject. In the case of countries where the schools provide confessional 
religious instruction, one trend is that goals in this area have to be consistent 
with those set for schools in democratic and pluralistic societies. (Willaime 
2007, 62-64.) In other words, the teaching of religion has to comprise “those 
religious expressions compatible with human rights and a democratic 
ordering of society” (Willaime 2007, 64). 
However, as Jean-Paul Willaime (2007, 64) notes, what is characteristic 
of religious education, and especially of changes in its content or in how it is 
arranged, as well as possible changes in the future, is that “they raise tensions 
and engender conflicts”. These conflicts naturally arise when the interests of 
the state are inconsistent with those of some of its citizens. Such a conflict of 
interests is of course far more complex than the simple dichotomy outlined 
above, but fundamentally the issue comes down to a question of rights: what 
kind of content of religious education can a state legitimately impose in its 
curriculum, and what rights does it have in obligating pupils to attend 
religious education classes? On the other hand, to what degree can parents or 
legal guardians exercise their right to decide about their children’s education 
by appealing to their freedom of belief? In order to answer this question, in 
the following I evaluate the international legal framework with reference to 
the relevant cases that have created the framework for a legitimate content of 
religious education. I also find it useful to analyse what minimum 
requirements international actors have established for the content and 
organisation of religious education. The advantage of clarifying these issues 
is that these actors are free from the specific history of organising religious 
education and thus represent an independent point of view, but are 
simultaneously obligated to sustain to its utmost the principle of the fair 








The United Nations and the Council of Europe: human rights in 
relation to the content of religious education 
One of the most important and comprehensive treaties on human rights is the 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), from 1966. This treaty is legally binding, in the sense that it has 
been ratified by three quarters of all states in the world. It protects a large part 
of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 
1948, but also includes rights not mentioned in the Universal Declaration. 
The same is true of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), likewise from 1966. According to Martin 
Scheinin (2004, 189) these two covenants “represent a progressive 
development in the understanding of human rights”. Article 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion as follows: 
 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. The right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s own religion or beliefs may be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedom of others. 
4. The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for 
the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their 
own convictions. (United Nations 1966a.) 
 
It is paragraph 4 that includes a special clause regarding religious education. 
In article 13(3) of the ICESCR, the rights of parents or legal guardians with 
regard to religious and moral education are expressed as follows:  
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect 
for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to 
choose for their children schools, other than those established by the 
public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational 
standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure 
the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with 




It is the idea of conformity with parents’ or legal guardians’ convictions that 
sets limits to the content of religious education. The main point is that the 
parents or guardians have the right to have their children educated 
consistently with their own convictions and values.  
In 1993 the Human Rights Committee adopted a General Comment on 
article 18 of ICCPR (United Nations 1994). In this General Comment, the 
forms of religious education given within the public schools system are 
treated in more detail. The essential point is that the imparting of knowledge 
should not be regarded as a violation of parental rights: 
 
Article 18.4 permits public school instruction in subjects such as the 
general history of religions and ethics if it is given in a neutral and 
objective way (United Nations 1994, par 6).  
 
However, it is also stated that if public education “includes instruction in a 
particular religion or belief” that is “inconsistent with article 18.4”, the state 
must ensure that exemption from religious education classes is possible for 
those who do not adhere to this particular affiliation (United Nations 1994, 
par 6). In the Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching About Religion and 
Beliefs in Public Schools the point is understood as follows: 
 
[P]arents can object to the nature and content of the education and 
teaching given to their children where religious instruction is 
predicated upon, is intended to or has the effect of projecting the 
truth (or falsity) of a particular set of beliefs. In consequence, parents 
must have the right to withdraw their children from such forms of 
teaching. (OSCE 2007, 35.) 
 
In the General Comment the concept of ‘conviction’ is also clarified:  
 
Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well 
as the right not to profess any religion or belief (United Nations 
1994, par 2).  
 
As Carolyn Evans (2008, 453) writes, “[t]hese rights have a number of 
implications for teaching in religiously plural classrooms”. While coercive 
powers are needed and are legitimate in some cases (for example homework, 
behaviour, even a dress code), “when it comes to issues of religion ...  the 
coercive powers of the school are restrained and schools must ensure that 
education does not impair the student’s choice to ‘have or adopt’ a religion or 
belief of his or her choice.”  
This is an interesting interpretation, since in the previous chapter I 
showed that education might indeed be corrosive to their beliefs since pupils 
are encouraged to be critical and make use of evidence in their moral 
reflection. The essential point is that this parental right is interpreted through 




the frame of the fundamental principles of human rights; thus no complaint 
can be made against teaching that aims at enabling students to live according 
to these principles. One of these principles is tolerance. Ingvill Thorson 
Plesner (2004, 805) makes the point as follows: 
 
If the pupils do not get any common religious education or 
knowledge about each other’s beliefs and traditions, education may 
fail to secure a foundation for tolerance and the development of a 
global and interreligious solidarity.  
 
It is also worth noting that Article 29(1) of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (1989) leaves room for states to impose their central values. The 
article calls for the education of the child to be directed to the following 
goals: 
 
(b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations; 
(c) The development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own 
cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the 
country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she 
may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own; 
(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, 
in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, 
and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious 
groups and persons of indigenous origin. (United Nations 1989; 
italics added.) 
 
The same point is made in the ICESCR: 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant ... agree that education 
shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, 
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations 
and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of 
the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. (United Nations 
1966b, par 13.1.) 
 
In the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) enacted by the Council 
of Europe, religious freedom is protected by Article 9: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 





The content is essentially the same as that of Article 18 of the ICCPR. The 
limitation clause states that  
 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others (Council of Europe 1950, art 9.2). 
 
Educational rights are treated in Protocol No. 1: 
 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of 
any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to 
teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and 
philosophical convictions. (Council of Europe 1950, Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1.) 
 
 
Application of the principles of human rights to legal issues  
In this section I present legal issues that have been raised before the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights. 
My purpose is to find out what kind of content of religious education is 
considered to be in accordance with the Human Rights principles described 
in the previous section. With regard to the European Court of Human Rights I 
focus on four cases; all four were brought by parents who objected to the fact 
that the alternative of exemption of the child from the class was either not 
available or was too limited, even when the content of religious education 
violated their own or their child’s freedom of religion. In other words, the 
education offered included something that parents regarded as inappropriate.  
 
 
United Nations Human Rights Committee  
For the purpose of this thesis, one important case is Leirvåg versus Norway 
dealt with by the UN Human Rights Committee (hereafter referred to as 
UNHRC) in 2004. The case was essentially about whether the subject entitled 
“Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Education” (CKREE),5 
which is compulsory in Norwegian schools (with only limited possibility of 
                                                
5 In August 1997 the Norwegian government introduced CKREE as a new and mandatory 
religious subject in the Norwegian school system; it replaced the previous Christianity 
subject and life stance subject. The new subject provides for exemption only from certain 
limited segments of the teaching. (UNHRC 2004, par 2.3.)  
See e.g. Hagesæther & Sandsmark (2006) for further information on the public debate 
over the implementation of CKREE. 




exemption), violated the right of parents to secure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions 
(UNHRC 2004, par 14.2). 
The applicants (parents of school-aged children and members of the 
Norwegian Humanist Association) complained that the subject focused on 
Christianity in such a way that a neutral and objective approach could not be 
guaranteed. They claimed, for example, that their “children are immersed 
deeply into the stories contained in the Bible as a framework around their 
own perception of reality” (UNHRC 2004, par 3.2). 
The Committee’s decision was based on ICCPR article 18.4. It argued 
that education was not imparted in a “neutral and objective way”, even 
though the Education Act of Norway stipulates that “[t]eaching of the 
different topics shall be founded on the same educational principles”. The 
decision was based mainly on two arguments. First, CKREE was not 
considered a neutral subject since the object clause of the Education Act 
states that the object of “education shall be in agreement and cooperation 
with the home, to help to give pupils a Christian and moral upbringing.”6 
According to the Committee, this makes “it clear that the subject gives 
priority to tenets of Christianity over other religions and philosophies of life”. 
(UNHRC 2004, par 14.3.) Secondly, the Committee was of the opinion that 
the subject also included activities that “may be perceived as being of a 
religious nature” (UNHRC 2004, par 14.3), since it included practices such as 
“learning by heart of prayers, declarations of faith and religious texts, singing 
of religious hymns, attendance of religious service, excursions to churches, 
production of religious illustrations, active or passive roles in religious 
dramatizations, and receiving holy scripts as gifts and taking part in events in 
this context” (UNHRC 2004, par 9.18).  
Although a possibility for partial exemption was granted, the Committee 
found that the system did not protect the parents’ right to ensure that the 
religious and ethical teachings were in accordance with their beliefs: 
 
[E]ven in the abstract, the present system of partial exemption 
imposes a considerable burden on persons in the position of the 
authors, insofar as it requires them to acquaint themselves with those 
aspects of the subject which are clearly of a religious nature, as well 
as with other aspects, with a view to determining which of the other 
aspects they may feel a need to seek – and justify – exemption from 
(UNHRC 2004, par 14.6). 
 
                                                
6 This clause of the Education Act was amended in 2010. The new wording goes as 
follows: “Education and training shall be based on fundamental values in Christian and 
humanist heritage and traditions, such as respect for human dignity and nature, on 
intellectual freedom, charity, forgiveness, equality and solidarity, values that also appear 
in different religions and beliefs and are rooted in human rights.” (Regjeringen 2010, 




The Committee’s conclusion was that the system of exemption needs to be 
revised and that “[t]he State party is under an obligation to avoid similar 
violations in the future” (UNHRC 2004, 16). 
 
 
European Court of Human Rights setting the criteria for appropriate 
content of religious and values education 
In 1976 the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECHR) issued its 
decision on Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen versus Denmark, in which 
three Danish couples had objected to the fact that their children had to take 
part in sex education classes which were “contrary to the beliefs they hold as 
Christian parents” (ECHR 1976, par 44).7 According to the parents, the 
arrangement whereby sexual education was made compulsory was in 
violation of their parental rights as expressed in Article 2 of the Protocol No 
1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1976, par 44).  
The Court decided that obligatory sex education was not in violation of 
the parental right. While it acknowledged parental rights,8 the Court made it 
clear that the state too has a legitimate interest in education and should have 
the opportunity to convey information or knowledge. The Court pointed out 
that many subjects taught at school have “some philosophical complexion or 
implications”. (ECHR 1976, par 5.)  
The Court also declared, however, that the state has the obligation to 
make sure that “information or knowledge included in the curriculum is 
conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner”, and distinguished 
between the conveying of information versus indoctrination (ECHR 1976, 
par 53). 
It is important to note that in the case of ways in which information is to 
be given, objectivity is not regarded as a sufficient condition. Various 
positions should also be introduced, in a pluralistic and critical manner. 
Looking at it the other way around, we can see that the emphasis is on the 
pupils’ right to gain knowledge in a way that encourages their own reflection 
on the reliability of the different positions presented. In this sense, pupils are 
not regarded as extensions of their parents. 
The Court also discussed what kind of moral and value statements a 
                                                
7 While this case is not about what kind of content is appropriate in religious education 
classes, I find it worth presenting because the case is fundamentally about the extent to 
which parents have a say with regard to the content of their children’s education.  
8 The point is stated as follows: “Accordingly, the two sentences of Article 2 (P1-2) must 
be read not only in the light of each other but also, in particular, of Articles 8, 9 and 10 … 
of the Convention which proclaim the right of everyone, including parents and children, 
‘to respect for his private and family life’, to ‘freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion’, and to ‘freedom ... to receive and impart information and ideas’” (ECHR 1976, 
par 52). 




teacher can legitimately make.9 It noted that although the overall aim of sex 
education is to give students better information, there is the possibility that 
teachers may violate parental rights, since “appraisals of fact easily lead on to 
value-judgments” (ECHR 1976, par 54). The Court argued that if teachers try 
to warn pupils for example about “the excessive frequency of births out of 
wedlock, induced abortions and venereal diseases”, it is clear that “[t]hese 
considerations are indeed of a moral order”. However, the Court’s opinion 
was that even though the above examples easily fall under the rubric of moral 
statement, they are “very general in character and do not entail overstepping 
the bounds of what a democratic State may regard as the public interest”. 
According to the Court, the school fulfils its function by giving knowledge to 
enable students eventually “to take care of themselves” (ECHR 1976, par 
54). 
Thus here again the interests of the child are not equated to those of their 
parents. Rather, the society is seen as having an interest in protecting the 
child’s rights, to ensure that they receive the necessary capacities – in this 
case information – to live a good life. 
In Lena and Anna-Nina Angeleni versus Sweden No. 10491/83, the 
ECHR considered whether the state has the right to introduce one particular 
religious way of life in more depth than another in religious education 
classes. In the case, a mother and a daughter, whose life values were non-
Christian, claimed that their freedom of thought was being violated since the 
daughter was obliged to take part in religious education classes and thus was 
exposed to the Christian way of thinking (ECHR 1983, par 46). 
In its decision, the Court made it clear that “[i]n principle, teaching 
which provides information only cannot be regarded as being in conflict with 
the Convention or its Protocols”, and that  
 
The fact that the instruction in religious knowledge focuses on 
Christianity at junior level at school does not mean that the second 
applicant [the daughter] has been under religious indoctrination in 
breach of Article 9 of the Convention (ECHR 1983, par 49). 
 
The possibility of focusing on one religion more than another is also treated 
in the case Folgerø and others versus Norway (2007). The case is essentially 
the same as that of Leirvåg v. Norway dealt with by the UNHRC.10 In this 
case the ECHR held that the interests of the parents and their child cannot be 
equated. Children have the right to have knowledge about other ways of life, 
and parents do not have the right to keep their child “ignorant about religion 
                                                
9 Scholars who have analysed the Court’s decisions in the light of what rights parents can 
legitimately claim seem to have ignored this important issue. 
10 After the Norwegian Supreme Court rejected the claims of parents attempting to get an 
exemption from participation in CKREE, some of the parents appealed to the UN Human 




and philosophy in their education.” Furthermore, according to the Court, 
even though knowledge about Christianity has a greater part than knowledge 
about other religions and philosophies, the curriculum does not violate the 
principles of pluralism and objectivity. Reference is made to the case of Lena 
and Anna-Nina Angelini versus Sweden. (ECHR 2007a, 89.) 
Interestingly, in the same year the Court seems to have taken a step 
further with regard to the question of how the interests of a child are to be 
interpreted. In the case of Zengin versus Turkey (2007), a father and his 
daughter attempted to obtain an exemption from a compulsory course in 
religious culture and ethics, which they claimed was incompatible with the 
right to freedom of religion or belief, with the parental right to guide the 
education of their children, and with the principle of secularism under the 
Turkish constitution. The Court’s opinion was that education should 
encourage pupils to be autonomous and independent, including the field of 
religion or belief: 
 
the State, in fulfilling the functions assumed by it with regard to 
education and teaching, must take care that information or 
knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, 
critical and pluralistic manner, enabling pupils to develop a critical 
mind with regard to religion (see, in particular, paragraph 14 of 
Recommendation 1720 (2005) ...) in a calm atmosphere which is free 
of any misplaced proselytism (ECHR 2007b, par 52; italics added). 
 
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that one important object for schools is 
the “development and moulding of the character and mental powers of its 
pupils as well as their personal independence” (ECHR 2007b, par 55). One 
precondition for this is that pupils are openly introduced to various life 
stances: 
 
[I]n a democratic society, only pluralism in education enables pupils 
to develop a critical mind with regards to religious matters in the 
context of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. (ECHR 
2007b, par 69; italics added.) 
 
It is interesting that in this case the Court refers to the Council of Europe’s 
Recommendation 1720 (ECHR 2007b, par 52) since the Recommendation is 
in no way legally binding. The point seems to be that the Court interprets 
society’s interests through the lens of quite a recent development as to how to 
achieve a more tolerant and peaceful society. Part of this development is to 
establish new aims and standards for religious education. The 
Recommendation emphasises that pupils need to be given information about 
different life stances (Council of Europe 2005c, par 14.1) and to be provided 
with “educational tools”, so that they will not be influenced by “supporters of 
fanatical religious practice” (Council of Europe 2005c, 14.3).  




The above serves as an illuminating example of how the boundaries 
between the public domain and the private one are constantly being redrawn. 
In this case the European Court of Human Rights defends the central 
secularist principle of demanding proof or evidence. In the previous chapter I 
showed that in England, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark public 
education aims at enabling pupils to be independent, for example with regard 
to moral matters. The Court seems to have taken a step further. According to 
the ECHR, the State “must take care” (ECHR 2007b, par 52; italics added) 
that religious matters are discussed in such a way that pupils may develop a 
“critical mind with regard to religious matters” (ECHR 2007b, par 69). It can 
thus be said that the public sphere, representing non-religious ideas, 
penetrates into the private one in the sense that the ability to be critical is 
promoted in schools regardless of parental convictions or desires in this 
respect. Furthermore, if pupils are encouraged and/or helped to develop a 
critical mind with regard to the ‘knowledge’ provided by religions even on 
one particular issue, they are simultaneously enabled to see the epistemic 
status of the ‘facts’ provided by religions as weak in general. It should also 
be noted that critical thinking is a central component of (secular) science. 
 
To sum up the above: we can say, first of all, that education that includes 
worship or other religious practices is inconsistent with the principles of 
plurality, neutrality and objectivity, unless the possibility of exemption is 
provided, and that in a non-discriminatory manner. One important point is, 
however, that this in itself does not entitle a pupil to be fully exempted from 
religious education classes. Rather, it is considered that partial exemption is 
enough if the content is otherwise in accordance with the above-mentioned 
principles. 
Under what circumstances, then, can the content of education be said to 
be in accordance with the principles of neutrality, objectivity and plurality? It 
is important to note that the decisions arrived at in the above cases are based 
on the explicitly stated aims of education, and of religious education in 
particular, rather than on the content of education. In Leirvåg versus Norway 
the UNHRC decided that education was not neutral because according to the 
Education Act the object of education is to give pupils a Christian and moral 
upbringing. In Folgerø and others versus Norway the ECHR noted 
quantitative and qualitative differences in teaching Christianity and other 
religions or philosophies, and concluded that this made a uniform 
pedagogical approach, as mentioned in the Education Act, impossible (ECHR 
2007a, par 95). This decision is based on the wordings of the Education Act:  
 
In this regard, reference should be made to the stated aim in section 
2-4 (1) of the Education Act 1998 to “transmit thorough knowledge 
of the Bible and Christianity in the form of cultural heritage and the 
Evangelical-Lutheran Faith”. In contrast, no requirement of 




religions and philosophies. (ECHR 2007a, par 92.) 
 
In this case reference was also made to the curriculum, in which “half of the 
items listed referred to Christianity alone” (ECHR 2007a, par 89). However, 
the Court did not regard this as problematic, since it considered that in 
principle the state has a margin of discretion in defining a curriculum in 
conformity with its long tradition:  
 
The fact that knowledge about Christianity represented a greater part 
of the Curriculum for primary and lower secondary schools than 
knowledge about other religions and philosophies cannot, in the 
Court’s opinion, of its own be viewed as a departure from the 
principles of pluralism and objectivity amounting to indoctrination 
(ECHR 2007a, par 89, italics added). 
 
In Angeleni versus Sweden the ECHR decided that compulsory religious 
education did not violate parental rights. The Court based its view on the 
Compulsory School Curriculum (1980), according to which education was 
intended to be objective. Similarly in Kjeldsen versus Denmark, according to 
the Court, the documents that guide teaching show that the aim of sex 
education is to help pupils avoid certain problems in their future life. Finally, 
the interpretation of the Court in Zengin versus Turkey was that the intentions 
laid down in the syllabus for religious education “are clearly compatible with 
the principles of pluralism and objectivity” (ECHR 2007b, par 59). 
 
 
Appropriate content and organisation of religious education seen by 
the eyes of United Nations and the Council of Europe 
In 1994 the Commission for Human Rights of the United Nations assigned a 
task to Special Rapporteur Mr. Abdelfattah Amor: to examine the role of 
education in the promotion of tolerance, and to find ways in which education 
could contribute effectively to the fostering of tolerance.11 The Special 
Rapporteur conducted a survey to find out whether religious education, as a 
school subject at the primary and secondary school levels in different 
countries, contributes to a climate of tolerance and non-discrimination. The 
survey was based on a questionnaire which was sent to all UN member 
states; 77 countries responded. The answers were analysed and summarised, 
and the results were reported to the Commission on Human Rights at its 
Assembly in Geneva in 2001.  
One conclusion in Mr. Amor’s report is that there is “considerable 
variety in the approaches taken with regard to education in the field of 
religion and conviction” (Amor 2001, par 14). He criticised the fact that in 
                                                
11 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/18, February 25, 1994. 




many countries there is a ‘ghetto approach’, “based on exclusion” (Amor 
2001, par 14); by ‘ghetto approach’ he is referring to religious education that 
provides knowledge mainly about one particular religion, thus failing to serve 
the aim of tolerance and non-discrimination: “There is a need to get rid of the 
dichotomy ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a sense that all are members of mankind” and 
there is an urgent need to develop in students “self-awareness in such a way 
that the ‘others’ are indeed us’” (Amor 2001, par 22).  
Thus Amor called for an education that develops the child’s self-
understanding and understanding of others. Religious education lessons 
should be organised in such a way that students are kept together. This 
arrangement is what he calls an ‘integration approach’; it “would 
undoubtedly contribute to the development of a logic of integration and 
reiterate that the condition of mankind is One, despite its multiple 
representations” (Amor 2001, par 17). Amor argues that this kind of 
approach differs radically from theological instruction, which aims at getting 
acquainted with the basics of only one religious belief (Amor 2001, par 3). 
This all suggests that Amor sees religious education as having a 
potentially high extrinsic value in promoting tolerance among students and 
increasing their understanding of different world views, and that this 
opportunity should be made use of. 
 
In recent years the Council of Europe has shown a strong interest in religious 
education in Europe. Before going into details of its views as to the 
appropriate content of religious education, it is worth exploring the Council’s 
reactions to religion as a phenomenon in general. First, the Council sees 
religion as one possible source of conflict among citizens:  
 
There is a religious aspect to many of the problems that 
contemporary societies faces, such as intolerant fundamentalist 
movements and terrorist acts, racism and xenophobia, and ethnic 
conflicts (Council of Europe 1999, par 3; 2005c, par 2). 
 
This same view is also presented by Álvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for 
Human Rights of the Council of Europe from 1999 to 2006. In 2003 he stated 
that many of the crisis situations that he has encountered have been deeply 
rooted in cultural and religious tensions (Council of Europe 2005d, par 7). 
From this it should not be concluded, however, that it is religion itself that 
creates problems. Rather the point is that “[m]any tensions are the result of 
mutual ignorance and lack of respect” (Council of Europe 2005d, par 40).  
Secondly, the Council of Europe recognises that a significant change has 
taken place in the ways that religions and religious issues are present and 
represented in Europe. Along with secularisation, Europe has also witnessed 
”the growing strength of the Muslim communities” (Council of Europe 




become a central issue of debate in our societies” (Council of Europe 2007c, 
par 7). 
Thirdly, the Council of Europe’s view is that “religion is an important 
feature of European society” (Council of Europe 2007c, par 1), and needs to 
be welcomed and respected in all its plurality (Council of Europe 2007c, par 
3). It is also recognised that religions have made important contributions to 
the evolution of human thought:  
 
Religions have contributed as much to the creation of a humanist 
morality as to a religious one and, in Europe, secular codes of social 
conduct and secular moral attitudes owe much to the Judeo-Christian 
tradition (Council of Europe 2007d, par 66; italics in original).  
The Assembly observes moreover that the three monotheistic 
religions of the Book have common origins (Abraham) and share 
many values with other religions, and that the values upheld by the 
Council of Europe stem from these values (Council of Europe 2005c, 
par 12; italics added). 
 
In this sense, religions may have a lot to give to European societies. It is 
argued that religions may play a highly beneficial social role, for example in 
eliminating “much of what breeds religious extremism” (Council of Europe 
2007c, par 10). It is acknowledged that “religion, through its moral and 
ethical commitment, the values it upholds, its critical approach and its 
cultural expression, can be a valid partner of democratic society” (Council of 
Europe 1999, par 5). However, strict limits are set for what kind of influence 
different religions can have on citizens. First, religious values cannot 
contradict core European values: 
 
[I]n no circumstances can the rights of others or the collective rights 
of communities be limited in the name of a particular belief-system; 
and if there is ever a conflict between human rights and the dictates 
of faith, the State must always defend human rights (Council of 
Europe 2007d, par 68). 
 
Secondly, religious influence in public is limited: 
 
This danger of a drift beyond the perfectly proper interest of faith-
communities as citizens in the activities of their governments, in 
accordance with democratic principles, towards religious interference 
in what should be purely secular matters is a danger that should be 
resisted (Council of Europe 2007d, par 66; italics in original). 
 
The above can be viewed as a definition of the ‘appropriate’ place of religion 
in European societies. The point is that not only may religions enter into the 
public sphere, but that their voice is in fact welcomed. This is the case, 




however, only under certain conditions and in certain matters. First of all, an 
essential condition is that religions need to be committed to the values upheld 
by the Council of Europe. In addition, the Council makes it very clear that 
secular matters are no place for religious interference (Council of Europe 
2007d, par 66). One area where the voice of religions is welcome is that of 
values; they are able to promote the principles of human rights. It is worth 
noting that the Council speaks of “secular moral attitudes” (Council of 
Europe 2007d, 66), whose roots are in the Judeo-Christian tradition (Council 
of Europe 2005c, par 12). It seems to be the case that something that was 
originally religious by nature has become something entirely secular.  
In addition to promoting important values, in the eyes of the Council, 
religions can also be ‘beneficial’ in helping the civil authorities to combat 
religious extremism (Council of Europe 2007c, par 10).  
In sum: it can be said that religion is regarded as a phenomenon in which 
desirable qualities can be distinguished from undesirable ones. A religion is 
regarded as a legitimate partner of a democratic society only with respect to 
its desirable qualities.  
 
Now let us move on to the Council’s views on religious education. As 
indicated in Chapter 4, the Council considers that in order to avoid the 
problems created by religions there is a need for intercultural dialogue, and 
that the religious dimension is very important in this dialogue (see e.g. 
Council of Europe 2007c).12 The role of education is seen as vital in this 
effort. The Council also considers that the way to reach a more tolerant 
society is by giving information to all pupils about different beliefs. The first 
reference to the importance of giving information was in the Council’s 
Recommendation 1202 (1993), ‘On religious tolerance in a democratic 
society’. Interestingly, this recommendation stresses the need to understand 
one’s own religion and its ethical principles; this is seen as a prerequisite for 
true tolerance, as well as acting as a safeguard against indifference or 
prejudice (Council of Europe 1993, par 16 iv). Knowledge about other 
religions or beliefs is also regarded as important, and it is recommended that 
students achieve “a better and deeper understanding of the various religions” 
(Council of Europe 1993, par 16 iii).  
Six years later, in 1999, the emphasis has clearly shifted from learning 
about one’s own religion to stressing the importance of gaining knowledge 
about other religions. As a matter of fact, the idea of getting to know the 
basic principles of one’s own religion no longer occurs in the Council’s 
documents. What is now stated is that school curricula should “promote 
better understanding of the various religions” and that “religious instruction 
                                                
12 See e.g. Council of Europe (2007c, par 8): “The Assembly recognises the importance of 
intercultural dialogue and its religious dimension and is willing to help devise a 




should not be given at the expense of lessons about religions as an essential 
part of the history, culture and philosophy of humankind” (Council of Europe 
1999, par 10).  
It is also recommended that the Committee of Ministers invite the 
governments of the member states to  
 
promote education about religions and, in particular, to step up the 
teaching about religions as sets of values towards which young 
people must develop a discerning approach, within the framework of 
education on ethics and democratic citizenship (Council of Europe 
1999, 13 ii a) 
[and to] 
promote the teaching in schools of the comparative history of 
different religions, stressing their origins, the similarities in some of 
their values and the diversity of their customs, traditions, festivals, 
and so on (Council of Europe 1999, 13 ii b). 
 
In Recommendation 1720 ‘Education and religion’ (2005), we find a 
connection between pupils’ gaining knowledge about different religions and 
a healthy democracy. The Council argues that “a good general knowledge of 
religions and the resulting sense of tolerance are essential to the exercise of 
democratic citizenship” (Council of Europe 2005c, par 1), and that “young 
people lack the necessary bearings fully to apprehend the societies in which 
they live and others with which they are confronted” (Council of Europe 
2005c, par 3). One reason for this is the distorted perception, for example of 
Islam, given by the media (Council of Europe 2005c, par 4). 
A further change compared to the past is that a critical attitude should be 
developed in pupils:  
 
School is a major component of education, of forming a critical spirit 
in future citizens and therefore of intercultural dialogue. It lays the 
foundations for tolerant behavior, founded on respect for the dignity 
of each human being. By teaching children the history and 
philosophy of the main religions with restraint and objectivity and 
with respect for the values of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, it will effectively combat fanaticism. Understanding the 
history of political conflicts in the name of religion is essential. 
(Council of Europe 2005c, par 7.) 
 
What is interesting here is that a critical spirit is seen as a prerequisite for 
intercultural dialogue, increased tolerance and the ability to combat 
fanaticism.  
The Council also criticises some countries because they are “not 
devoting enough resources to teaching about religions” (Council of Europe 
2005c, par 9), and observes that in Europe in general there is a shortage of 




teachers qualified to give comparative instruction in different religions 
(Council of Europe 2005c, 10). 
In sum, we can say that in the Council’s opinion a proper religious 
education requires that pupils are given knowledge about different beliefs in 
a comparative manner and in a way that encourages their independent and 
critical thinking. The Parliamentary Assembly encourages the Committee of 
Ministers to ensure that every nation adopts this form of religious studies in 
all primary and secondary schools (Council of Europe 2005c, par 13-14).  
In 2007 the Council of Europe issued Resolution 1580, ‘The dangers of 
creationism in education’. According to the Resolution, the Parliamentary 
Assembly is concerned about “the possible ill-effects of the spread of 
creationist ideas within our education systems and about the consequences 
for our democracies” (Council of Europe 2007a, par 2). The Assembly points 
out that “[t]he prime target of present-day creationists ... is education” 
(Council of Europe 2007a, par 4), and wants to ban creationism from all 
schools.  
In the Resolution, the parents’ right to choose a suitable content for their 
children’s education is challenged by two arguments. First of all, students’ 
minds are to be protected from a distorted view about the reality: 
 
There is a real risk of serious confusion being introduced into our 
children’s minds between what has to do with convictions, beliefs, 
ideals of all sorts and what has to do with science. An “all things are 
equal” attitude may seem appealing and tolerant, but is in fact 
dangerous. (Council of Europe 2007a, par 7.) 
 
Secondly, there are high public stakes involved. Banning creationism is 
linked to maintaining a healthy democracy: 
 
The teaching of all phenomena concerning evolution as a 
fundamental scientific theory is therefore crucial to the future of our 
societies and our democracies. For that reason it must occupy a 
central position in the curriculums, and especially in the science 
syllabuses, as long as, like any other theory, it is able to stand up to 
thorough scientific scrutiny. (Council of Europe 2007a, par 15.) 
 
What is at stake here is made explicit in the Parliamentary Assembly’s 
Report (Doc. 11375) that preceded this Resolution: 
 
By denying proven facts, the creationist ideas do not contribute to the 
transformation of societies but to making them become archaic. The 
creationists are in fact supporters of a radical return to the past, 
which could prove particularly harmful in the long term for all our 
societies. This is therefore a crucial issue. (Council of Europe 2007b, 




The point is that society should be protected from close-minded citizens who 
are not willing to weigh the evidence but rather rely on the authority of 
religious leaders. Thus “it is necessary to prevent belief from opposing 
science” (Council of Europe 2007b, par 1).  
The Parliamentary Assembly, therefore, urges the member states and 
especially their education authorities to: 
 
19.1. defend and promote scientific knowledge; 
19.2. strengthen the teaching of the foundations of science, its history, its 
epistemology and its methods alongside the teaching of objective scientific 
knowledge; 
19.4. firmly oppose the teaching of creationism as a scientific discipline on 
an equal footing with the theory of evolution and in general the presentation 
of creationist ideas in any discipline other than religion; 
19.5. promote the teaching of evolution as a fundamental scientific theory in 
the school curricula. (Council of Europe 2007a.) 
 
The point of view expressed by the Council of Europe is an example of how 
secular ideals are protected from unwanted effects exerted by the ‘religious’; 
more precisely, by the information that some religions provide. In this case, 
‘scientific knowledge’, representing the secular or non-religious sphere, is 
contrasted to religious belief; the latter represents something that is not only 
imprecise but that is categorically wrong with regard to the question of the 
origin of the world. In other words, science holds a monopoly, as the only 
‘camp’ that can produce valid knowledge at least in this matter. This stance is 
non-negotiable. It is thus not an exaggeration to state that in the eyes of the 
Council of Europe, banning creationism is a ‘sacred concern’. 
The view of the Council also allows us to draw conclusions as to the 
epistemic requirements underlying the argumentation involved in the 
democratic decision-making process. The Council considers that “scientific 
theory is ... crucial to the future of our societies and our democracies” 
(Council of Europe 2007a, par 14) and that “[s]cience is a prominent player 
and plays a big and active role in this process of the evolution and 
transformation of societies” (Council of Europe 2007b, par 80; italics in 
original). 
This can be understood to mean that the citizens’ willingness to accept 
the outcome of science, i.e. facts, is seen as a necessary condition for the 
existence of a healthy democracy. Thus, if for example religious citizens 
want to further their cause successfully, they are ‘forced’ to enter the secular 
arena, where an appeal to a ‘moral ought’ dictated by a supernatural entity is 
not regarded as a valid claim. All citizens are expected to use ‘secular 
language’ by which I mean that they need to use arguments to which all 
persons have equal access. The underlying idea that rational citizens will 
accept arguments that are grounded in proven facts. 




Another important point is that according to the Resolution children are 
in need of protection from the possible ill-effects of an upbringing that aims 
at inducing them to believe in creationism or to adopt the position that there 
are many equally valid points of view: “[A]dopting a denialist stance on 
scientifically proven theories constitutes a brake on education and the 
intellectual and personal development of thousands of children” (Council of 
Europe 2007b, par 80). In this sense, creationism, representing a religious 
way of thinking, is treated with a relatively hostile attitude. 
It is also worth noting that in the view of the Council, at least in this 
particular matter, the schools should represent solely the secular ‘camp’. 
Looking at this from another angle, the schools are expected to encourage 
their pupils to be critical with regard to religions’ ability to provide 
knowledge.  
 
In 1999 the Council of Europe appointed Álvaro Gil-Robles as 
Commissioner for Human Rights. In 2000 Gil-Robles started a series of 
dialogues with representatives of religious communities, to examine the 
contribution that religions can make to the maintaining of a democratic state 
that respects the rule of law and fundamental freedoms. The results of these 
dialogues are presented in the document ‘Dialogue of the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights with the religious communities’ (2004).  
The fourth seminar, held in Malta in 2004, was titled ‘Religion and 
education: The possibility of developing tolerance through the teaching of 
religious facts’. Already in the previous seminar at Louvain-La-Neuve, the 
participants saw a need to “establish a specific training centre in which a 
methodology for integrating human rights principles into religious education, 
and for integrating the religious dimension into general education, could be 
developed” (Gil-Robles 2004, 42, par 6). One purpose of the Malta seminar 
was to discuss the possibility of creating a common programme for religious 
education.  
The discussion at the seminar focused primarily on how religious 
education can contribute to the promotion of awareness of cultural heritage, 
“in which religions play an integral part”, and to the promotion of tolerance 
in post-modern societies (Gil-Robles 2004, 58). The former goal was 
regarded as important because, according to the participants, there is a lack of 
awareness of the cultural heritage in European societies. The participants 
were especially concerned about the fact “that religious institutions have 
ceased to transmit their religious cultures to new generations”. They agreed 
that the prime place for cultural revitalisation is the school. It was also 
recognised that it is impossible to combine “the individual histories of 
religions in a single unified approach”, since “national and traditional 
components remain central to the re-appropriation of our religious heritages”. 
(Gil-Robles 2004, 58.) However, despite this the participants considered that 




[I]t is incumbent on schools, whether public or private, to include 
other aspects of religious cultures in its teaching, such as their 
history, ethics, philosophy, artistic manifestations, literature and 
forms of social organisation. Such subjects will contribute to an 
understanding of religious beliefs as they are subjectively 
experienced by their congregations.  
 
With regard to the question of other minimum requirements as to the 
content of religious education, the conclusion of the seminar was that 
“the universal values and wisdom inherent in each religion” should 
be presented. This was seen as a prerequisite for “a common ground 
for dialogue between different religions, respecting, and in harmony 
with, human rights”. (Gil-Robles 2004, 59.) 
 
In sum, the participants shared the same ideas as the Council of Europe: 
(i) that human rights must be taught, as basic values, and (ii) that students 
need to gain knowledge about other ways of life, as a prerequisite for 
dialogue among citizens and for a more tolerant society. The participants also 
shared the view of the Council of Europe and of Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, 
representing the United Nations, that religious education can, and perhaps 
should, be arranged in such a way as to integrate all pupils in the same 




As the legal cases presented and discussed above show, it is legitimate to 
organise religious education as an integrated approach, on condition that the 
information is presented in an objective and neutral manner. With regard to 
the dimension of values, the state has the right to instil in pupils its own 
values. Problems arise when a state tries, within this kind of approach, to 
impose its own religious heritage too heavily on students. The two legal cases 
against Norway serve as illuminating examples of this.  
Three of the four countries that I have been focusing on in this thesis, 
namely Great Britain (England), Sweden, and Denmark, have integrated non-
confessional religious education. In all three countries, a significant 
weighting is given to Christianity.13 In England and Denmark the pupil’s 
right to full exemption is protected by law,14 while in Sweden only partial 
                                                
13 It is worth noting that in Denmark the name of the subject is ‘Knowledge of 
Christianity’ (Kristendomskundskab). 
14 The Education Act (1996) in the UK permits “students at the request of their parents, to 
be wholly or partly exempted from the religious education” (section 389). In Denmark the 
Folkeskole Act states that “[i]f requested, a child shall be exempted from participation in 
the instruction in the subject of Christian studies, when the person who has custody of the 
child submits a written declaration to the head teacher of the school to the effect that 




exemption is possible. This gives cause to ask: in what respect does religious 
education in Sweden differ from that in Norway, which has been seen as 
violating parental freedoms?  
Bjørn Gundem and Berit Karseth (1998) have analysed policy texts 
issued by the Royal Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs of 
Norway and the public debate concerning the curriculum, in order to find out 
how the curriculum adopted in 1997 reflects Norway’s national culture or 
identity. According to them, “the underlying assumption in the curriculum is 
that personal identity develops through a common base of knowledge, culture 
and values”; they also conclude that “this perspective relies on a 
monocultural ideal of the society” (Gundem & Karseth 1998, 10). They argue 
that “at a time when the need to create a scope for pluralism is evident”, there 
is a strong tendency toward securing the common cultural heritage (Gundem 
& Karseth 1998, 8). They use Jane Franklin’s expression ‘nostalgic 
community’ to describe Norway’s policy (Gundem & Karseth 1998, 10).  
I have argued in this thesis that the national heritage is highly valued in 
Sweden as well. One significant difference between the two countries, 
however, is that in Norway Christianity, as part of the national culture, is 
more profoundly tied in with educational goals – and in what can be seen as a 
unique manner. According to the Core Curriculum (1997),  
 
The Christian faith and tradition constitute a deep current in our 
history – a heritage that unites us as a people across religious 
persuasions (Royal Ministry of Education, Research and Church 
Affairs 1997, 7; italics added). 
 
It is worth mentioning that Christianity is strongly present in the illustration 
of Core Curriculum. It is also stated that “education must be based on the 
view that all persons are created equal” (Royal Ministry of Education, 
Research and Church Affairs 1997, 7; italics added). 
The role of Christianity is evident when the society’s values and their 
instilling in pupils are discussed in the Core Curriculum. The text first states 
that the fundamental values of the society are the values of Christianity and 
humanism. It then continues: “[e]ducation must ... authenticate society’s 
ideals and values and enliven them so that they become a potent force in 
people’s lives”. In this process, religious education can be used as a tool: 
 
These [ethical principles and norms] in turn can be elucidated by 
Biblical similes, but also by illustrations from other religions, from 
history, fiction, biography, and from legends, parables, myths and 
fables. (Royal Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs 
                                                
he/she will personally assume the responsibility for the child's religious instruction” 







But if we look at these “unwithering values” that are to guide Norwegians’ 
conduct (Royal Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs 1997, 
7), there are actually no differences from Sweden. Norway’s Education Act, 
the Core Curriculum and the Syllabus for Religious Education contain the 
following explicitly stated values: equality, human rights, inviolability of 
human dignity, rationality, solidarity, selfless behaviour, tolerance, and 
honourable and courteous behaviour (Royal Ministry of Education, Research 
and Church Affairs 2008; 2005; 1997). The main difference between Norway 
and Sweden is that the same values that in Sweden are regarded as 
fundamental democratic values are seen in Norway as Christian and 
humanistic ones. 
We can ask, then, why Christianity is emphasised in Norway. According 
to Geir Skeie (2006a, 22), one of the main reasons can be traced to concerns 
about the disintegration faced by post-modern society: 
 
[t]he present remedy is partly a recognition of diversity, but mixed 
with a ‘cultural’ and ecumenical version of Christianity, used as a 
kind of ‘civil religion’, putting emphasis on national heritage and 
moral values. 
 
The point is that Norway takes a monoculturalistic approach in order to deal 
with the situation of cultural plurality. If this kind of ‘thinking’ also guides 
the educational system, it is certainly difficult to maintain neutrality. 
 
What, then, can be said about the purpose of religious education? In the light 
of the views of international actors, one conclusion to be drawn is that 
religious education is an important instrument for achieving a more tolerant 
society. The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur Abdelfattah Amor argued 
that there is a need to get rid of the dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, and to 
develop both the child’s self-understanding and his or her understanding of 
others. (Amor 2001, par 22). In the case of the Council of Europe, the starting 
point was that pupils need to be prepared for a responsible life in a free 
society in a spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, gender equality and 
friendship among all peoples. The Council suggests the development in the 
field of religious education of certain ‘basic modules’, that can then be 
applied in various educational systems. (Council of Europe 2005c.) The goal 
is that pupils should receive education in religious and secular diversity and 
be encouraged to enter into intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. The 
Council has also appointed a group of specialists in religious and intercultural 
education, to produce a teacher’s guide on how to deal with religious 
diversity. The resulting publication, Religious Diversity and Intercultural 
Education: A reference book for schools, was issued in 2007. 
What we have seen in this chapter shows that when it comes to 




education, religious groups cannot claim uniqueness for themselves in the 
sense that their code provides an exclusively reliable guide to the good life. 
First, human rights are presumed to transcend any individual privilege to 
which persons may be entitled by virtue of their membership in a group or a 
society. Secondly, pupils should be provided with tools to combat fanatical 
religious interpretations. This means that a critical attitude needs to be 









Summary and discussion 
 
 
Main conclusions revisited 
In this work I have explored the strategies used in Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, both in the past and currently, in dealing 
with cultural plurality. In addition, I have investigated ways in which the 
educational system in these countries is harnessed to produce tolerant citizens 
and to contribute to the creation of a more harmonious and cohesive society. 
With regard to education, I have also examined the content of values 
education to determine what kinds of ethical attitudes are cultivated in pupils, 
and have analysed recommendations by the Council of Europe and decisions 
handed down by two international courts concerning the appropriate nature of 
religious education. 
All of these issues have been discussed in relation to a general question: 
what is considered the ‘appropriate’ place of religion in contemporary 
Europe? This question was subdivided into three more specific ones: 1) to 
what extent is space allotted to religion in the state and its public affairs 
(especially in the field of education); 2) what expectations and 
responsibilities are placed on citizens in general and on religious citizens in 
particular; and 3) how is the domain of the ‘secular’ preserved from the 
impact of that of the ‘religious. 
In Chapter 2 I focused on the question of how the national and regional 
identity is imagined and articulated in policy documents and statements 
issued by politicians. The focus of my enquiry was on the imagination of the 
national self. I was interested in national identity, because the way in which 
politicians imagine and articulate the nation can be viewed as one 
manifestation of what can be identified as the overall policy of treating 
cultural plurality. The notion of identity also provides an interesting arena for 
the discussion of the nature and characteristics of a given society.  
The analysis of the empirical material was based on the idea that the 
articulation of a national identity can be considered an epistemological 
reality, a perspective on the world (Brubaker et al. 2004, 45); in other words, 
such an articulation provides information as to how reality is perceived and 
constructed by politicians in this particular matter. I started with the 
assumption that in a multicultural nation the identity of a community is 




defined in such a way as to allow as many people as possible to identify with 
it. I also introduced a normative claim, according to which national identity 
should be defined in such a way as to include all its citizens (Parekh 2000, 
233). My purpose was to find a common denominator, sameness, and to 
answer why precisely a given sameness is regarded as a necessary ingredient 
of a national identity.  
What I found was that in each nation, as well as in the Council of 
Europe and European Union, the core of identity consists of values.1 In each 
nation politicians talk about ‘our values’; but when we compare these values, 
we find that they are strikingly similar. It is thus more appropriate to speak of 
democratic, liberal and/or human rights values.2 Another interesting finding 
was that in some of the documents explored human rights values and 
humanist morality are seen as a continuum, with its origin in Christianity or 
in the roots of the three monotheistic religions.  
I connected articulations of national identity to a theory proposed by 
Triandafyllidou (1998), according to which in the process of creating a 
national identity a significant role is played by the ‘other’. I argued that one 
reason for the need to stress the importance of a society’s core values is, 
inevitably, the belief that the values of some religions, above all those of 
Islam, are perceived as threatening the sameness or uniformity that is 
believed to exist among the majority.  
I also asked what is required of citizens to fit into a given definition of 
national identity, and argued that the main marker of inclusion or exclusion is 
attitude. All citizens are expected to have a positive attitude towards the 
society’s values. Furthermore, in some cases it is expected that these values 
will take precedence over individual cultural values. In the case of a conflict 
between the values of the society and those that are culturally driven and 
privately held, there is nothing to negotiate. In this sense, national policies 
can be expressed as “When in Rome, do as the Romans do”.  
I further explored the question whether, in the documents analysed, 
religion serves as a marker of distinction as to who is regarded as a 
‘respectable’ member of the society. In this connection, I referred to the study 
by Bauder & Semmelroggen (2009) concerning the parliamentary debate 
over immigration in Germany. According to Bauder & Semmelroggen (2009, 
14) “[t]he new perspective of German identity excludes immigrants based on 
                                                
1 In addition to values, language was also often mentioned as an important element of 
national identity. 
2 According to Alasdair MacIntyre, the concept of human rights has its origin in the late 
eighteen century in the idea of ‘the rights of a man’. At that time rights were defined 
negatively, i.e. as rights in which no one is allowed to interfere (MacIntyre 2004, 93-94). 
Turner (2011, 232) writes that the philosophical foundation for the development of the 
rights of man can be traced to Locke’s defence of tolerance and Leibniz’s idea of 
respecting other cultures. The first formulation of the notion of individual rights, 




their religion rather than their ‘ethnic’ origin.” I referred to the idea of the 
Christian cultural milieu, which marks the majority as ‘us’, and suggested 
that while this milieu includes illiberal interpretations of the Christian faith, 
religion might serve as a reason in making the difference.3 However, the 
material analysed does not offer strong evidence in favour of such a view. As 
noted in Chapter 3, in the documents and statements issued by politicians, 
religion, in particular Islam, is often referred to as an example of something 
unwanted in a society. In other words, some religions are ‘accused’ of 
upholding attitudes that conflict with the society’s fundamental values. 
Indeed, in this sense national identity excludes citizens based on their 
religion. This, however, is only half story: when it comes to explicitly 
articulated definitions of identity or solutions to a perceived problem, namely 
how to achieve a more cohesive society, it is clearly attitude that serves as a 
marker of belonging. Citizens are expected to fulfil certain responsibilities, 
including a respect for the society’s core values and an attitude of good will 
towards other members of society. Thus no one is excluded due to religious 
affiliation as such. In principle, Muslims who assimilate their responsibilities 
as citizens are regarded as respected members of a society. 
I asked why it is so important that the society’s values need to be not 
only accepted but also internalised, as personally binding in some respects. I 
wrote that for the majority of citizens within Europe, the significance of core 
values does not lie merely in providing a framework enabling peaceful co-
operation among citizens, as suggested for example by Rawls. In Chapter 2 
introduced a global survey by Inglehart and Baker (2000), according to which 
Europe has a long historical tradition of cultivating democratic values and 
these have been deeply internalised by citizens. It can thus be argued that if 
citizens act according to these values, this creates a sense of security and 
belonging among people. From this perspective, the negative attitudes toward 
Muslim women wearing a hijab or niqab become more understandable.4 The 
veil can be seen as a symbolic negation of respect for fundamental 
democratic values, namely individual liberty and gender equality.  
In Chapter 3 I extended the discussion of the importance of the society’s 
core values, arguing that in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Denmark mass immigration has led to fears of fragmentation and 
segregation; this in turn has led to a need to reaffirm not only the nation’s 
existence but its unity and character as well. Referring to Durkheim’s theory 
of religion, I argued that in all these nations politicians seem to envisage a 
                                                
3 It may be recalled that in Chapter 1 I referred to Loraine Sheridan’s (2002) study, 
according to which religion seem to trigger both implicit racism and general 
discrimination. However, what is interesting is that after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11 in 2001, Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus reported an increase in their 
experiences of implicit racism, while Christians and Jews reported a decline in such 
experiences. 
4 This is not to say that negative attitudes are acceptable. 




society built upon the idea of citizens forming a single moral community. 
Despite the fact that cultural plurality is seen as something that should be 
valorised, the goal is nevertheless a strong civic sphere. At the heart of this 
lies a respect for values and for a sense of solidarity.5 Since it is stressed that 
all citizens, without exception, should internalise these core values and have 
faith in them, in the sense that they provide mutual trust and predictability, it 
can be argued that these values form the sacred. By this I mean two things. 
First, core values form a framework or social structure that exists 
independently, outside the individual, while at the same time exerting a 
significant moral force over the lives of citizens. This is because values are 
experienced as obligatory and binding.6 Secondly, the debate over values 
shows that the society’s core values are seen as untouchable, in other words 
as something special, beyond any possibility of change or compromise.  
One pervasive question in this work has been this: how can – and should 
– citizens be treated in an equal manner in general and in education in 
particular. In Chapter 3 I introduced two theories, one by Kymlicka, the other 
by Taylor, that were in favour of the idea that in the name of equal treatment 
cultural minorities should receive special rights in order to ensure their 
survival. One finding in the empirical material was that in all four nations the 
strategy of integration leaves the maintenance of religious minority cultures 
and the upholding of religious identity to individuals. No extra institutional 
support is provided for this purpose. Equality is interpreted as meaning that 
all citizens are granted equal political rights. In this sense religion is regarded 
as a private matter.7 Thus the term ‘religion-blind’ treatment is applicable. In 
Chapter 1 I presented Soysal’s (1994) view, according to which the rights of 
citizens are no longer linked to national or cultural identity but to the fact that 
one is a human being. This claim is also applicable to the treatment of 
cultural diversity. The leading principle, as already noted, is that all citizens 
are entitled to exactly the same rights.  
                                                
5 According to Durkheim, unity among members of a certain group “can be achieved only 
by means of meetings, assemblies, or congregations in which individuals, brought into 
close contact, reaffirm in common their common feelings” (Durkheim 2001, 322). My 
point is that even if citizens are not physically brought into close contact, they are 
expected to share similar values and fulfil their responsibilities as citizens. 
6 The essential point in Durkheim’s theory of religion is the division of the universe into 
two mutually exclusive parts, the sacred and the profane. The dichotomy between the 
individual and the collective plays a crucial role in this distinction.  
7 It is worth noting that in some respects religion is also a public matter. In the 
Netherlands culturally founded identity is a matter of public recognition, and religion 
plays an important role in public institutions since the government finances schools, 
hospitals, media channels, social work etc. on a religious basis. (Koopmans 2003, 4.) In 
Britain, for example, the Jews and the Sikhs are recognised as ethnic groups, and are 
entitled to certain group-specific rights (Barry 2001). However, this is a rather unusual 




It is also worth noting that in the course of history none of these 
countries has applied a policy that could be called ‘active multiculturalism’ in 
Bleich’s sense of the term.8 In the case of selected policies from the 1990s, 
suggestions of the kind offered by Kymlicka and Taylor are not seen by 
political actors as viable future solutions. In the documents analysed these 
ideas are not even discussed. In the case of the Netherlands and Sweden, 
earlier policies, i.e. those in which immigrants were defined by their 
collective identities, have since come to be regarded as having caused 
problems to both sides: to immigrants and to the majority population. In 
Chapters 2 and 3 I pointed out that in Sweden it was admitted in the 1980s 
that one bedrock of the immigrant and minority policy, the principle of 
‘freedom of choice’, had led to false interpretations on the part of some 
immigrants as to kind of what cultural practices are legitimate. Thus the state 
needed to clarify what norms should be accepted and followed by all citizens. 
Furthermore, in the 1990s it was admitted that the immigrant and minority 
policy had caused a breakdown of the population into ‘us and ‘them’, thereby 
contributing to the rise of alienation in many immigrants and their children. 
In addition, many majority citizens saw this kind of arrangement as a threat 
to the Swedish national character. (Riksdagen 1997, 18.) In the Netherlands, 
the ethnic minority policy implemented in 1980s was changed in 1990s 
because the integration of immigrants was not successful. 
In tracing the policies applied in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Denmark in dealing with cultural plurality, I have made use of models 
presented by Bleich, Alexander, Hartmann and Gerteis. I have argued that all 
these nations’ attempts to create a strong civic sphere have necessarily meant 
a certain degree of acculturation and assimilation. However, I have also 
argued that the material does not indicate that the aim has been to erase 
difference at all levels. While citizens are expected to adopt a kind of meta-
identity, a civic identity, transcending their cultural identities, they are free to 
keep their cultural and other customs as long as these do not violate the 
society’s ideals. It should also be noted that in the documents from all four 
countries the plural nature of the society is strongly present. This holds true 
both for documents concerning the management of plurality at a general level 
and for those dealing with educational arrangements. In this sense, the 
reaffirmation of national character is not only about adhering to ‘old’ ideas 
about what that character is but also about acknowledging a (new) plural 
identity. 
With regard to the models presented by Bleich, Alexander, Hartmann 
and Gerteis we can infer that they are not applicable as such to any of the 
four countries. No current policy strongly resembles any of the typologies 
                                                
8 According to Bleich (1998, 83), active multiculturalism means that the state is active in 
attempting to create a new national culture which encompasses minority as well as 
majority cultures and perspectives. 




given. The contribution of the models to this thesis has been in providing 
interesting questions and points of view for the analysis of the former and 
current policies practiced in Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, 
and in offering a perspective in evaluating other scholars’ conclusions as to 
the kinds of policies European nations are currently applying.  
To sum up the strategic choices presented above: it can be argued that in 
Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark there has been an increased 
need to monitor the normative level of cultural plurality: in other words, 
citizens’ thoughts and attitudes as to what is worthwhile, what is right or 
wrong, and other questions concerning values.  
 
With regard to the question of how the educational system is harnessed to 
produce tolerant citizens and to contribute to the creation of a more 
harmonious and cohesive society, I began by focusing on politicians’ 
attitudes towards faith schools. I showed that in Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark there has been rising doubt as to whether 
faith schools can promote in pupils the virtues and the necessary knowledge 
that are regarded as a prerequisite to the achievement of a cohesive society. 
As a consequence, the activities of some faith schools in this respect have 
been monitored carefully. Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark have also 
initiated the revision of school curricula. In the first decade of this 
millennium, ‘citizenship education’ has been introduced in Britain and the 
Netherlands as a new, compulsory subject, while in Denmark special 
programs have been established to help pupils to function successfully and 
peacefully in a multicultural society. In Sweden a subject under the name of 
‘Civics’ already existed; its goals are similar to those of citizenship education 
in Britain and the Netherlands. 
It can thus be argued that the public stake in the field of education has 
been recognised, and that previous actions toward creating tolerant and 
understanding citizens are now seen as insufficient. The measures taken are a 
concrete example of nations’ increased need to control what kind of attitude 
is cultivated in future citizens.  
At the beginning of Chapter 4, I introduced scholarly views as to 
whether or not faith schools can produce social cohesion. It is interesting to 
note that the investigations9 carried out in faith schools in Britain and the 
Netherlands seem to confirm the arguments offered by Burtonwood, Short 
and Lenga, according to whom what counts is not that pupils with different 
cultural backgrounds are in direct contact with each other; rather, it is the 
curriculum of the school, and of course its successful implementation in 
practice, that is important. Politicians and the public, however, seem to share 
                                                
9 Ofsted: ‘Independent faith schools’ (2009); Inspectorate of Education: Islamic Schools 
and Social Cohesion (2002); the Dutch Secret Service (BVD): The Democratic Legal 





the opinion of those scholars, namely Kymlicka, Moller-Okin, Reich and 
Jackson, who perceive a need to increase interaction among pupils with 
different cultural backgrounds.  
Chapter 4 concluded with a brief discussion of the possible pitfalls of 
civic education and of the inculcation of the society’s values in pupils. I 
found that although curricular choices may be accused of not presenting 
diversity in an appropriate way, the programs include giving pupils 
information about different ways of life as well as encouraging them to take a 
positive attitude towards such ways of life and to engage in dialogue with 
pupils with a different cultural background. The point is that cultural plurality 
is not silenced but is treated as a public matter. 
In Chapter 5, I analysed the nature of values education in the four 
countries. One interesting finding was in the framework guiding schooling 
arrangements the aim that pupils should internalise society’s values was not 
explicitly articulated, except in Sweden. All four countries, however, shared 
the view that the desirable ethical attitude is essentially about possessing 
virtues that enable citizens to co-operate peacefully. After a successful 
education, pupils are expected to have the ability to tolerate and respect or 
even empathise with others and their values. The key methods in achieving 
this goal are giving students impartial knowledge about different ways of life 
and encouraging them to discuss their differing belief systems and values. In 
Britain teachers are obligated to explicitly present and discuss controversial 
issues.  
In the same chapter, I referred to McLaughlin’s (1995, 248) normative 
position that the distinction between public and private values should be 
respected: the schools should make it clear to pupils that even though some 
culturally held values may conflict with those of the society, they are not 
necessarily wrong. This seems most difficult to accomplish in Sweden, since 
the goal of education is a citizen who has deeply internalised the society’s 
fundamental values. I have argued that this means that the distinction 
between private and public values cannot be meaningfully maintained. 
I also analysed the nature of ethical reflection and its goals. At the 
beginning of the chapter I referred to other scholars’ ideas about the 
importance of promoting autonomy. The analysis of the concrete solutions 
implemented by Britain (England), the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark 
shows that the current trend is clearly to enable pupils to be autonomous 
persons, which in moral matters means that they are given the means and are 
encouraged to independently reflect upon the validity of different moral 
positions. Whatever desires the parents may have in this respect, the interests 
of the child as a future citizen takes precedence.  
In Chapter 1, I referred to Sakaranaho (2006) and Maréchal (2003) in 
noting that particularly some Muslims experience a contradiction between the 
values and worldviews of the school and the home. I also commented, 
referring to Turner (2011), on changes taking place within Muslim 




communities, since it is not clear to all members under what norms a good 
Muslim should live in a secular society. Interestingly new sources of 
authority have emerged to challenge the traditional framework of social 
consensus within Muslim communities. With regard to these points, I asked 
what kind of strategic choices the states have made to enable the inner 
development of religious traditions toward greater appropriateness in the eyes 
of a secular society. In the light of my findings as to the means and content of 
values education, it is clear that official state actions encourage Muslim 
pupils to challenge the validity of traditional authority in deciding upon right 
and wrong or the right course of action. 
One area of interest in Chapter 5 was to investigate whether in religious 
education morality as a phenomenon is tied to religion. I found that even 
though the reflection of moral questions starts within the framework of 
religions’ ethical norms, in upper classes the questions and answers are not 
tied to religion. Rather they are treated as philosophical questions. 
As a summary about the nature of religious education, it can be argued 
that it is currently believed to have high extrinsic value, since it can 
contribute to the development of those mental abilities that pupils need as 
citizens living in a multicultural society. RE has been harnessed to work 
towards a more stable and just society.  
In Chapter 6, I explored how international actors – the Council of 
Europe and the United Nations, as well as international courts such as the 
European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee – see what kind of RE would be appropriate and legitimate. 
According to both the Council of Europe and Special Rapporteur Amor as a 
representative of the United Nations, religious education plays a very 
important role in making tolerant citizens. Amor was in favour of creating a 
uniform approach, in which all pupils take part in the same religious 
education lessons. The Council of Europe argued for ‘education about 
religion’; in other words, pupils should be given impartial information about 
the beliefs, values and practices of different religions. 
How is the legislative framework interpreted with regard to controversial 
issues and religious education? The general rule is that in any case of 
conflict, education that is in accordance with the principles of human rights 
should always supersede religious values. Children’s needs are interpreted 
through the frame of what skills and abilities they will require as future 
citizens in order to live successfully in a diverse society. Thus no child can be 
kept ignorant with regard to what is going on in society. It is emphasised that 
information should be conveyed in an impartial, neutral and objective 
manner. Quite recently, it has also been emphasised that religious issues 
should be discussed in such a way as to develop a “critical mind” in pupils 
(ECHR 2007b, par 69). This is a rather explicit response to the question 
whether or not parents’ desires to shelter their children from secular 




At the beginning of Chapter 6, I wrote that two types of complaints, 
namely inclusion and exclusion complaints, can be and have been made 
about the content of religious education. As an example of an exclusion 
complaint, I referred to Bonna Haberman’s argument according to which 
education easily comes to exclude the possibility of passing on traditional 
life-styles from one generation to the next. According to Haberman (1994, 
185), giving real opportunities for example to religious parents to initiate 
their children into a certain way of life would make pluralism meaningful. 
However, nothing suggests that the international actors referred to in this 
thesis share such an opinion. Quite the contrary: as noted above, it is the 
abilities that pupils are believed to need in the future that set the criteria for 
appropriate content for religious education. In other words, plurality requires 
that the schools equip pupils both with a certain body of knowledge and with 
the skills to co-operate with each other.10  
With regard to the views presented above, there are two approaches to 
religious education that deserve to be mentioned here. The first, known as 
‘critical religious education’, is supported by L. Philip Barnes and Andrew 
Wright. In their article ‘Romanticism, representations of religion and critical 
religious education’ (2006), the authors argue that in a situation of cultural 
plurality religious education should retain the integrity of different religions, 
while helping pupils to handle religious language and claims with 
intelligence and informed judgement. The starting points for proper religious 
education are (i) the broadest possible freedom of belief, (ii) tolerance of the 
beliefs of the others, (iii) maximising the “wise debate between adherents of 
differing beliefs systems and world views”, and (iv) cultivating “[the] pursuit 
of truth and truthful living” (Barnes & Wright 2006, 73-74). With regard to 
the last criterion, Wright (2004, 168-179) writes that in a culturally diverse 
world “religious and secular worldviews are grounded in fundamentally 
incompatible ontological foundations”; and this requires, according to 
Wright, that all pupils be enabled to achieve “appropriate levels of religious 
literacy”.11  
This kind of approach in pretty much in line with the international actors 
analysed in this thesis. It aims at cultivating both autonomy and critical 
thinking in pupils, while encouraging them to engage in mutual debate. 
Another suggestion for the organisation of religious education that is in line 
with the international perspective is called the ‘interpretative approach’. In 
                                                
10 In Chapter 6, for example, I wrote that in 1993 the Council of Europe was of the 
opinion that pupils should be given possibilities to become familiar with their own 
religion and its ethical principles, but in 1999 the importance of gaining knowledge about 
other religions was elevated as the primary target of religious instruction. The idea of 
learning about the basic principles of one’s own religion is not found in the Council’s 
documents since 1993. 
11 Wright’s argument is actually provided as a defense of religious education as 
independent subject.  




this regard, Jackson (2004b, 4) sums up his view: “the most appropriate 
pedagogical responses to plurality in the common school provide a 
framework of democratic values which respect diversity within the law and 
allow pupils to clarify and refine their own position on religion.”12 The 
interpretative approach has three key pedagogical principles. First, 
representation means that religious traditions are not represented as 
“bounded systems but in ways that recognize their diversity and the 
uniqueness of each individual who is subject to many influences (e.g. from 
membership group, wider tradition and beyond tradition)”. Second, 
interpretation means that pupils need not set aside their own presuppositions, 
“but should compare their own concepts with those of others”. Third, 
reflexivity: Pupils are encouraged to be “constructively critical” of their own 
ways of life. (Jackson & O’Grady 2007, 196.) 
One more point needs to be mentioned before discussing my findings 
concerning the ‘appropriate’ place of religion in Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. In Chapter 6, I presented the Council of 
Europe’s (2007a) negative view on teaching creationism in schools. The idea 
I raised was that in the Council’s Resolution, ‘The dangers of creationism in 
education’, certain epistemological requirements, namely that the knowledge 
taught has been produced by scientific methods, are a necessary condition for 
the maintenance of a healthy democracy. The ability of religion to provide 
appropriate knowledge is explicitly rejected in this particular matter, i.e. what 
is the origin of forms of life. A stance is also taken in favour of the view that 
schools, as public institutions, should represent solely ‘secular’ ideas in this 
matter. In Chapter 4 I argued that in Sweden as well the new legislation 
mandates that knowledge presented in any type of school should be impartial 




Summary and discussion: the ‘appropriate’ place of religion 
In Chapter 1, I wrote that the more visible presence of Islam is one reason 
why the distinction between the public and the private has been challenged in 
Europe. This is due to the fact that the culture that immigrant Muslims have 
inherited does not recognise the notion of private religion (Lehmann 2006, 
284). Furthermore, as I have shown in this work, the public-private 
distinction is challenged because it is argued that religious minorities should 
be given public support to enable them to secure their existence. I have 
mainly focused on actions by those who stand in the other camp, namely 
secular officials, and have explored ideas as to the appropriate place of 
religion in a multicultural Europe. As a general conclusion, we can say that 
                                                
12 It is worth noting that Jackson has been a member of the drafting team of the Council of 




not only is the boundary between the public and the private unstable and 
vague, but current policies also give cause to argue that in certain areas the 
distinction is impossible to maintain; the obvious outcome of defending the 
ideals of the public sphere is that secular ideals will penetrate into the private 
one, as shown in the following paragraphs. 
First, with regard to the question ‘what expectations and responsibilities 
are placed on citizens in general and religious citizens in particular’: as I have 
indicated, it is considered important for the sake of a harmonious society that 
all citizens should not only have a positive attitude towards the society’s 
(public) values but should also act according to them, even if these public 
values conflict with those possibly held privately. The need for assimilation 
and acculturation in this matter is one example of how public ideals should 
be considered valid in private as well. I have argued that the states are 
departing from the traditional separation of state and religion by attempting 
to create a ‘liberal state of mind’ in citizens. In the material referred to in 
Chapters 2 and 3, it is merely stated that citizens should accept these values, 
while Chapters 4 and 5 give examples of concrete actions taken to achieve 
this goal. 
Secondly, citizens are expected to acquire knowledge about different 
ways of life in order to better understand each other. In the case of education, 
this means that pupils are not only given information about different ways of 
life, but are also, and for the same reason, encouraged to engage in mutual 
dialogue. This too means that religious beliefs are not considered as private 
matters. 
When it comes to ways of preserving the domain of the ‘secular’ from 
the impact of that of the ‘religious’, one concrete example is the arrangement 
of education in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, based 
on the principle that pupils are expected to adopt Enlightenment-inspired 
forms of critical thinking. This also includes education in moral and religious 
matters, which have been regarded as matters of ‘conviction’. I have shown 
that pupils are encouraged to approach issues related to values and morality 
with a scientific attitude. In this process the approved-of key words are 
‘knowledge’, ‘proof’, ‘evidence’, ‘discussion’ and ‘argumentation’. In 
Chapter 6, I explored the perceptions of the international courts in this matter. 
The most striking example of how secular ideals are to be applied in 
education comes from the European Court of Human Rights. Not only should 
pupils receive neutral and objective knowledge, but they should also be 
enabled to take a critical attitude with regard to religious matters. It can thus 
be argued that the underlying assumption with regard to educational goals is 
that 
 
[h]uman rationality is universal, requiring only education for its 
development. In the virtue of their common rationality, all human 
beings have certain rights, among them the rights to choose and 




shape their individual destinies. (Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy 1999, 266; italics added.) 
 
I am not saying that the evident outcome of successful education is that 
children will apply critical thinking, for example as to the validity of the way 
of life taught to them by their parents. I am merely claiming that the 
distinction between the public and the private domain is not respected, in that 
religious ‘conviction’ is not left intact and parents do not retain the authority 
to decide upon the extent or form of their children’s education in religious 
and moral matters.  
What, then, can be said as to the question ‘to what extent is space made 
for religion in the state and its public affairs (especially in the field of 
education)’? It is obvious that religion and its effect on society are recognised 
as public matters. Religion is not privatised but is welcomed into the public 
domain. As already noted, pupils are given information about different ways 
of life and are encouraged to engage in mutual dialogue. Expressions of 
religion are also taken seriously. 
In Chapter 1, I wrote that the distinction between ‘religion’ and the 
‘secular’ can ultimately be reduced to the ways these concepts are understood 
and deployed. In Discourse on Civility and Barbarity (2007), Timothy 
Fitzgerald argues that ‘religion’ is “a modern invention” (Fitzgerald 2007c, 
6); there is no such thing as ‘religion’ as a separate entity of reality. Religion 
and politics (representing the secular) are defined in such a way that the two 
are seen as mutually exclusive domains (Fitzgerald 2007c, 173).  
In this work I have applied as a methodological tool Kim Knott’s model 
for locating religion in secular contexts. In this model, the ‘secular’ and the 
‘religious’ are treated as distinct, separate and mutually exclusive domains. 
My idea in applying the model was based on the interpretation that the public 
sphere is regarded as representing the secular, which in turn is assumed to be 
an ideologically neutral and objective space. However, it is necessary to note 
that in real life religious issues are an important part of the public sphere. As 
we have seen, religions are allowed to enter the public domain. In the view of 
the Council of Europe, for example, religions can contribute an important 
moral dimension (if it is in accordance with the principles of human rights), 
and can help in the fight against religious extremism. The fundamental point 
is that if religions accept ‘secular’ ways of acting and engaging in discussions 
over the right course of the society, their influence will be welcomed. In 
present-day Europe, within the non-negotiable framework based on liberal 
and democratic values and those of human rights, the ‘appropriate’ 
interpretation of many values is the subject of continuous debate.13 Religions 
                                                
13 An illuminating example:  in 2011 in Finland, in order to gain a parliamentary majority, 
the leading party in Parliament, the National Coalition party [Kansallinen Kokoomus], 
had to accept the demand of the Christian Democratic party [Kristillisdemokraatit] that in 




– or, more precisely, arguments involving an implicit or explicit rationale 
based on the belief that a certain religion’s ‘truth’ should be applied – are not 
automatically set aside in this project.  
It seems, then, that Europe has entered into a post-secular era: one in 
which the influence of the domain of the ‘religious’ is no longer expected to 
decline or diminish. Rather, some religions are accepted as valid partners in 
the democratic decision-making process. In this sense, in Knott’s 
methodological model the category of ‘post-secular’, which referred to 
‘spirituality’ rather than ‘religion’ or ‘religiosity’ (Knott & Franks 2007, 2), 
could have a different meaning. What is obvious, however, is that in order to 
be taken seriously as a publicly accepted stake-holder, a religion has to meet 
certain prerequisites.  
In this sense, the relevant question is not that of the appropriate place of 
religion, but that of the form or content of religion required to satisfy the 
conditions for acceptance in the public sphere. In this thesis, I have explored 
the role of values in this project. It is evident that the more ‘sacred’, non-
negotiable attributes a given religious affiliation has that conflict with liberal 
democratic values, the less it will be welcomed as part of the democratic 
decision-making process. It seems, however, that this is not the only criterion 
in considering why certain religions are taken more seriously than others. I 
have also suggested that being part of the European cultural context itself 
may confer a crucial advantage over other religions, such as Islam.  
                                                
same-sex couples similar rights with others (see e.g. Helsingin Sanomat 2011). Before the 
election, the National Coalition party held that the current law did not treat all citizens 
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